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Abstract 
The thesis addresses the evolution of EU labour governance and its relationship to the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the financial crisis. The thesis approaches EU 
labour governance as an essentially contested and structurally weak project of European 
integration. To this end, the thesis develops critical integration theory for analysing EU labour 
governance in relation to the EMU. Conceptually, the thesis stresses the role of institutional 
and global macro-structures and the importance of competing hegemonic projects in mediating 
structure and agency. Hegemonic projects allow diverse social groups and political leaders to 
develop comprehensive programmes of action that may transform existing structures of EU 
labour governance. Advancing a novel framework for studying the institutional and macro-
structural conditions for political contestation in the EU, the thesis contributes to European 
Integration studies and International Political Economy. Empirically, the thesis analyses the 
relationship between EU labour governance and European monetary integration since the 
1980s and highlights the enduring weaknesses and contradictions of the emerging project of 
EU labour governance. Over time, the thesis argues, EU labour governance has become a 
terrain of political contestation for Europe’s competing hegemonic projects, most prominently 
social democrats and neoliberals committed to European integration. Given the enduring nature 
of these contestations, and the institutional structure of the EMU, EU labour governance has 
had only a weak and emergent character. Analysing the impact of the financial crisis on EU 
labour governance, the thesis highlights the contested nature of the neoliberal hegemonic 
project since the crisis. The thesis argues that enhanced creditor power within the Eurozone 
has allowed for much more intrusive labour governance in Greece and other programme 
countries. However, the thesis also argues that the structural weaknesses of EU labour 
governance persist in the period since the crisis. 
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Introduction 
Whether and how much the European Union (EU) should get involved in the 
governance of domestic European labour markets is a hugely contested issue in European 
integration. EU labour governance is contentious because it concerns some of the most 
fundamental aspects of social and economic life: how many hours you work, how your pay is 
settled, whether you get sick pay during illness, etc. While the EU has successfully passed 
labour law to regulate working conditions and worker consultation, the EU has limited 
competence to interfere with issues of pay, benefits, and many other core elements of Europe’s 
labour markets. 
Despite the EU’s limited competences over social and labour market policy, a 
framework for EU labour governance has emerged since the 1990s. Policymakers and 
observers have justified the emergence of EU labour governance on several grounds. First, EU 
labour governance may coordinate member states’ efforts to modernise labour markets in the 
face of deindustrialisation and globalisation. Second, and relatedly, EU labour governance may 
enhance social inclusion and promote economic fairness as globalisation threatens to liberalise 
European market economies.  Third, EU labour governance may help to improve the efficiency 
of labour market institutions, like benefits, retirement schemes, and collective bargaining, 
under the conditions of fiscal discipline and price stability that guides the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU).  
In this thesis, I deploy a critical theory of European integration to analyse the evolution 
of EU labour governance since Europe’s leaders embarked on the process of creating the EMU 
in the 1980s. The main research question(s) of the thesis is:   
• How and why has EU labour governance evolved since the conception of the Euro? 
What difference did the financial crisis make? 
Given its contentious nature, the advancement of EU labour governance has faced 
significant opposition. In reaction not least to the European Commission’s plans for a common 
labour market policy and emphasis on social union, in 1988 Margaret Thatcher voiced her 
concern over EU protectionism and bureaucracy. Her government had ‘not successfully rolled 
back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with 
a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels’ (Thatcher, 1988). 
Vanguards of neoliberalism are not the only actors to express concern over the development of 
EU labour governance. In Denmark, for instance, social partners and parties across the political 
 9 
spectrum continuously oppose EU labour governance that may infringe with the ‘Danish 
Model’ of labour market flexibility, social security, and autonomous social partners. After the 
financial crisis, the EU’s enforcement of austerity and labour market deregulation in crisis 
countries has sparked concern, protests, and social unrest in the Eurozone periphery.   
Effectively, political contestation shapes the degree and content of EU labour 
governance. For most of the history of European integration, domestic actors have fought over 
the regulation and institutions of labour markets. For long, direct EU involvement in domestic 
labour governance was low. In the recent evolution of European integration, there are examples 
of much greater involvement of EU and international actors in questions of domestic labour 
market regulation: in the case of Greece, for example, policy conditionalities attached to the 
bailout programmes of 2010, 2012, and 2015 initiated radical labour market reforms. Yet, these 
were extraordinary cases of EU intervention: as a framework for European integration, the 
institutional coherence of EU labour governance is relatively weak. Addressing the weakness 
of EU labour governance in assisting European integration, the thesis looks at an aspect that 
political and academic discussions often deal with only implicitly: the relationship between EU 
labour governance and the EMU. 
This thesis analyses the EU’s governance of wages and labour markets as it has evolved 
within and in relation to the EMU over the last three decades. Despite the promise of greater 
convergence in living standards, the EU has seen a growth in economic inequality within and 
between EMU member states, which has sparked macroeconomic instability, social unrest, and 
further political contestation. The growing disparity in EMU income levels and the associated 
greater macroeconomic instability suggests that the EU should act to secure convergence and 
stabilisation. The direct way to address these problems would be by developing a framework 
for EU labour governance that supports income growth among Europe’s poorest, provides 
unemployment insurance in member states in crisis, and more. Alternatively, the EU could 
experiment with the kind of comprehensive labour market liberalization that – according to 
mainstream economic reasoning – could lead to convergence via the pressures of market 
competition. However, enduring political contestation has hitherto prevented the EU from 
developing either of these models of labour governance. This suggests a key contradiction in 
EU labour market: despite the importance of governing labour markets for the purpose of 
economic convergence and stability in the EMU, the EU cannot achieve either full 
liberalisation or supranational coordination.  
Why is European integration in the field of labour market policy so difficult? The 
argument I pursue in this thesis suggests that the EU has hitherto failed to develop a procedure 
 10 
for converging labour markets and wage levels that acquires widespread consent and is at the 
same time politically and institutionally effective. In short, EU labour governance has been 
unable to secure hegemonic support across Europe. The effects of the underdevelopment of 
EU labour governance – an uncontrollable widening of inequalities in Europe - point to a 
deeper crisis of European integration itself. The devastating financial and Eurozone crises, 
which threatened to undermine the project of European integration itself, did not resolve the 
impasse of labour governance. With growing divergence, inequality, and instability, European 
integration is producing dysfunctional labour market outcomes. Rather than acting as guarantor 
for upwards convergence and stability, the emerging structure of the EMU and labour 
governance creates a series of dynamics, which actively undermines these core objectives of 
European integration. Therefore, this thesis studies EU labour governance as a politically 
contested and institutionally weak project of European integration. Structural and agential 
factors have worked against a coherent regime of EU labour market governance emerging, 
from the 1970s onwards. Following the Eurozone crisis, labour market reforms at the domestic 
and EU-level has in fact intensified, rather than lessened, Europe’s problems of growing 
inequalities and deficient institutional frameworks. 
This thesis emphasises, above all, the contestation between opposing political forces 
that has driven EU labour governance before, during, and after the financial crisis. 
Theoretically, Antonio Gramsci’s writings on the relationship between economy, state, and 
civil society has inspired the thesis’ interrogation of hegemony in EU labour governance and 
European integration (Gramsci, 1971). The thesis also draws on the concept of hegemony as 
developed in critical political and international studies (Jessop, 1983; Joseph, 2002).  
Given the thesis’ engagement with the hegemony in European integration, the thesis 
effectively also posits the relevance of applying social theory to the study of the EU. Hence, 
the thesis posits the ontological depth of European integration in which structural forces shape 
political contestation and practical policymaking. In line with this ontological depth and the 
role of structural forces, the thesis advocates the analytical utility of competing hegemonic 
projects and analyses political contestation over EU labour governance as competition among 
hegemonic projects. The structural context of European integration gives rise to competing 
hegemonic projects, which in turn are the mediating force between strategic policymaking and 
its structural conditions (Bulmer & Joseph, 2016)). 
Deploying the concept of hegemonic projects, the thesis addresses the actors that have 
pushed EU labour governance forward since the agreement on the EMU and discusses their 
efforts to promote the governance of labour in the structural context of monetary integration 
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and economic globalization. Given the institutional structure of the EMU, Eurozone economic 
crises were certain to put extraordinary pressure on labour. Within the framework of a single 
currency, which abolishes exchange rate adjustments between member states, wages, income, 
and employment are the key tools of economic adjustment to economic crisis. As severe 
economic crises are a recurring phenomenon of our contemporary global economy, I argue that 
the EMU contains a structural anti-labour component that reveals during crisis. This thesis’ 
research question addresses the evolution of EU labour governance in light of the contested 
strategies to address the EMU’s deficient framework for labour and macroeconomic 
governance. Contested strategies include the establishment of a supranational framework for 
labour market policy and the promotion of domestic liberalization.  
The consequence of the political contestation over EU labour governance is not the 
status quo. With forceful interventions into labour markets in crisis countries, and largely 
ineffective governance of broader, European dynamics, EU labour governance deepens 
European divergence and inequalities. In order to appreciate the negative and unequal effects 
of the EU’s weak and contested framework for labour governance, this thesis moves beyond 
existing approaches to EU governance.    
Developing critical integration theory and drawing on the concept of competing 
hegemonic projects, I highlight the relations between the material basis of economic 
production, the institutional basis of European integration, and the ideational basis of 
governance. All three components are integral to EU labour governance. Critical integration 
theory focuses on the constraining roles of the EU’s institutional structure as well as that of the 
macrostructures of the global political economy. Both set of structures are deeply social, 
dependent on the social relations of production, and essentially conflict-ridden. This means 
that they arise from social conflicts, facilitate political compromises, and give rise to new forms 
of social conflict and political contestation. 
Focusing on the role of competing hegemonic projects, this thesis studies the conditions 
under which political and economic actors may facilitate the emergence of broad programmes 
of action. Hegemonic projects mediate the political/economic agency of European social 
groups, and the EU institutional and global macro-structures. Institutional and macro-structures 
shape the identities, interests, motives, and strategies of EU actors, which in turn coalesce into 
established or emergent EU programmes of action. I analyse EU labour governance as an 
emergent project of European integration driven by the contestation and compromises of social 
democratic and neoliberal (hegemonic) projects. 
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EU labour governance, therefore, rests on the active engagement of neoliberal and 
social democratic hegemonic projects. Over time, and despite its weak institutionalisation, EU 
labour governance has come to function as a strategic terrain for political contestation and 
hegemonic competition. Subject to continuous political contestation, EU labour governance 
has reproduced and, in some cases, worsened the trends in contemporary European capitalism 
towards greater inequality within countries, greater divergence in living standards and 
economic performance between countries, and greater macroeconomic instability. This way, 
the thesis highlights some of key reasons why the incomplete and crisis-prone character of 
European integration, particularly in the sphere of labour markets, is likely to continue.  
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I highlight the gaps in the existing theories 
of EU wage and labour governance, stress the need for a different approach based on critical 
integration theory (Bulmer & Joseph, 2016), and outline the methodology and the structure of 
the thesis. I first review the existing literature’s approach to EU labour governance in the 
context of the single currency. Second, I introduce the thesis argument in brief. I introduce how 
the competition between Europe’s hegemonic projects provides the framework for analysing 
the evolution of EU labour governance and argue that the EMU recurrently brings the question 
of labour and its governance to the centre of European integration. Third, I reflect on the 
methodology underpinning the research behind this thesis. Fourth, I outline the structure of the 
thesis, chapter by chapter. 
 
Justifying the thesis and its contribution 
Put succinctly, this thesis argues that competing hegemonic projects continue to contest 
the emergent project of EU labour governance, which is institutionally too weak to address the 
defects in the EMU and in contemporary European capitalism. The main contribution of this 
thesis is the deployment of critical integration theory to demonstrate the political contestation 
that shapes the evolution of EU labour governance and creates new tensions and crises at the 
heart of European integration. Advancing the notion of competing hegemonic projects in 
application to the subject of EU labour governance, this thesis contributes to studies of political 
conflicts in European integration, studies of the political and economic effects of EU 
governance, and studies of crises in the European political economy. In sum, the thesis is meant 
as a contribution to the existing literature on the interaction between European political 
economy and European integration (e.g. Ryner & Cafruny, 2017; Talani, 2016). 
The thesis highlights the fraught nature of EU labour governance as caused by the 
enduring political contestation that underpins it. Highlighting the politically contentious nature 
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of EU labour governance, and analysing its crisis-ridden, political-economic consequences as 
well, the thesis acts as a corrective to the predominantly functional and instrumental 
explanations offered in existing EU studies. The thesis’ emphasis on the structured reality of 
society, and the importance of competing hegemonic projects, is crucial in the efforts to set 
apart the thesis from the existing literature on EU labour governance. This emphasis allows the 
thesis to analyse the causes behind the evolution of EU labour governance, as it uses the 
concept of hegemonic projects to highlight the enduring nature of the political contestation that 
shapes EU labour governance. The theoretical emphasis of the thesis also allows for an analysis 
of the consequences of EU labour governance, and of the relationship between this aspect of 
European integration and the crises of Europe’s political economy. As such, the thesis should 
be of interest to readers with an interest in EU labour governance, but also to those interested 
in the dynamics of European political economy, including Europe’s crisis-ridden economy, 
divergent economic performance within the Eurozone, and widening socio-economic 
inequality within and between European countries.  
The thesis deploys critical integration theory as a novel approach to EU labour 
governance, based on Bulmer and Joseph’s (2016) advancement of the term. The thesis uses – 
in particular – the structures of European integration and Europe’s competing hegemonic 
projects to explain the evolution of EU labour governance since the conception of the Euro 
currency. In developing this emerging approach to European integration, a secondary 
contribution of the thesis is to use the case of EU labour governance to demonstrate the utility 
of critical integration theory for EU studies. 
How does the existing literature explain the evolution of EU labour governance? What 
mechanisms does the existing literature offer as explanations for the historical and recent 
development of EU labour governance? In the academic literature, there exists extensive work 
on policies that fall within EU labour governance, including the EU’s social and employment 
policy (Goetschy, 1999; Mosher & Trubek, 2003; Zeitlin, 2008). In addition, there is an 
extensive body of literature on the political economy of the Euro, especially monetary, 
financial and fiscal policy (Hall, 2012; Jones, 2013; Mabbett & Schelkle, 2007; McNamara, 
1998; Talani, 2016). This thesis builds on both bodies of literature but addresses the existing 
scarcity of critical studies of labour governance in the context of the EMU.  
There exists some work on the political economy of labour under the EMU. In 
particular, this work comes from a branch of the Comparative Capitalism literature asserting 
the existence of distinct national growth models, with distinct industrial relations, corporate 
governance structures, finance and banking sectors, and welfare states (Hancké, 2013; 
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Johnston, 2016a; Nölke, 2016). The institutional evolution emphasised here is useful but 
insufficient for this thesis, given the emphasis on political contestation. Moreover, economic 
studies have studied the role of wages within the EMU. Mainstream economics asserts that in 
a currency union without political union, labour markets bear a great burden of adjustment in 
case of serious shocks to the economy (de Grauwe, 2014; Mundell, 1961). Arguably, this was 
the reality across the Eurozone’s periphery following the financial crisis. In mainstream 
economics, the evolution of EU economic governance to include wage developments and 
labour markets is seen as something almost natural, given the market disequilibria laid bare by 
the Eurozone crisis (Belke & Gros, 2017). In this thesis, I argue that the broadening of EU 
labour governance has not responded naturally to economic demands. Instead, the development 
of EU labour governance has taken place through ruptured processes, which are fraught with 
contestation and prone to crisis. 
A notable and problematic feature of the Comparative Capitalism and the economics 
literature on labour in the EMU is the lack of theorising about European integration. When 
mainstream economists explain change in EU governance, they look for market forces, not 
social or political forces. Within the Comparative Capitalism literature, many are sceptical 
about the EMUs ability to centralise monetary policy and constrain fiscal policy among 
Europe’s diverse political economies (Johnston & Regan, 2016). From their perspective, the 
EMU is likely to experience the recurrence of political and economic crises. In this sense, the 
literature offers a minimal theory of integration, in which the centrifuging pressures of 
Europe’s political economy are greater than the integrating efforts of European politics. Actor 
preferences and institutional complementarity explains the diversity among Europe’s growth 
models, but the Comparative Capitalism literature, I contend, presents their effect on European 
integration in functional terms: as the inevitable outcome of institutional incompatibility.  
Focusing solely on the interaction between actor preferences and institutional 
complementarity, the Comparative Capitalism literature ultimately depoliticise the social and 
distributional struggles that underpin European integration and provides therefore an 
insufficient framework for analysing the evolution in EU labour governance. Critical 
integration theory, conversely, forefronts those social struggles and the resulting political and 
hegemonic contestation that shape EU labour governance (Bulmer & Joseph, 2016). 
Emphasising the role of hegemonic projects to explain the evolution of EU labour governance, 
I stress the role of policymakers and social groups involved in EU integration and governance, 
as well as their structural context. I address how strategic agency may seek to change the 
direction of European integration and EU labour governance, the political conflicts they engage 
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in, the structural conditions they inhabit, and the hegemonic projects that mediate structure and 
agency.  
I now turn to a broader range of literature on European integration, addressing the way 
they deal with the question of EU labour governance. Taking its cue from intergovernmental 
theories of integration, one model of explanation for the evolution of EU labour governance 
focuses on the preferences, power and coalitions of the most powerful member state 
governments and their engagement in the European Council, the Council, and the Eurogroup 
(Maricut & Puetter, 2018). The most powerful member states in the EU, this explanation 
claims, set the limits on European integration. Generally, European governments have exerted 
their preference for predominantly intergovernmental solutions to the crisis and have limited 
the empowerment of supranational institutions (Bickerton et al., 2015b). 
Intergovernmentalism treats the politics and institutions of European integration as 
organized by European governments. EU institutions, fundamentally, are designed the way 
governments want them, and EU political conflicts depend on the preferences of member states 
and the strategies of their governments. Intergovernmentalism, in its varying appearances, 
asserts the ability of leading European governments to set the tone, agenda, and limits for the 
evolution of European economic and monetary integration, including the policy response and 
governance reforms in the wake of the financial crisis (Puetter, 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2015). 
New Intergovernmentalism focuses on governments’ insistence that EU social, economic, and 
labour governance operates through intergovernmental, decentralised, and open-ended 
procedures (Bickerton et al., 2015a). Since the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, member state 
governments have expanded the EMU governance framework to include macroeconomic 
questions of wages and labour markets. The alliances pursued by the German government were 
particularly effective for initiating change. Overall, the ‘institutional design [of Eurozone crisis 
governance] reflected the preferences of Germany and its allies’ (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 
179).  
Intergovernmentalism would explain EU labour governance through member state 
preferences and alliances between like-minded member states. Limiting its analytical scope of 
recent events in European integration, and in line with the self-identification as a parsimonious 
theory, intergovernmentalism ‘offers no specific propositions to account for the crisis as such’ 
(Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 178). Effectively, this rules out a comprehensive analysis of the 
relationship between EU governance and the European political economy. Instead, the theory 
points to preference constellations among governments that allowed for more integration in 
areas perceived as vital to the survival of the common currency: ‘financial assistance, fiscal 
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surveillance and banking regulation’ (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 191). Conversely, as 
intergovernmentalism expects governments to conceive EU labour governance as less vital, 
more fractured integration is expected in these areas. The rational, intergovernmental approach 
of e.g. the German government would be to resist deeper integration of European wage systems 
and labour markets. Yet, recently the German government has shown considerable interest in 
pushing forward the agenda on EU labour governance. A prominent recent example of this 
interest is the Euro-Plus Pact for competitiveness proposed by German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy (Chapter 5). The challenges for 
intergovernmentalism in explaining recent evolution in EU labour governance comes, in part, 
from its assumption of a neat separation of state and civil society, whereby governments are 
able to aggregate and effectively solve contradictory preferences of potentially antagonistic 
social groups. Conversely, critical integration theory deploys the concept of hegemonic project 
to highlight the integrated nature of state and civil society actors. This provides a different 
explanation of how governments respond to the shifting preferences of domestic actors. In 
critical integration theory, intergovernmental negotiations reflect fragile outcomes of domestic 
social conflict rather than the rational and functional solution to those conflicts.  
While intergovernmental explanations acknowledge and centre on the power of 
Germany, they rarely talk explicitly about hegemony. Unlike EU studies, the concept of 
hegemony is integral to (neorealist) International Relations (IR) theory. In neorealist IR, 
hegemony refers to the imposition of the interests and preferences of a dominant power with 
the purpose of stabilizing the world or regional system (Gilpin, 1981; cf. Waltz, 1979). In EU 
studies, Thomas Pedersen (2002, p. 678) offers an explicit, ‘modified realist … theory of co-
operative hegemony’ that asserts the importance of power-sharing among the region’s most 
powerful states (Germany and France in Europe’s case). Otherwise, the hegemony of powerful 
member states in European integration is an implicit assumption in most intergovernmental 
accounts.  
In contrast to the intergovernmental focus on member states’ reluctance to concede 
power, neofunctionalism asserts the pressures on EU institutions from European integration 
and economic development. The scope and scale of the Eurozone crisis, understood as a crisis 
of unbalanced financial integration and competitiveness losses in the Eurozone periphery, must 
inevitably lead to some reform of the EMU. The major contribution of neofunctionalism to the 
study of European integration lies in the concepts of ‘spillover’, whereby a combination of 
functional pressures and transnational advocacy coalitions push forward European integration, 
sometimes seemingly at odds with the interests of some member states. A functional spill-over 
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from the ‘significant functional dissonances that arose from the incomplete EMU architecture 
created at Maastricht’ (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p. 212) has advanced EU economic 
integration after the crisis. At times, this even happened against the reluctance of member 
states. Neofunctionalism correctly identifies that supranational institutions have successfully 
bypassed member states’ reluctance to concede authority. After the crisis, the reinforced 
economic governance framework left the Commission with considerable discretionary scope 
in defining the parameters and determining which member states experienced excessive fiscal 
deficits and macroeconomic imbalances (Bauer & Becker, 2014). 
However, there are also limitations to the explanatory power of neofunctionalism. 
Given the emphasis on functional explanations, neofunctionalism often explains integration 
with integration – integration and spillover are simultaneously explanans and explanandum 
(Chapter 1). In neofunctionalism, the pressure coming from integration is what facilitates 
further integration. Unlike intergovernmental explanations, European politics is not reduced to 
isolated national preference formation and intergovernmental deliberation. Rosamond (2019, 
p. 34) argues, persuasively, that neofunctionalism is indeed able to study European integration 
as ‘expressions of broader dynamics’ in European political economy. Nonetheless, it is rare in 
neo-functional accounts to find much consideration for the impact of the global (economic) 
structures for the degree and direction of integration pursued by European actors.1 Compared 
to critical integration theory, for instance, neofunctionalism does not provide a framework for 
analysing the impact of global transformations on European integration. In this thesis, I 
construe economic globalization as a global macrostructure that has reshaped the competition 
of hegemonic projects. This way, global transformations become part of the explanations of 
the evolution of EU labour governance. 
Historically, intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism developed in the context of 
the European Economic Communities. Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, there has 
been an explosion of competing approaches to the study of the EU. In this era, perhaps the 
biggest contribution of neofunctionalism has been the inspiration it has provided for a range of 
political sociologists and empiricist studies of EU governance. These studies, constitutive of 
the ‘“governance turn” in EU studies’ (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006, p. 32), tend to rest on 
an implicit theory of pluralism, in which EU (state) institutions and interest groups engage in 
continuous bargaining over EU policy. Over a longer period of time, the literature asserts, EU 
 
1 This does not rule out the possibility that the core concepts of neofunctionalism ‘could be divorced 
from their Eurocentric grounding’ (Rosamond, 2005). 
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labour governance has developed through institutional spillover (Strøby Jensen, 2000), 
experimental governance (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008), transnational advocacy coalitions 
(Johansson, 1999; Mailand, 2010), and policy entrepreneurship (Copeland & James, 2014).   
In all of these accounts, there is little consideration of the possible structural power of 
e.g. capital (either as social relation or source of political power), and the literature runs the 
risk of neglecting both the broader EU institutional framework and global macrostructures, 
such as global financial networks. Instead, it traces empirical changes to governance practices. 
Commenting on the limitations to empiricist governance studies, Owen Parker and Robbie Pye 
argue that while a different strategic orientation of supranational institutions, like the European 
Commission, could ‘radically challenge a neoliberal reality’, long-term transformation of ‘the 
EU’s constitutional asymmetry’ depends on ‘radical re-politicisation’ of European governance 
(Parker & Pye, 2018, pp. 808, 820). This way, Parker and Pye open the analytical and political 
space for assessing change in EU governance. In this thesis, I argue that enduring hegemonic 
competition explains the piecemeal and fragile development of EU labour governance in recent 
decades.  
Moving beyond the main theories of European integration and the compatible 
empiricist studies, historical institutionalism provides a competing approach to European 
integration and EU labour governance (Bulmer, 1998, 2012). Here, focus is on the institutional 
path-dependencies that shape and condition the development of the EU labour governance 
framework and practices (de la Porte & Heins, 2015a; Scharpf, 2016). In institutionalism as 
applied to European integration and EU labour governance, attention is on the institutional 
factors that explain the preferences and decisions of member state governments, EU 
institutions, and other actors. For Fritz W. Scharpf (2016, p. 18), the disciplinarian post-crisis 
regime for macroeconomic governance cannot be explained solely as ‘a consequence of 
hardball bargaining by Germany and its Northern allies’, as suggested by more 
intergovernmental observers. What then explains the development of a regime that Scharpf 
(2016, p. 29) views as highly asymmetric and politically explosive? All EU institutions and all 
member states, also in Southern Europe, supported the policy response to the crisis, Scharpf 
(2016, p. 19) asserts, because it was ‘inevitable’ for the ‘purpose of defending the common 
currency and preventing another euro crisis’, the overriding concern of all actors. In other 
words, imposing social and economic deterioration on member states in the Eurozone periphery 
was the rational thing to do for actors committed to preserving the euro. Further, Scharpf (2016, 
p. 19) writes, once this policy response was initiated, it was difficult to change course:  
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‘… once the initial requirements of fiscal retrenchment and supply-side wage 
compression for the crisis states were in place, the subsequent euro regime was 
largely shaped by path-dependence. (…) relaxing the downward pressures on 
unit labour costs would have prevented the intended improvements of export 
competitiveness. In other words, changing the original approach would have 
counteracted the program that had just been imposed on crisis countries and, 
perhaps even more important, would have meant having to deny the economic 
assumptions and expectations on which these conditionalities had been based.’ 
Thus, Scharpf emphasizes how actor preferences and the existing institutional 
framework gave the crisis response a rational and path-dependent character. Institutionalist 
explanations may also emphasise the role of German industrial relations in shaping the 
evolution of EU labour governance (Baccaro & Benassi, 2017). Because the German model of 
corporatism and sectoral bargaining has been capable of securing wage developments 
conducive to price and macroeconomic stability, there has been little appetite to complicate 
this relatively well-functioning system by adding a layer of European-level labour governance. 
Related studies in historical institutionalism also emphasize how actors’ commitment to the 
EMU shape ‘acceptable solutions’ (Verdun, 2015, p. 231) and how institutional change often 
happened through processes of ‘institutional layering’ whereby ‘new policy [was] grafted onto 
an existing institutional framework’ (de la Porte & Heins, 2015a, pp. 13, 11). Yet, the 
institutionalist explanations are unable to account for role of global macrostructures in shaping 
the preferences and strategies of European actors. Critical integration theory has the crucial 
advantage of studying the interactive relationship between global macrostructures, European 
institutions, European leaders, and domestic social groups. It is this relationship that hegemonic 
projects mediate. 
Beyond the role of governments, supranational actors, and/or existing institutional 
structures, we may hypothesize that dominant ideas and ideologies about labour, the economy, 
and European integration, has decisively shaped the evolution of EU labour governance. This 
argument would find support in a range of constructivist and discursive studies of European 
integration (Checkel, 1999; Hay & Rosamond, 2002). In the post-crisis era of European 
economic governance, Mark Blyth and Vivien A. Schmidt, among many others, have forcefully 
argued for the necessity of interrogating the resilience and power of neoliberal discourses on 
welfare, austerity, governance, etc. (Blyth, 2015; Matthijs & Blyth, 2018; Schmidt, 2010; 
Schmidt & Thatcher, 2014). This scholarship on the role of neoliberalism may also incorporate 
studies of the specific role of ordoliberal ideas in structuring EU integration and economic and 
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labour governance (Matthijs, 2016). Yet, neo-/ordoliberalism is not the only idea informing 
EU labour governance. Rather, I argue, core concepts of EU labour governance transcend 
hegemonic projects and become new discursive terrains for political contestation. One such 
concept is the idea of the European social model(s), which has decisively informed European 
welfare and labour market politics (Jepsen & Serrano Pascual, 2005). The idea that Europe’s 
social models are capable of combining economic performance with social quality and 
inclusion acts as a positive reference point to distinguish the EU from (the neoliberal) American 
model. Original interviews for this thesis confirmed that the perceived positive duality or 
triangle between productivity and fairness (and stability) is important for EU institutions (e.g. 
Interviewee #15).  
Finally, a Marxist approach would interrogate class relations to explain the evolution 
of EU labour governance. A number of critical and Marxist theories of EU governance have 
emphasised the relational aspects of European integration and capitalist development. Here, 
EU labour governance depends on the global-economic structural constraints on European 
integration. Concretely, critical/Marxist theories highlight the important role of capitalist 
pressures in shaping European leaders’ evolving interests, identities, and ideas over European 
integration, and thereby help identify the forces driving change in EU labour governance. From 
the perspective of critical/Marxist theories, changes to EU labour governance depend not only 
on political leaders, EU institutions, and the EU legal constitution (the acquis communautaire), 
but also economic macro-structures of the global economy, such as the rise of financial markets 
over recent decades. The macro-structures of the global economy that gave rise to the financial 
crisis in the first place have also shaped the EU’s response and the reinforcement of EU 
economic governance after the crisis.  
Two of the most influential Marxist approaches in EU studies are Open Marxism and 
neo-Gramscian International Political Economy (IPE). Open Marxism has highlighted how 
class relations are inherent to the European project of managing rivalry and dependency of 
capitalist classes in different member states (Bonefeld, 2002). It follows from this logic that 
the scope and scale of EU labour governance depends on the ability and necessity of Europe’s 
capitalists to manage class relations and enable capitalist reproduction. 
Neo-Gramscian IPE is arguably the most prominent critical/Marxist approach to 
European integration. Neo-Gramscian IPE maintains the importance of class struggle, but 
introduces a radical open-endedness to European integration by highlighting the equally 
important aspects of domination and resistance (Bieler & Morton, 2003; van Apeldoorn & 
Horn, 2018). This body of literature includes the Amsterdam school of transnational historical 
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materialism (van Apeldoorn, 2002), Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton’s labour-oriented 
approach (Bieler, 2005a, 2005c; Bieler & Morton, 2001), and Alan Cafruny and Magnus 
Ryner’s positioning of European integration in the dual context of US neoliberal and German 
ordoliberal hegemony (Cafruny & Ryner, 2007; Ryner, 2015). What unites these approaches 
is the conviction that a class-relational perspective strengthens the analysis of power and 
change in European integration and EU governance. In terms of the evolution of EU social, 
economic and labour governance, there is a shared understanding of the importance of locating 
the social purpose of governance in the class interests and -compromises of capital and labour. 
According to this logic, EU labour governance has evolved in accordance to the interests of 
(the most transnational fractions of) the European capitalist class, increasingly organized at the 
transnational level, with labour struggling to assert their interest on European 
integration/governance (Holman, 2004; van Apeldoorn & Hager, 2010).  
Notwithstanding these differences, Marxist approaches see EU labour governance as 
the expression and outcome of enduring class struggle, mediated and shaped by domestic, 
regional, and global structures. The Marxist approaches do not deny the importance of 
Germany, given its importance for the integration and transnationalisation of European 
economic relations. As European economic relations have transformed, the preferences of 
German capitalists and state institutions have evolved. Thus, the German strategy for EMU has 
evolved from one seeking to make monetary and fiscal conservatism the governing principle, 
to one aiming at enforcing structural convergence among the EMU member states’ economies 
(Germann, 2018). More recently, an autonomous Marxist approach to disruptive subjectivities 
has criticized neo-Gramscian and critical IPE for overly relying on relations of domination at 
the expense of resistance (Bailey et al., 2018; Huke et al., 2015).  
Marxist accounts of capitalist development constitute an important element of the 
version of critical integration theory advanced in this thesis. One explanation for Europe’s deep 
economic crisis is the rise of global economic competition, which puts the EU’s role as an 
‘economic giant’ in world politics under pressure  (cf. Mark Eyskens, in Whitney, 1991). A 
Marxist variant of this argument focuses on the transformations of structures in contemporary 
European capitalism, in which ‘the alternation of epochs of material expansion… (and) phases 
of financial rebirth and expansion (…) constitute a full systemic cycle of accumulation’ 
(Arrighi, 1994, p. 6). The process of financial expansion has overall increased debt levels and 
heightened market volatility leading to financial instability and ultimately financial crash and 
economic recession (Keen, 1995). In other words, capitalist ‘impulsions’ towards capital 
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accumulation has caused financial expansion and the creation of cheap credit which fuelled the 
Eurozone crisis (Macartney, 2011, pp. 25–31).  
Building on institutionalist and Marxist approaches, this thesis advances a critical 
integration theory that analyses the evolution of EU labour governance as the outcome of 
hegemonic competition in EU politics. Critical integration theory focuses on the competing 
hegemonic projects forming the basis of political contestation over European integration. The 
EU’ competing hegemonic projects share the condition of operating within the EU institutional 
structure and responding to the evolving dynamics of global macro-structures.  
Focusing on hegemonic projects, critical integration theory draws extensively on neo-
Gramscian IPE, and breaks with the functional optimism of mainstream integration theories, 
the pluralism of public policy studies, and the market fetishism of mainstream economics. 
Instead, this thesis argues that social forces - with often-antagonistic material interests and 
uneven material capabilities - struggle over the development of EU labour governance. EU 
labour governance is an open-ended process, and while constrained by the EU institutional 
framework and global macro-structures, ultimately depends on the strategies of social forces, 
their ability to develop hegemonic projects at the EU level, and their dominance over or 
compromise with other projects. 
Yet, compared to neo-Gramscian IPE accounts of the post-crisis EU landscape, 
including the governance of wages and labour, this thesis seeks to give the EU institutional 
framework more consideration, and to allow more autonomy to those institutions vis-à-vis 
structures of European and global capitalism. As neo-Gramscian scholars have noted, the 
extent to which EU integration and governance serves the interests of different social groups 
depend on their ability to organise at the transnational level (Bieler, 2005b). Yet, this also 
highlights the importance of the institutional determinants of transnational organization.  
Whereas neo-Gramscian scholars tend to study the uneven relationship between capital and 
labour in European integration as reflecting neoliberal globalisation (Bieler, 2005c), this thesis 
has slightly different emphasis, and is primarily concerned with how political and economic 
actors assert their interest through the EU institutional structure in light of global 
macrostructural processes.  
 
Thesis argument in brief 
In brief, this thesis argues that despite the high structural pressure on developing a 
framework for EU labour governance that is fit to face the challenges of the EMU, Europe’s 
leaders have hitherto not been able to deliver. Instead, the evolution of EU labour governance 
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has taken place at the margins of the EMU institutional framework, unable to address the crisis 
tendencies of the EMU. EU labour governance suffers from the perseverance of diverse 
preferences of political forces and the absence of deeper political hegemony in European 
integration. Political contestation and weak institutionalisation prevent the development of 
modes of governance adequate for governing labour in the EMU.  
Therefore, I argue that the financial crisis exposed both the structural deficiency of 
Europe’s single currency and the inadequacy of EU labour governance. The Eurozone had 
experienced an acceleration of macroeconomic imbalances in the lead-up to the financial crisis, 
which signalled a widening in the competitiveness gap between member states and regions. 
The imbalances caused enormous ruptures to the European economy when global financial 
markets dried up during the crisis. Yet, at a more fundamental level, I posit, the Eurozone crisis 
was a structural crisis of European integration. Economic divergence, imbalances, and 
competitiveness gaps all reflect the inability of Europe’s leaders to deliver on the key promise 
entailed in the creation of the EMU: that monetary integration would eventually produce the 
necessary convergence in living standards to ensure stability and progress for Europe’s peoples 
across the continent. 
One of the big questions that have permeated European politics since the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty is whether Europe’s single currency can function without a central 
mechanism for economic stabilisation. Labour and labour markets, I argue, play a constitutive 
role for providing macroeconomic stabilisation within the EMU. Or rather, economic 
stabilisation in the EMU runs through labour. The EMU depends on member states accepting 
the loss of monetary policy instruments. The institutions and rules of the EMU supposes that 
fiscal discipline is sufficient to compensate for the centralisation of monetary policy. Yet, in 
the instance of crises, workers bear the main burden of adjustment by accepting lower wages 
if an EMU member state is required to restore their external position. Despite the importance 
for providing macroeconomic stabilisation, in the EMU there is a marked degree of political 
evasiveness on labour markets. 
The EMU’s deficient institutional structure, unable to address the tendencies of 
contemporary capitalism towards inequality, divergence, and instability, persists in the era 
following the financial crisis (Talani, 2016). Therefore, there remains strong structural pressure 
on reforming the EMU and its relationship to Europe’s labour markets. Competing hegemonic 
projects have advocated at least three different reform paths: first, pro-European social 
democrats have advocated for the EU to expand supranational economic governance; second, 
Eurosceptic projects have argued that the EU should place greater fiscal policy space and some 
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currency adjustment capacity back in the hands of governments; and third, the neoliberal 
project mostly insists that the EU should focus on marked-based solutions and push for 
financial integration and labour market reforms. On any of these reform paths, there are serious 
political and economic obstacles. 
First, various policymakers and institutions have promoted a path towards much more 
supranational economic, social, and labour governance. Especially for the social democratic 
actors pushing this prospect, it could take the form of a fiscal union with a much larger common 
budget, and a social union with common European unemployment benefit funding. It would 
help align labour, fiscal, and monetary policy at the EU level, and ensure that efforts to stabilise 
the EMU economy through monetary policy was coordinated with efforts to create 
convergence among EMU economies. However, neoliberal actors have ferociously resisted 
plans for supranational spending and transfer power. Located most strongly in the Eurozone 
core, these actors oppose a fiscal union for EMU members because they fear it would 
incentivise fiscal recklessness and they oppose a social union on the ground that it hinders 
Europe’s necessary modernisation.  
Second, actors more critical of the prospect of advancing European integration to solve 
the problems with the EMU advocate the enhancement of the fiscal, monetary, and currency 
policy space of EMU member states. This would align more policy competence at the national 
level. This is currently unfeasible, as it would amount to a politically unacceptable roll-back of 
monetary integration (Scharpf, 2016). Yet, in case of another deep crisis, the choice between 
fiscal union and currency decentralisation may become inevitable, and either scenario become 
much more likely. There is already diverse, if scattered political support for opening up the 
national policy space: the Party of the European Left have long advocated the abolition of 
austerity measures in the EU, while e.g. the recent Italian government of the Lega Party and 
the Five Star Movement sought to challenge the EMU’s fiscal rules. 
Third, most neoliberal actors (and some social democrats in the EZ core) seem happy 
to let the EU continue its current trajectory of pushing market-based solutions, such as wage 
bargaining decentralization and labour market liberalization - perhaps with the addition of 
some funding tied to domestic reforms. Yet, the current trajectory is far from risk-free, as 
European economic divergence remains high, growth rates are low, and political dissatisfaction 
is likely to continue.   
That any reasonably thinkable solution to the structural deficiencies of the EMU is 
highly contested is nothing new. As such, this thesis shows how dilemmas over 
centralisation/decentralisation, liberalization/re-regulation, etc., have shaped European 
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integration and EU labour governance since the conception of a monetary union in the 1980s. 
The EMU has a fragile institutional structure for dealing with the recurrent issues of wages and 
labour markets in the common currency.  
This institutional fragility comes in part from the way the political leaders set up the 
EMU in the first place. As Mody notes, European economic leaders had warned about the risk 
that structurally weaker economies would fall further back compared to advanced economies 
like Germany (Mody, 2018). An example is the German industry federation, which in 1989 
expressed fear that while wage flexibility would be the right solution to this problem, there 
would be great political demand for fiscal transfers at the EU-level (Mody, 2018, p. 70). This 
concern, firmly embedded in the Bundesbank, translated into a German insistence that a 
common European currency would not require an enlarged central EU budget, but could use 
rules on fiscal discipline as a mechanism of stabilization. 
Using fiscal discipline as a substitute for economic stabilization, the political 
compromise reached in Maastricht in 1991 neatly avoided confronting the social issues facing 
Europe, issues that greater fiscal integration could potentially address. Europe’s leaders 
initially restricted the governance of monetary union to monetary and fiscal rules. The 
institutional and rules-based framework of the EMU, centred on the Maastricht convergence 
criteria, avoided the popular qualms about unemployment and inadequate welfare states. 
Committed to the principles of sovereignty over taxation, social spending, and wages, Europe’s 
governments left open the future of Europe’s social models. The French government had 
particularly championed the idea that a common currency would provide the framework of 
stability required for social and economic prosperity. Against this perspective many observers, 
trade unions, and others expressed strong discontent against the lack of a social and political 
union to balance the EMU’s imposition of fiscal discipline on member states. 
In the decades preceding the financial crisis, actors sympathetic to more neoliberal 
visions for European integration showed little consideration for the social consequences of the 
kind of adjustments required from workers within the EMU in case of crisis. Instead, in the 
pre-crisis years, they focused on market liberalization to improve member state adjustment to 
global competition and potential economic recessions. Conversely, social democrats and other 
left-leaning actors starkly divided over whether to strengthen EU social and labour market 
policy or preserve member states’ rights to decide on key issues of domestic welfare state 
politics. Policy-makers eager for sweeping reforms in Europe’s labour markets, hoping to 
follow the Anglo-Saxon path to economic renewal, were left disappointed. So were trade 
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unions, hoping for a spillover of ‘soft’ wage and employment policy coordination into firmer 
modes of labour governance. In the pre-crisis period, at least, neither ever materialised. 
Hegemonic competition over the degree and content of EU labour governance resulted 
in a number of policy initiatives seeking to promote labour market liberalization and wage 
moderation in the 1990s. Notwithstanding this spur of initiatives, the EU’s institutional 
structure preserved the competence over wage and other labour policies at the national level, 
and kept separate EU labour governance and the EMU. The EU’s pre-crisis labour strategy - 
embodied in the 2000 Lisbon agenda - developed through a web of experimental governance 
practices without much bite. For a long time, political contestation over EU labour governance 
therefore channelled through the Lisbon Strategy and the European Employment Strategy 
(EES). These strategies conveyed a project of wage moderation and labour market 
liberalisation in the quest for competitiveness and employment. Mostly, these strategies 
gathered broad political support. Critical integration theory, as deployed in this thesis, analyses 
this political support as the result of hegemonic competition. The strategies for competitiveness 
and employment that emerged at the EU-level in the 1990s became terrains of political 
contestation as both neoliberal and social democratic forces competed to shape the evolving 
agenda on EU labour governance. 
Notwithstanding hegemonic competition over EU labour governance, European leaders 
and institutions silently agreed to treat macroeconomic imbalances with ‘benign neglect’ up 
until 2008. A nagging policy question since the launch of the EMU, EU leaders had mostly 
ignored the Eurozone’s problems with current account deficits, labour costs differentials, and 
adjustment channels (Blanchard & Giavazzi, 2002; Collignon, 2013). The consensus view 
suggested that current accounts would rebalance as soon as less developed, peripheral member 
states started to catch up with the standards of living in the Eurozone core. In the lead-up to the 
global financial crisis, the Commission outlined reform plans to address the accelerating 
Eurozone imbalances. Linking Eurozone macroeconomic imbalances to the long-standing EU 
concern for Europe’s global competitiveness, European leaders tied the new regime of 
macroeconomic governance to the governance of labour market structural reforms. Politically, 
the Commission’s proposal for an enhanced EU governance framework to deal with the 
Eurozone’s imbalances received broad support. The economic consensus on the importance of 
imbalances in causing the Eurozone crisis helped foster a political demand from across the 
political spectrum, including trade unions and business, for stronger governance on 
macroeconomic matters, with wages and labour markets at its core. 
 27 
The consensus on the importance of governing macroeconomic imbalances rested on 
the technical economic consensus on the importance of financial credit flows for the 
accumulation of debt within a currency union. It was, to a large degree, a technical consensus, 
and not a recipe for political hegemony. The emergence of macroeconomic imbalances on the 
political agenda was conducive to the major reorganisation of EU governance after the 
financial crisis, epitomised in the new Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). Yet, the 
political identification of imbalances as a cause of the crisis was an insufficient condition for a 
general, radical transformation of the institutional framework for EU labour governance. 
More broadly, the inability of the EMU to stimulate convergence and greater economic 
coordination in the pre-crisis years highlighted a deeper crisis of real political and economic 
integration. The crisis of political integration also materialised in European leaders’ difficulties 
in charting a way out of the crisis. The results were devastating. The financial crisis, prompting 
governments across Europe to bail out failing banks and induce fiscal stimulus to prevent 
complete economic meltdown, made a total of 24 member states subject to the EU’s excessive 
deficit procedure, and prompted the efforts to address the perceived problem with fiscal 
profligacy in Europe. Austerity, it seemed, was the panacea for government deficits, putting a 
range of expensive labour market institutions under pressure across Europe. In the aftermath 
of the financial crisis, we have seen the hitherto most ambitious efforts to develop a framework 
for EU labour governance, as European leaders sought to release a programme of internal 
devaluation to suppress wages in crisis countries.   
Since the crisis, the EU’s strategy for labour governance has attained some of the 
disciplinarian enforcement tools otherwise characterising EMU fiscal governance. This has 
particularly been true in the case of member states receiving financial assistance from the EU 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In Greece, as well as in Ireland and Portugal, 
governments have implemented sweeping labour market and social security reforms on the 
insistence of the EU/IMF. No contractual agreements could dictate structural labour market 
reforms and wage cuts in countries not threatened by imminent bankruptcy. Yet, in the context 
of wages, employment, and labour market regulation, the EU has pursued wide-ranging 
reforms across EMU member states. In principle, countries experiencing excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances, such as a very large current account deficit, could be required to 
correct those imbalances through structural reforms to labour and product markets, or face fines 
(European Commission, 2010h). However, the revised EMU governance framework functions 
in practice much as a continuation of the EU labour governance that preceded the crisis, albeit 
in the shadow of potential sanctions.  
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Since the reforms to the EMU economic governance framework, significant reform 
plans have stalled. Since the European Central Bank’s (ECB) declaration of intent to do 
whatever it would take to save the euro, efforts to stabilize the Eurozone economy by 
developing a Eurozone budget have met severe political contestation, while plans to provide 
stabilisation by building new financial markets have experienced considerable delay (Financial 
Times, 2019; Khan, 2019). Further, the combination of economic recession and fiscal austerity 
in the wake of the crisis meant that Eurozone member states’ current accounts rebalanced. No 
member states have received fines due to excessive imbalances. Last, the original idea in the 
Euro-Plus Pact, to establish a clearly defined procedure for concrete policy reforms such as the 
abolition of minimum wage indexation, never happened.  
 
Methods and methodology  
The research project culminating in this PhD thesis started to take shape in late 2015. 
The question that has guided the research addresses the changes to EU labour governance over 
time, and specifically addresses the possible effects of the financial crisis. This thesis strongly 
emphasises the role of theories and historical processes for the analysis of the evolution in EU 
labour governance. The discussions of the theories of European integration and governance 
heavily inform the analysis of the practice, significance, and context of EU labour governance, 
while the historical processes should make clear how changing constellations of actors, 
institutions, and economic structures develop over time to shape EU labour governance.  
Based on the contention that the EU’s governance in different policy areas should be 
studied as integral to the processes of European integration, I stress the importance of engaging 
with the main theories of European integration, thereby contributing to the development of a 
distinct ‘critical integration theory’ (Bulmer & Joseph, 2016; Pye, 2018). Studies of EU 
governance in the tradition of public policy often neglect the general questions of European 
integration in favour of empirical case or quantitative studies. This leaves aside the seemingly 
unresolvable questions of power and authority permeating theories of European integration. 
While such studies may enhance our understanding of the concrete practices of governance and 
the preferences of the individuals involved, the proliferation of public policy studies has 
marked a more general neglect of social theory in EU studies.  
In response, this research project starts from a set of ontological premises about the 
social world, based on the philosophical approach of critical realism. A key factor in critical 
realism, as interpreted by scholars such as Douglas V. Porpora, Margaret Archer, and others, 
is the ‘riddle of “structure and agency”’, which requires ontological disentanglement prior to 
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empirical research (Archer, 1998, p. 191). In this thesis, I start from Porpora’s concept of social 
structure as ‘systems of human relations among social positions’ (Porpora, 1998, p. 343; 
Chapter 1). Social positions refer to the relationships inherent in social structures, whether 
parent-child of the family, ruler-ruled of the state, employer-employee of the workplace, or 
capital-labour of capitalist production. The emphasis on social positions implies the materiality 
of these human relations. 
Critical realism and critical theory have also informed the way I have approached the 
analysis of empirical resources in the research process. My empirical analysis has developed 
through analysis of EU policy documents, using descriptive statistics, and through original 
interviews with key stakeholders in EU labour governance. In the early phases of the research 
project, I developed the research primarily through engaging with existing theories and 
empirical studies of European integration, wage and labour governance, and the Eurozone 
crisis. Based on the theoretical engagement with the existing literature, I began the empirical 
research by analysing EU policy documents.  
In particular, I have focused on European Commission white papers and important 
reports (e.g. European Commission, 1993, 2008a), Commission and Council proposals and 
decisions, and ECB reports and notes (e.g. European Central Bank, 2010). In addition to this 
set of key reports, proposals, and decisions, I have analysed public speeches by e.g. former 
Commissioners, position papers by social partners, etc. The purpose of the extensive 
engagement with the selected reports and other publications was to gain insight into the 
technical as well as political thinking - particularly in EU institutions, but also in political 
parties, among social partners etc. The analysis of EU institutional publications has focused on 
the rhetorical and strategic considerations that underpin the development of EU institutions’ 
and institutional actors’ political proposals. A key challenge in analysing EU institutional and 
EU leaders’ documents has been the identification of hegemony and hegemonic projects. For 
this purpose, I have analysed how the documents address key issues of EU labour governance, 
such as employment, competitiveness, and the relationship to the EMU. I have then discussed 
the documents’ approach to these key issues in light of the ideological differences and evolution 
of key EU leaders and political parties.  
To substantiate the content analysis of these documents, I compiled relevant descriptive 
statistics based mostly on the European Commission’s AMECO database, and where 
necessary, ECB, Eurostat, IMF, and OECD databases. Descriptive statistics have helped 
contextualising the rhetoric and the strategic considerations of EU institutions and European 
leaders. In particular, the statistics on the development in labour costs, wage shares, etc., 
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allowed me to compare and discuss the EU’s focus on e.g. competitiveness in light of the 
available statistical indicators.  
 In the next phase of the research project, I arranged for a set of interviews with policy 
stakeholders in Brussels in autumn 2017. The purpose of what turned out to be the first of two 
rounds of interviews was particularly to target the contesting political and economic forces 
shaping the EU’s governance of wages and labour markets since the financial crisis. In total, I 
conducted 20 in-depth interviews during 2017-18. The interviews were all semi-structured, and 
I had distributed the research brief and interview questions in advance. I developed the prepared 
interview questions over time in response to the advancement of my research and experiences 
in conducted interviews. This allowed for interviews that generally addressed the specific 
knowledge of the interviewees, but it also complicated any comparative analysis of the 
interviews. 
When I started the first round of interviews, my document analysis had suggested that 
social democratic and neoliberal forces were most prominent in contesting EU labour 
governance and that the involvement of social partners was a key source of legitimacy for EU 
institutions as well as European leaders. Therefore, I focused on interviewing officials/advisers 
in the EU’s social partners as well as MEPs and advisers in the European People’s Party (EPP) 
and the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group in the European Parliament. To contextualise 
the interviews with representatives from these key organisations, I also interviewed an adviser 
at the Greens/European Free Alliance group, and an official at a Brussels-based NGO. In the 
first round of interviews, I also interviewed three European Commission officials in winter 
2018. Based on an initial analysis of these interviews, I decided to return to Brussels for a 
second round of interviews in autumn 2018, this time focusing solely on European Commission 
officials. Given the focus on EU labour governance, and specifically its relation to the EMU, I 
conducted interviews with six officials in the Directorate-General for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL) and two officials in the Directorate-General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN).  
 
Thesis chapter outline 
Chapter 1 develops a critical integration theory suitable for this thesis. Based on Bulmer 
and Joseph’s (2016) coining of the term, the chapter engages the main theories of European 
integration as well as major contributions in IPE. The main takeaway point is that it is worth 
developing theories of European integration, also for critical observers of the EU. While not a 
theory of European integration per se, critical IPE helps situate European integration in the 
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context of global economic structures, and via neo-Gramscian scholarship, provides the 
important concept of hegemonic projects. Invoking European institutional structures, global 
economic structures, and hegemonic projects, the chapter argues that political contestation, 
rather than e.g. German dominance or neoliberal hegemony, has shaped European integration.  
 Chapter 2 turns to the apparent imbalance that exists between the supply and demand 
of EU labour governance in the context of Europe’s single currency. The chapter argues that 
mainstream economic assessments of the Eurozone’s deficiencies are right to argue that the 
EMU lacks political-economic adjustment mechanisms. However, arguing that pre-crisis 
government was too narrowly oriented on fiscal policy and too laxly enforced, mainstream 
economics neglects Europe’s underlying economic instability. Conversely, mainstream public 
policy studies ignore the structural forces that shape EU labour governance. Drawing on critical 
integration theory, I argue that the key problem has been the inability to create political 
hegemony in EU labour governance. The chapter then turns to four heterodox, institutional, 
and critical approaches to analyse political contestations over labour governance. 
Chapter 3 analyses European leaders’ preparations of Europe’s monetary union and 
addresses the role – if any - that questions of labour and wages played in this process. In the 
chapter, I argue that even though questions of distribution motivated Europe leaders to pursue 
monetary integration, avoiding questions of labour and wages was a precondition for agreeing 
on EMU. The European Commission successfully pushed the economic argument for EMU: 
reaping the full benefits of the single European market required a monetary union with a single 
currency. This helped shore up consent for EMU among most major political parties in Europe. 
Yet, there was a persistent popular dissatisfaction with the constraints of the EMU rules and 
Europe’s associated socio-economic woes. In response to popular scepticism of European 
monetary integration, European leaders did not pursue the development of an integrated 
framework to align monetary integration with popular demands for job creation and wage 
growth. Instead, an incoming wave of social democratic leaders started to build a framework 
for governing European labour by use of performance management techniques like 
benchmarking and other ‘new modes of governance’.   
Chapter 4 analyses the first decade after the introduction of the Euro, which ended in 
the deep economic recession that followed the global financial crisis. While the EU had agreed 
on the Lisbon Strategy for growth, competitiveness, and social cohesion, EU labour governance 
was unable to address the negative and unintended processes of economic divergence within 
the EMU. Domestic strategies of wage moderation had caused a gradual redistribution from 
labour to capital since the mid-1980s, which continued into the EMU’s first decade. As the EU 
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was unable to address the adverse effects of this redistribution, macroeconomic imbalances 
accelerated in the lead-up to the crisis. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, EU leaders 
sought to shore up the governance of the Eurozone and labour by building a new framework 
for addressing macroeconomic imbalances. 
Chapter 5 analyses how the EU has governed labour in the post-crisis era and discusses 
what post-crisis labour governance reveals about the status of hegemonic competition in the 
EU. In the chapter, I argue that post-crisis labour governance reflects an unstable political 
compromise in the absence of deeper political hegemony. I advance this argument by analysing 
institutional reform to the EU governance framework, and EU labour governance in France, 
Italy, and Greece. In terms of political-economic implications, I suggest that while labour 
market liberalization in Greece has come at severe social and economic costs, the Eurozone as 
a whole is unlikely to experience extensive labour market liberalization because of EU labour 
governance. Far-reaching institutional reforms at the supranational level are equally unlikely. 
Instead, the EU continues with a fragile consensus of combining structural reform and 
investment, which leaves the Eurozone crisis-prone in case of future economic turmoil.  
In the conclusion, I summarise the key findings and the contribution of the thesis. Here, 
I focus on how the thesis has answered the research questions, how it has advanced our 
understanding of the EU and EU labour governance, and what the current state of EU labour 
governance tells us about the prospects of European integration and the EMU. 
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1. EU Labour Governance and Critical Integration 
Theory 
This thesis analyses causes and processes of EU labour governance as they relate to 
the unfinished project of European monetary integration (Introduction). EU labour 
governance and monetary integration are arguably both instances of incomplete European 
integration. Labour governance is incomplete as competence over core issues such as wages 
remains with member states, and monetary integration is incomplete as the EMU has been 
unable to stabilise the European economy and bring structural convergence among its member 
states. In this chapter, I engage with the main theories of European integration, and argue that 
the concept of competing hegemonic projects provides a novel and useful explanation for 
European conflict and cooperation. 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to show why the study of EU labour governance warrants 
a broader (theoretical) discussion on European integration. Economic and political crises have 
reshaped EU politics over the last decade. The EU’s multiple crises challenge existing theories 
and highlight the importance of theoretically informed analysis. The financial and Eurozone 
crises, which for about five years threatened the existence of Europe’s monetary union, still 
leave deep scars in European politics, and vast disagreement persists on fundamental questions 
of European economic integration. Beyond economics, Hungary and Poland’s democratic 
trajectories contrast with the ‘old’ EU’s purported liberal values. The 2015 crisis over refugee 
and migration governance questioned whether member states were willing to find solutions 
based on universal values of human rights and solidarity, as stated in the Treaty on European 
Union (European Union, 2012). The question of Brexit has ignited renewed scholarly interest 
in questions of disintegration and differentiation (Bickerton, 2019; Rosamond, 2019). 
With the EU in a prolonged state of crisis, EU scholars should arguably revisit debates 
on the theoretical underpinnings of the study of European integration. Recently, two major 
journals have issued special issues on theories of European integration in crisis and ‘dissident 
voices’ in European integration theory (Ioannou et al., 2015; Manners & Whitman, 2016). The 
purpose of this chapter is to discuss existing European integration theories to address the 
structural conditions and the strategic agency that shape policy processes and power relations 
in European integration. This chapter thereby enables this thesis’ analysis of concrete 
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developments in EU labour governance and their relationship to general processes of European 
integration.  
In this chapter, I argue that institutional and global macrostructures set the conditions 
for political contestation and hegemonic competition, which shapes the evolution of EU labour 
governance. The institutional structure of European integration is characterised by multi-level 
governance, in which the nation-state continues to have great importance, but this EU polity 
also needs contextualisation in terms of global macrostructures. The macrostructures of global 
capitalism condition labour, capital, and governments, as global trade and productions patterns 
challenge Eurozone labour relations in ways that European actors only have partial influence 
over. This construal of multi-level governance lays ground for a critical alternative to the 
mainstream theories of integration. 
This chapter engages with a range of theories of European integration from an overall 
perspective of critical theory. Critical theory takes its point of departure in the critique of 
traditional or rational theories by pointing out the historical specificity and social relevance 
underpinning all theory. No theory stands outside social processes of domination and 
emancipation (Horkheimer, 1937). In European studies, an early example of socially embedded 
theory is that of neo-functionalism, which emerged in conjunction with ‘the strategies of the 
founding architects of the [European Communities]’ and thus served to ‘theorize the strategies 
of the founding elites of post-war European unity’ (Rosamond, 2000, pp. 50–51).  
The starting point of critical theory allows for analysing global macrostructures and 
their interaction with EU institutions. The literature inspired by Italian philosopher Antonio 
Gramsci on the role of transnational social forces in the integration of European capitalisms is 
a natural starting point for dealing with the constraints of global economic structures on EU 
policymaking. Mainstream integration theories are on the other hand ill equipped to theorise 
dynamics of global capitalism and their effects on European politics and economics. 
Constructivism and institutionalism, two other influential streams in the EU literature, have 
advanced our understanding of the role of ideas, ideology, and institutions, in European 
integration. However, as social theories, these two approaches are unable to uncover deeper 
social structures and their importance in European integration. Critical theories of European 
integration, and particularly critical IPE, have further exposed the idealised and teleological 
assumptions shared by mainstream theories of European integration (Ryner & Cafruny, 2017). 
In the chapter, I argue how a critical integration theory building on the Gramscian 
concept of hegemony can bring the analysis of global and institutional structures to the 
forefront of the study of European integration. Importantly, I follow Simon Bulmer and 
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Jonathan Joseph’s argument that European integration is not hegemonic in any deep sense, but 
rests on a number of competing hegemonic projects (Bulmer & Joseph, 2016).  
Following many of Gramsci’s key notions, contemporary critical IPE has interrogated 
the relationship between European integration and the global economy. The emphasis on global 
dynamics gives this body of literature significant explanatory power over mainstream 
integration theory. However, analytically prioritising changing relations of social forces in 
global capitalism to explain European integration, critical IPE has at times struggled with 
adequately theorising the institutional characteristics of the EU. Critical IPE is, in other words, 
generally less attentive to the multilevel governance dynamics that give rise to the particular 
forms of policymaking and governance in the EU. EU labour governance, and its relation to 
European monetary integration, does not respond functionally or instrumentally to the 
pressures of global capitalism. Instead, the institutional dynamics of European integration and 
governance are path-dependent and subject to fierce political contestation from domestic 
actors.  
Critical integration theory and the concept of competing hegemonic projects, I argue, 
better captures the institutional dynamics of European integration and governance. Major 
political projects do not usually develop at the level of EU institutions but are more likely to 
be aggregated projects developed first at the national level. At the European level, given the 
diversity of member-states’ domestic social, economic and political traditions, there is a bigger 
chance of greater heterogeneity in the ideas, norms, and customs guiding political proposals. 
While the European level may be institutionally rich in terms of political bureaucracy, most 
socio-economic groups, such as trade unions, have not been Europeanised, and crucial political 
decisions - such as the conditions under which workers and employers agree wages - remain 
primarily the responsibility of member states.  
In light of mainstream theories of integration and critical IPE’s inadequate analysis of 
EU institutional structures, this chapter aims at theorising the structures of European 
integration to contextualise EU decision-making in light of global structural change, without 
losing sight of the unique character of European integration. A theoretically informed analysis 
of the structures of European economic integration is thus both necessary and useful for 
delineating an empirical analysis of the policymakers, decisions, and mechanisms that have 
guided the evolution of EU labour governance in recent decades. The analysis of the structural 
context for policy-making concerns both political and economic dimensions to labour market 
governance. This thesis argues that EU economic, wage, and labour governance are at times 
strongly politicised, while at other times confined to technocratic procedures and governance. 
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This can be contrasted with e.g. Magnus Ryner and Alan Cafruny’s (2017) critical IPE 
approach to the EU, which emphasises the ‘essential functions that capitalist governance must 
serve and the depoliticised forms that it must take’ (2017, p. 31).  
The chapter proceeds in the following way. First, I introduce the importance of political 
contestation and hegemonic competition, which takes place within the macro-structures of the 
global economy and the EU institutional structure of multilevel governance. Second, I review 
the main, contemporary theories of European integration, liberal intergovernmentalism and 
neofunctionalism. What the two lack, I argue, is a conception of what gives integration projects 
a social basis and how European integration is embedded in social structures more broadly. By 
subduing the question of what constitutes the wider social structures in which integration 
unfolds, the mainstream theories fail to contextualise integration in terms of the 
macrostructures that change global conditions of e.g. labour markets. Third, I engage with 
constructivist, institutionalist, and critical IPE, and discuss how these approaches assess the 
institutional and macrostructures of European integration. Fourth, this chapter outlines a 
critical integration theory focusing on competing hegemonic projects. The chapter ends with a 
conclusion. 
 
1.2. Critical integration theory, crisis, and hegemony 
The financial and Eurozone crises have revealed and reshaped power relations inside 
the EU. For instance, the uneven relationship between creditors and debtors was painfully 
manifest in the prolonged saga of the Greek debt crisis. The crises have also reshaped electoral 
politics. In the wake of the crisis, new left- and right-wing parties prospered at the expense of 
traditionally dominant social democratic, Christian-democratic, and conservative parties. 
Right-wing populists are reshaping electoral politics in several member states, including Italy 
and France. Broad dissatisfaction with actually existing European integration now seems a 
permanent condition rather than a temporary feature of European electoral politics – which in 
the most extreme cases add up to support for unilateral exits like Brexit.  
This suggests that political contestation, politicisation, and dissensus are all integral to 
European integration (Börzel & Risse, 2018; Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Huke et al., 2015). At 
the domestic level, European crises are likely to be met with fierce political contestation 
(Schimmelfennig, 2018). EU-level policy-making is no longer a primarily technical policy 
exercise, but is characterised by power battles and contentious politics (Schmidt, 2019). With 
contestation at the forefront of politics across the multiple levels of the EU polity, I argue, the 
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strategic action of political projects with competing visions for European integration are central 
to the evolution of EU governance.  
In addition to heightened political contestation and competition, the crises have also led 
to the prevalence of the view that Europe’s economy is so structurally diverse that it is 
threatening the functioning of the EU. That this view is widely shared is shown by a report 
from 2015 by the Presidents of the five EU institutions (the European Commission, the 
European Council, the European Parliament, the Eurogroup of Eurozone finance ministers, and 
the ECB). In the so-called Five Presidents’ Report, the presidents outlined the view that: 
‘Today’s divergence creates fragility for the whole Union’ (Juncker, 2015, p. 4). In line with 
the view that economic divergence between the Eurozone member states is destabilising the 
EU, the five presidents propose a reinforced process ‘to achieve similarly resilient economic 
structures throughout the euro area’ (Juncker, 2015, p. 7). In other words, the presidents 
deemed a fundamental reform of Eurozone economies necessary for a stable EU. Thus, the 
political action required for the economic stabilisation of the EU requires structural 
transformations to the existing EU polity. 
Critical integration theory, deploying the concept of competing hegemonic projects, 
addresses the interplay between structures and agency in European integration. Structures 
include EU institutional structures and global macro-structures. Agency includes political, 
economic, and legal actors. Critical integration theory situates the competing hegemonic 
projects in the multilevel governance structure of the EU and addresses European integration 
as a multilevel and conflict-ridden phenomenon. Analytically, the theory prioritises the 
domestic and supranational level, but other levels include cities, metropolitan regions, etc.   
The concept of competing hegemonic projects focuses on contestation and the 
hegemonic character of political projects (Bulmer & Joseph, 2016). It is clearly something 
different to say that European integration depends on competing visions, for instance, than to 
say it depends on competing hegemonic projects (cf. Risse, 2004). That there exist competing 
visions for European integration tells us little about the ability of actors to transform existing 
structures of European integration. A central claim in critical integration theory, hegemony can 
mediate structure and agency, and therefore allows for collective agency with the possibility 
of transforming structural conditions. Through social practices, agents unconsciously 
reproduce, consciously transform, or consciously resist transformation of existing structures. 
In this process, ‘hegemony becomes a mediating factor between the reproduction of social 
structures and conscious efforts to transform or prevent the transformation of these structures’ 
(Joseph, 2008, p. 120). 
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There are, in other words, several elements to the concepts of hegemony and competing 
hegemonic projects: contestation, social structures, ideas and ideologies, etc. One of the 
trickiest concepts in social science is that of social structures. In critical realism, the 
reproduction and occasional transformation of the structures of European integration is 
fundamental to understand conflict, cooperation, integration, and crisis, in the EU. The 
importance of identifying structures stems from the meta-theoretical proposition that reality 
exceeds, predates, and does not necessarily correspond to events, people’s experiences, and 
their ideas. The structured reality of the world does not depend on people believing in the 
existence of these structures, nor does it depend on the ability to identify the structures through 
empirical research.  
This approach differs from positivism, and most mainstream integration theory, which 
contain an apparent, but ambiguous, anti-realism, and see politics and the social world as ‘an 
elaborate conception constructed and reconstructed’ through ‘our selection and organisation of 
materials’ over time (Waltz, 1979, p. 5; cited in Patomäki & Wight, 2000, p. 217). 
Ontologically, positivist European political science draws a sharp distinction between the 
reality of the physical world and politics: the materiality of the physical world is given, while 
politics depends on the way we as humans and citizens organize materials. For positivists, 
social reality is therefore nothing more than constructed conceptions that we construct by 
reorganizing existing materials.  
My insistence on the importance of structures comes from the deliberate choice to 
situate my research along the lines of critical realism (Archer, 2009; Sayer, 1992). Put simply, 
critical realism addresses the underlying structures, powers, and tendencies that provide ‘the 
conditions of possibility for actual events,’ ideas, and discourses (Patomäki & Wight, 2000, p. 
223), but structures and events do not necessarily correspond. The causal powers of underlying 
structures exist independently of whether they manifest through empirical events. If the causal 
powers of one set of structures are counted, and in effect cancelled, by other structures or 
tendencies, the former set of structures are still real. Social structures are distinct from agency 
in that they have their own properties, powers, and liabilities. In particular, social structures 
are responsible for enabling and constraining the ability of agents to promote conscious actions, 
and to reproduce and occasionally transform their context and structural conditions.  
What do I mean by structures? Using Douglas V. Porpora’s typology, a critical realist 
concept places social structures in a dialectical relationship to agency ‘that leads from structure 
to interests to motives to action and finally back to structures’ (Porpora, 1998, p.344). For 
Porpora, the nature of structures differs significantly depending on the basic ontological and 
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epistemological assumptions underpinning any given research (Porpora, 1998). The positivist-
individualist account of social structures (‘patterns of aggregate behaviour that are stable over 
time’, Porpora, 1998, p. 340) differs from that of linguistic-structurationism (‘intersubjective 
rules, norms, ideology’, p. 346), which again differs from the critical-realist concept of 
structures (‘systems of human relations among social positions’, p. 343). Drawing on the latter 
concept, I treat structures as material and objective, which are not reducible to patterns of 
individual behaviour or intersubjective rules.  
 
Figure 1.1. Dialectical path of structure-agency 
 
Figure of critical integration theory’s structure-agency path based on Porpora (1998). 
 
The critical realist position also differs to the epistemology and ontology of 
constructivism. Borrowing Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight’s (2000, pp. 217–219) term, 
constructivist epistemology can be characterised as anthropocentrism + scepticism: reality is 
constituted by human discourses, while observers should be very cautious in providing general 
propositions about that world. In other words: the social world is constructed by intersubjective 
beliefs and reconstructed through processes of shared meaning-making, but since we are not 
individually in control of these processes, we should question established patterns of research 
methods and claims to causality. However, constructivism is used for empirical studies, and 
research agendas are delineated and outlined to make intersubjective ideas and discourses the 
objects of inquiry. Hence, social constructions become the reality to be studied, and the 
ontological questions as to what that reality looks like re-enter the centre of discussion. Given 
that all research traditions develop a concept of reality, Patomäki and Wight state that ‘(t)he 
question is not of whether to be a realist, but of what kind of realist to be’ (2000, p. 223). 
However, positivism and constructivism’s concepts of reality are arguably ontological 
relativist or anti-realist: as researchers, we can only count on the entities we observe 
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scientifically (the empiricist metaphysics of positivism) or on intersubjective ideas and 
discourses (constructivism) (Patomäki & Wight, 2000; Rivas, 2010). 
 
1.2.1. Institutions, macro-structures, and European integration 
In critical realism, social structures, such as political and economic institutions, possess 
certain powers, capacities, and liabilities. They shape individuals’ interests, motives, and 
actions, even if individuals may choose to act against their structured interests (Porpora, 1998). 
In line with critical integration theory, in this thesis I operate primarily with two types of 
structures in European integration: the EU institutional structure, which has legal, economic, 
and political dimensions, and global macrostructures, such as the structure of global capitalism 
and the structure of global geopolitics.  
First, the EU institutional structure has great importance for delineating the legal 
competences of various actors at different levels. In addition, the EU institutional structure 
shapes the wider power relations and various forms of domination, compromise and conflict. 
In the field of labour markets, the EU shares competence with member states on issues of social 
and employment policy, and national actors are (in theory) free to reform member states’ wage 
institutions (European Union, 2008, TFEU, Article 153). The Maastricht Treaty did not include 
convergence criteria for Eurozone wages or labour costs. Member state governments, on the 
other hand, rarely have authority over wage formations similar to the authority they have over 
e.g. public finances. For these reasons, EU institutions must engage with member states and 
social partners to reform wage setting and labour market institutions. When crises expose the 
structural deficiency of existing governance frameworks, more rapid change may follow. For 
instance, the financial and Eurozone crises arguably exposed the inability of the EMU to bring 
convergence and stability to the European economy. During the financial crisis, the European 
Commission and ECB voiced their concern for the divergence in member states’ 
competitiveness and wage levels in the lead-up to the crisis. According to the EU institutions, 
the divergence was unsustainable and a significant factor behind the Eurozone crisis (European 
Commission, 2010a; Trichet, 2011).  
The institutional identification of the problem with labour cost divergence was 
conducive for the far-reaching reorganisation of EU economic governance after the crisis 
(Chapter 4). The EU’s new economic governance (NEG) framework provided the Council with 
the authority to make recommendations for member states’ macroeconomic adjustment legally 
binding (Chapter 5). If threatening the macroeconomic stability of the Eurozone, the EU would 
now be able to sanction member states for failing to restrain wages. Outside the ordinary reform 
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of EU economic governance, the Eurozone crisis has caused new modes of domination: for 
countries in need of bailout packages, like Greece, the establishment of a Troika have enabled 
Eurozone creditor countries to cooperate with EU institutions in directly reshaping labour 
market policies in indebted member states. 
While the ability of EU institutions to interfere in labour markets is hindered by the EU 
institutional structure, the demand for action has increased as the acceleration of 
financialisation and globalization has concurred with a persistent divergence in industrial 
relations, wage regimes, and labour market institutions in the Eurozone. Because of European 
financial and monetary integration, as well as the rise of finance capitalism globally, inter-euro 
capital and financial transactions have increased significantly over the last couple of decades. 
This leads us to the role of global macrostructures in shaping European integration (Bulmer & 
Joseph, 2016). These structures include the power-relations enacted through the globalisation 
of production networks and finance (Held et al., 1999). Global macrostructures also encompass 
the internal competitive structure of capitalism, which operates ‘as an overarching constraint, 
relayed to individual capitals by competition, which coerces them to operate in a structurally 
similar fashion’ (van der Pijl, 2012, p. xiv). In other words, the competitive pressures of the 
capitalist system reproduce the system of human relations we know as class relations.  
Global macrostructures shape European integration by making different accumulation 
strategies or growth models more or less attractive for capital, labour, and state actors in 
different member states (Jessop, 1983; Nölke, 2016). The rise of global finance, and the 
financial deregulation that accommodates it, has vastly accelerated the stocks of public and 
private debt across the Eurozone, both in core states, such as the Netherlands, and across the 
periphery of Ireland, Greece, and Portugal. The productivity crisis in many parts of southern 
Europe combined with the availability of cheap credit in the Eurozone fuelled sector booms 
and debt-led growth patterns across the Eurozone periphery (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 2015). This 
has contributed not only to the Eurozone’s exposure to financial turmoil, but also to divergent 
inflation rates and wage developments in core and peripheral member states. In return for 
Europe’s dependency on cheap credit, the structural power of finance has only ascended in 
recent decades. In Europe and globally, the likelihood of sovereign defaults have rapidly 
diminished in recent decades (Roos, 2019), and in the EU, over the ECB and the European 
Commission’s policy priorities; (Braun, 2018; Braun et al., 2018). 
EU institutional and global macrostructures may interact to shape the policy-field 
available for EU political leaders at a given time. In the following three paragraphs, I illustrate 
the relationship between macro-structures and institutional structures with the example of the 
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Greek bailout in 2010. This bailout effectively suspended the Maastricht Treaty’s rule that the 
EU could not bail out member state governments experiencing financial distress. European 
leaders had introduced the “no bailout clause” in the hope that it would discipline both creditors 
and (government) borrowers. The rule implies that governments unable to repay their debt will 
eventually default on their private creditors. In theory, private creditors are therefore less 
willing to lend governments money and will only do so for a higher price. Private creditors’ 
reluctance to lend would in turn discipline member states’ ability and willingness to borrow. 
European leaders were not fully convinced of financial markets disciplining capacities (Mody, 
2018). Therefore, they installed the rule on excessive deficits that limited permissible 
government budget deficits to 3% of GDP.  
Notwithstanding EU leaders’ lack of faith in market discipline, the no bailout clause 
reminded governments that sovereign bankruptcy remained a possibility. However, as Jerome 
Roos (2019) documents, in recent decades, national governments have very rarely defaulted 
on their debt obligations. The structural power of global financial markets did not so much rest 
in their ability to limit government debt to levels sustainable even in the face of major financial 
distress. Instead, ‘in a context of growing credit dependence’, global finance has ‘the capacity 
to withhold the short-term credit lines on which all economic actors in the borrowing countries’ 
depend, which makes government defaulting politically extremely difficult (Roos, 2019, p. 12). 
The disciplining power of finance lies not so much in the ability to constrain government 
borrowing as in the inability of governments to default on their debt. 
As it turned out in the event of the global financial crisis, the EU no bailout clause and 
the excessive deficit rule was insufficient in safeguarding member states against financial 
distress. The rules were arguably unhelpful as far as the excessive deficit rule restricts 
macroeconomic policymaking and the no bailout rule heightened financial market panic at the 
height of the European sovereign debt crisis. These EMU-imposed limits on macroeconomic 
coordination as well as the intensity of financial turmoil only strengthened the severity of the 
Eurozone crisis, and thus increased the indebted member states’ dependence on the eventual 
EU bailout programmes. These bailouts, of course, came with detailed and painful adjustment 
policy programmes that radically changed social security systems, wage levels, and labour 
markets in the affected countries. The institutional structure of the EU, and the structural 
position of finance and credit in global capitalism, interacted to shape the available strategies 
for the policymakers determining the course of the Eurozone crisis.   
Beyond the example of the Greek bailout, critical integration theory can help addressing 
the structures that constrain and enable the agency of domestic state actors and EU institutional 
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actors. Seeking to assess the relative power of strategic policymaking in relation to institutional 
and macrostructures, I argue for the crucial importance of hegemonic projects. Hegemonic 
projects are the means by which diverse groups of political and economic actors develop 
programmes of action that transcend the basic interests of any given group. Hegemonic projects 
are vital for the reproduction and occasional transformation of social structures. Because the 
durability of institutions and macro-structures depends on social legitimacy as well as a more 
material basis, structural reproduction depends on the active involvement of a broad range of 
actors (e.g. not just financial fraction of the capitalist class). Structural transformation also rests 
on active agency, but any given group of actors cannot be expected to transform, for instance, 
the conditions underpinning the ascendency of finance in modern capitalism (Vogl, 2017). As 
critical integration theory posits the processes of structural reproduction and transformation as 
endogenous to European integration, hegemonic projects are vital to the analysis. As we shall 
see, mainstream integration theories cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the conditions for 
the reproduction and transformation of structures.   
  
1.3. Mainstream integration theory: liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism 
The EU is characterised by recurrent crises, and in the last decade more so than ever 
(Börzel & Risse, 2018). The recurrent crises may result in further integration, stagnation, 
differentiation, or disintegration (Fabbrini & Schmidt, 2019; Jones, 2018). Crucially, the 
Eurozone crisis reminded us that EU crises might in fact accelerate integration (Jones et al., 
2016). Increasingly, therefore, theories of European integration must confront how European 
integration develops in and through crisis. The relationship between crisis and integration is a 
puzzle of European integration. At the most general level, theories of regional integration 
divide in three. First, rational explanations focus on the choices and dilemmas of rational 
actors. Second, ideational explanations forefront the role of norms, ideas, ideology etc. Third, 
materialist explanations emphasise the conditions for capitalist reproduction. Institutional, 
multi-level governance, and other approaches can be based on either or a combination of these 
three general theories.  
Rational theories of European integration tend to approach the puzzle of European 
integration through the processes of either intergovernmental bargaining or supranational 
institutionalisation. Intergovernmentalism, at least in its liberal variant (Moravcsik, 1993), and 
neofunctionalism are ‘united by a common focus on the functional, efficiency-based rationale 
for regional integration, economic preferences, and bargaining between interest groups’ 
(Schimmelfennig, 2014, pp. 321–322). As rational theories of regional integration, they are 
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sceptical about theorising the social and economic purpose of integration. With theories 
focusing on the formal transfer of sovereignty in European integration, mainstream integration 
theories tend to neglect the political economic context for integration (van Apeldoorn, 2002).  
Their commitment to a scientific paradigm of hypothesis testing and falsification a 
priori repudiates the necessity of considering the nature of social structures, and by extension 
hegemony. Mainstream integration theories conceive structures as irreversible conditions for 
integration, independent of social pressures, and detached from the socio-economic content of 
European integration. Offering an alternative, critical integration theory highlights the social 
nature of political and economic structures and foregrounds the social struggles that reproduce 
and transform structures. Intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism fail to take into account 
the interactive relationship between institutional and global-economic structures, on the one 
hand, and the relative powers of governments and other actors to change their structural 
conditions, on the other.  
 
Table 1.1. Rationale, interests, and preferences in European integration 
 Liberal 
intergovernmentalism 
Neofunctionalism Critical integration 
theory 
Rationale for 
integration 
EU integration as 
function of national 
calculus and 
intergovernmental 
bargaining 
EU integration as 
function of supranational 
efficiency 
EU integration through 
structured political 
projects contesting 
hegemony 
Actor interests   Economic interests 
dominate national 
preference-formation  
Supranational actor may 
emerge with distinct 
interests 
Objective interests 
depend on social 
position  
Preferences 
and action 
Intergovernmental 
bargaining on the basis 
of national preferences 
Supranational agency 
with distinct preferences 
Preferences, motives and 
action may differ from 
objective interests, and 
depend on structural 
configuration  
 
 
1.3.1. Liberal and new intergovernmentalism  
Often conceived as the baseline theory of European integration, liberal 
intergovernmentalism addresses European integration as the outcome member states asserting 
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their national interests through intergovernmental bargaining (Moravcsik, 1993; 
Schimmelfennig, 2014). For Andrew Moravcsik, liberal intergovernmentalism rests ‘on the 
assumption that state behaviour reflects the rational actions of governments constrained at 
home by domestic societal pressures and abroad by their strategic environment’ (Moravcsik, 
1993, p. 474). It deploys a ‘intergovernmental institutional’ theory of interstate bargaining and 
derives its analysis of national preference formation from ‘liberal theories of international 
interdependence’ (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 480). This means that intergovernmental negotiations 
are constrained by its strategic environment as well as by domestic politics. The emphasis on 
domestic politics is warranted, but the assumptions about how interests are aggregated, and 
come to act as a constraint on government action through domestic political institutions, are 
simplified in order to identify patterns of regularity and derive falsifiable hypotheses (Buch-
Hansen, 2008, p. 27). For instance, Moravcsik argues that the preferences of domestic social 
groups ‘are aggregated through political institutions’ (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 481), but there is 
little consideration of how those institutions filter preferences, or which preferences are 
aggregated most efficiently.  
As a rationalist theory of governments’ interaction, liberal intergovernmentalism 
assumes that individual agency is the fundamental unit of the social world, and that actors are 
rational, utility-maximising individuals. This gives intergovernmentalism credence as a 
parsimonious framework for analysing bargaining positions and priorities of individual 
government representatives. However, the assumptions prevent any deeper consideration of 
the structural conditions for intergovernmental negotiation and possible changes to those 
conditions over time. The way liberal intergovernmentalism conceives structural constraints is 
too rigid and too thin. The intergovernmental concept of structures is too rigid to provide a 
clear account of how actors may overcome and transform the strategic environment of 
interstate bargaining. Further, when liberal intergovernmentalism accepts the basic 
assumptions of rational choice theory, it fully embeds individual choice in a pre-given context 
of utility-maximization. As Moravcsik argues, liberal intergovernmentalism assumes that 
‘(g)overnments evaluate alternative courses of actions on the basis of a utility function 
(Moravcsik, 1993, p. 481). Ultimately, this is also a very thin concept of structure, because 
there is little consideration of the consequences for the institutional structure in case the 
negotiating actors chose not to adhere to the rational model of agency. It is worth noting here 
that liberal intergovernmentalism leaves more scope for governments to develop their 
negotiating positions compared to structural realism in IR (e.g. Waltz, 1979).  
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In liberal intergovernmentalism, therefore, utility-maximising individual agency is the 
primary context for the EU’s institutional structure. Over time, bargaining positions and 
decisions of member state governments cannot fundamentally change the institutional 
framework. Governments may establish new institutions to solidify policy implementation, but 
the broader structure of EU negotiations remains the same: a non-coercive and information-
rich environment with low transaction costs for bargaining (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 498). In 
addition, there is little consideration of how the massive transformations in the global political 
economy since the 1970s have impacted on the way European politics is structured (Bickerton 
et al., 2015a). The framework seems immune to global pressures, such as the globalization of 
financial flows, or shifts in the geopolitical balance of power.   
In meta-theoretical terms, the structure of integration is devoid of distinct properties 
and causal powers that can actively shape the conditions for decision-making; it only operates 
as a passive constraint on governments. In intergovernmentalism, structures are aggregations 
of individual, rational choices. Since all governments are utility-maximising agents acting in 
their own self-interests, the institutional structure always will always remain one of interstate 
bargaining. Against the backdrop of the intergovernmental concept of structure as aggregated 
rational choices, critical integration theory advances a concept of structures as the institutional 
or material manifestation of the historical dominance of specific socio-economic forces. For 
instance, the European welfare states, and the state structures developed to secure welfare 
provision, were at least partly the result of the historical emergence of labour as a politically 
organised social force during the 19th Century. In return, as highlighted by critical scholars of 
European integration, the emergence of a capitalist class increasingly organised at the 
transnational level has sought to institutionalise market-conforming policies at the European 
level in recent decades (van Apeldoorn, 2002).  
Intergovernmentalism and critical integration theory do not deal with questions of 
structure-agency and similar questions at the same level of abstraction. In 
intergovernmentalism, states are the only agents that may change the direction of European 
integration, and this happens on a case-by-case basis when domestic preferences and the degree 
of interdependence suggests that more or less integration is beneficial. Refraining from 
discussing the potential for deeper social change through hegemonic projects, 
intergovernmentalism differs from critical integration theory in its assessment of conflict in the 
process of European integration. Intergovernmentalism has mostly ignored both the realist IR 
and the Gramscian concept of hegemony. The latter posits hegemony as the political and 
agential ‘moment in the reproduction of social structures’ (Joseph, 2008, p. 110). 
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Intergovernmentalism has no equal term for the processes of structural reproduction and/or 
transformation.  
In practical terms, intergovernmentalism tends to analyse the European-level 
institutional structure as both geographically and temporally independent of domestic politics 
and does not interrogate how the EU institutional structure shapes contestations among 
domestic social groups. The separation of domestic and European politics is particularly 
problematic at the current stage of European integration, because the political environment in 
many member states has now been significantly altered by European integration and the rise 
of Euro-scepticism (Bickerton, 2012). Christopher J. Bickerton, Dermot Hodson and Uwe 
Puetter have developed a theory of New Intergovernmentalism to take into account the 
paradoxical dynamics of European integration since the Maastricht treaty. For Bickerton et al. 
the evolution of EU labour governance since Maastricht is indicative of this paradox of 
integration, whereby member states have pursued policy co-ordination ‘at an unprecedented 
rate’, which has been fully confined to intergovernmental agreements, with the EU ‘stubbornly’ 
avoiding supranational decision-making (Bickerton et al., 2015a, p. 4).  
Rather than separating domestic and EU politics in time and space, New 
Intergovernmentalism analyses the ‘causal variables that put the emphasis on the domestic and 
endogenous pressures for change’ to European integration (Bickerton et al., 2015a, p. 21). This 
allows New Intergovernmentalism to better incorporate domestic conflicts, including rising 
Euroscepticism in the studies of institutional change at the EU level. However, it is crucial to 
note here that New Intergovernmentalism continues to neglect the impact of global 
macrostructures on European integration. EU-level policy-making is rarely explained with 
references to macro-structural or global trends, as focus remains on the conditions for (new) 
intergovernmental negotiations (Bulmer, 2015). Macro-structural transformations reside, in 
other words, outside the mode of explanation, when they in fact ought to be integrated into the 
analytical model. Bickerton et al. acknowledge and defend their decision to discount the 
influence of macrostructures: “Our own focus is not intended to dismiss this broader context 
but rather to recognize that as causal variables these exogenous forces have indeterminate 
institutional effects” (Bickerton et al., 2015a, p. 21). By focusing only on endogenous causal 
variables, New Intergovernmentalism risks severely underestimating the causal and 
constitutive properties of social structures and thereby effectively rendering endogenous 
mechanisms unstructured.  
Despite this severe limitation, New Intergovernmentalism also contains tangible 
advancements compared to liberal intergovernmentalism, and Bickerton’s emphasis on state 
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transformation as the modus operandi of European integration is a very careful correction to 
the rather static ontology of liberal intergovernmentalism (Bickerton, 2012). What is needed in 
order to go beyond New Intergovernmentalism is an analytical model that connects the 
institutional structure of European integration with economic macrostructures. Before 
developing this model, we examine the relevance of neofunctionalism in contributing to a 
critical theory of European integration.  
 
1.3.2. Neofunctionalism  
At the heart of neofunctionalism lies the emphasis on utilising a theory of regional 
integration that differs from state-centric theories of IR. A very influential theory of European 
integration in the 1960s and early 1970s, neofunctionalism addressed the role of non-state 
national and international actors, such as corporations, and supranational institutions, in 
shaping integration (Sandholtz & Sweet, 2012). As the pace of European integration slowed 
down in the 1970s, and experienced a series of institutional crises, it was increasingly subject 
to criticism (Rosamond, 2005). Despite its decline in popularity as a general framework for 
analysing the powers and processes behind European integration, proponents have continued 
to defend its capacities in explaining the dynamics in clearly defined policy areas, such as 
social and labour market policy (Strøby Jensen, 2000). 
In studies of EU social, labour, and economic governance, a number of the key concepts 
in neofunctionalism has been utilised to explain the processes of decision-making in this area. 
Functional spill-over is arguably the most important of these, and describes a technical process 
whereby integration in one area requires further integration in another (Rosamond, 2000). 
Caroline de la Porte and Elke Heins argue that the establishment of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) caused functional spill-overs on public expenditure and welfare states (de la 
Porte & Heins, 2015b). Realising this partly unintended pressure on social protection, the social 
democratic coalition of the late 1990s (particularly British Labour and the French Socialists) 
was eager to use labour market policies to offset the pressure of the Maastricht convergence 
criteria that required fiscal consolidation as a condition for member states joining the Euro. 
The importance of functional spill-overs from the EMU to labour market policies is disputed, 
but there is widespread support for the proposition that transnational advocacy coalitions – or 
cultivated spillovers in neofunctional terminology – played a key role in developing a 
compromise on the content and enforcement mechanisms of the EU’s employment strategy 
(van Riel & van der Meer, 2002). 
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Some critics of neofunctionalism are particularly concerned with its lack of agential 
consideration. Notwithstanding the strategies and ideas of policymakers and the political 
institutions they inhibit, political integration is the almost necessary by-product of economic 
integration (Rosamond, 2000, p. 51-2). This concern has been somewhat rectified by more 
recent neofunctionalists who emphasise the role of political coalitions in negotiating and 
cultivating processes of spill-over (Strøby Jensen, 2000). Still, neofunctionalism necessarily 
underpins the functional dynamics in European integration. Transnational networks contribute 
to the depoliticisation of policymaking through elite socialisation and bureaucratic procedure 
at the supranational level. The increasingly supranational organization of interests and 
preferences gives rise to densely coordinated private actors, such as business associations 
(Strøby Jensen, 2000, p. 75-6). The emphasis on functional and depoliticised processes has 
received substantial critique, not least from political economists studying EU socio-economic 
governance through the framework of historical institutionalism (Schäfer, 2004; Scharpf, 
2002).  
The emphasis on depoliticised processes means neofunctionalism has little concern for 
hegemony, or in other words the conditions for agents to install or resist structural 
transformation (Joseph, 2008). In Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz’s account, the three 
main factors that allow for spill-overs and supranational integration are supranational 
organizations, supranational rules, and transnational society (Sweet & Sandholtz, 1997, pp. 
304–305). With these three in play, European integration becomes more or less independent of 
domestic political struggles. In effect, transnational agency develops rules and organizations 
directly. At a more fundamental level, neofunctional accounts leave unexplored the conditions 
that allow agency to transform structures. 
Neofunctionalism, therefore, does not explain when and how policymakers are capable 
of changing European integration. Instead, European integration appears as both the 
mechanism in need of explanation (explanandum) and the explanation provided (explanans). 
If economic integration in areas of ‘low politics’ has led to ‘the gradual and progressive 
entangling of national economies’ and then to greater regulatory complexity and thus political 
integration, then there is no need to look at the structural conditions shaping integration 
(Rosamond, 2000, p. 51). The concept of spillovers can highlight how integration aggregates, 
but it cannot contextualise integration in terms of the political and economic conflicts that 
shape its direction. In effect, both domestic politics and global macrostructures become 
obsolete. This research thesis on the other hand, seeks to demonstrate the role domestic politics 
 50 
and global economic structures have played in the negotiations over EU labour market policy 
reforms, recasting them as structural conditions shaping multi-level policymaking.   
In this thesis, I stress the importance of institutions and macrostructures for the 
evolution in EU labour governance and more broadly European integration. These structures 
are important because they shape the formation of hegemonic projects, which in turn allow 
political and economic actors to challenge existing structures. In the absence of structural 
transformation, EU labour governance will evolve slowly and be subject to recurring political 
contestation. To improve our analysis of these processes, I move beyond the two main theories 
of European integration. We have seen how, in liberal intergovernmentalism, the EU’s 
institutional framework underlines, but does not interact with processes of decision-making. In 
neofunctionalism, the framework for policy-making – functional spillovers demanding co-
operation in new policy areas – is determined by economic processes, which unfold without 
significant conflicts. In response, I highlight exactly those political-economic conflicts over 
who gets what, when, and how, and the way these conflicts, or competing hegemonic projects, 
are transmission belts through which policy-makers reproduce and maintain existing structures, 
or occasionally, transform them, thereby accelerating integration or unleashing disintegrative 
dynamics. The remainder of this chapter discusses the role of ideas, institutions, and capitalist 
reproduction in EU integration, and argues that hegemonic projects is a useful and necessary 
concept to explain how policymakers and other actors may change the course of integration.  
 
1.4. Towards competing hegemonic projects: the role of ideas and institutions 
In contrast to the rational explanations of European integration, Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony and critical integration theory rests on a materialist explanation of political and 
economic integration that provides analytical priority to the reproduction of capitalism. For 
Gramsci, the context was Italian unification, enabled through a process of “passive revolution” 
that subjugated Southern Italy and its peasants to the rule of Northern capitalists (Gramsci, 
1978, p. 441). For critical integration theory, the context is European integration, especially in 
the post-Maastricht era. Critical integration theory follows Gramsci’s writings to stress how 
the basic structure of capitalism matters for political and economic integration: economic 
relationships are exploitative and result in class struggle, capitalist competition necessarily 
causes crisis, etc. For Gramsci, and for critical integration theory, capitalist relations provide 
the ‘decisive nucleus of economic activity’ for any political order, including the EU (Gramsci, 
1971, p. 161). Nonetheless, institutions and ideas both play a considerable role in European 
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integration. Institutions structure state actors and civil society, while ideas help legitimise 
and/or contest political and economic orders.  
This thesis addresses the evolution of EU labour governance as the result of competing 
hegemonic projects operating within EU institutional and global macrostructures. Unlike 
critical integration theory, constructivist and institutional explanations generally distrust the 
stability and materiality of global macrostructures. Constructivism adds valuable knowledge 
on the role of ideas and discourse that shapes EU political contestation. However, at a more 
fundamental level, constructivism is at odds with the idea in critical integration theory that only 
hegemonic projects are capable for transforming existing social structures and enable persistent 
political change. Institutionalism in EU studies has traditionally eschewed questions of social 
structures that run deeper than institutions, but critical integration theory proposes the merging 
of key institutionalist concepts with the Gramscian emphasis on hegemony (Bulmer & Joseph, 
2016).  
 
1.4.1. Ideas and discourse 
Ideational explanations stand alongside rationalist and materialist explanations of 
integration. Succinctly, ideational explanations possess a distinct ontological and 
epistemological approach to the social sciences that forefronts the constitutive power of ideas, 
norms, and rules - i.e. constructivism. For Craig Parsons (2010), constructivism is a scientific 
approach that explains the social processes through which the identities, norms, and ideas of 
actors are shaped. The strategies of policy-makers develop through primarily social 
constructions, and not the economic, material, or organizational landscape in which 
interactions take place (Parsons, 2010, pp. 87–88). The concept of social structure developed 
in constructivist frameworks tends to resemble Anthony Giddens’ concept of structures as a 
set of rules and resources (Porpora, 1998). Giddens’ structuration theory neglects any potential 
‘causal significance of objective, social relationships’ (Porpora, 1998, p. 346).  In effect, the 
constructivist literature struggles to enquire the role of social relationships that obtain 
objectivity within specific political-economic orders (capitalism and class; patriarchy and 
gender; imperialism and race). Constructivist and sociological studies of European integration 
tend to treat the social structure as a ‘system of relations’ structured by the ideas and positions 
of actors (Matthijs & McNamara, 2015, p. 232; Mudge & Vauchez, 2012, p. 455). 
Constructivist and sociological studies of these variants can make very valuable contributions 
to the study of European integration, but they inevitably treat social phenomena (like class 
struggle or racialized hierarchies) with reference to that which is subjectively intelligible.  
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Notwithstanding the limitations to their analysis of social relations, materialist analysis 
can take great inspiration from constructivist and sociological approaches to normative and 
ideological change. For the purposes of studying EU labour governance, studies of resilient 
neoliberalism and social learning in economic governance are particularly relevant (Matthijs 
& Blyth, 2018; Schmidt & Thatcher, 2013). Mark Blyth, Erik Jones, Matthias Matthijs, and 
Kathleen R. McNamara’s attention to the dominance of ordoliberal culture in Germany and 
neoliberal ideas in Brussels highlights the routes that EU policy-makers followed as they came 
to terms with the Eurozone crisis (Jones, 2013; Matthijs & Blyth, 2018; Matthijs & McNamara, 
2015). Investigating social logics and learning processes in the Eurozone crisis, Matthijs, and 
McNamara show how ‘the putative answers to the crisis arose out of deeply entrenched social 
structures that informed economic debates’ (Matthijs & McNamara, 2015, p. 231). They trace 
the economically irrational fixation on fiscal balances in the Eurozone crisis to the capacity of 
‘Germany’s ordoliberal tradition and stability culture … in shaping the field of economics’ 
(Matthijs & McNamara, 2015). Social structures, in other words equate to a system of 
knowledge that inform the worldview of academics, civil servants, and policymakers.  
When the constructivist literature equates structures with ideas and subject positions, it 
embeds political institutions in purely normative and cognitive frameworks. In addition, 
constructivism only embeds ideas and paradigms in intersubjective social relations. Ultimately 
it underplays the real causal properties of institutional and macrostructures and leaves aside the 
deeper relations in the social world. Structures shape actors’ interests, limit or promote these 
actors’ ability to act strategically, and influence their capacity for changing their environment. 
Deeper social relations create uneven conditions for shaping social knowledge and epistemic 
cultures. Given the dependence of labour on market forces for a job and a living wage, we may 
question what options workers have to challenge market structures (Porpora, 1998). In the 
context of labour market governance, objective social relations matter in the way labour 
markets are altered by the increasingly transnational organization of production, which in turn 
readjusts the relationship between employers and workers, the possibilities for solidarity and 
collective agreements, and the role of the state in regulating capital and labour. Changes to the 
organization of work and labour, falling wage shares, and the rise of cheap credit as a source 
of income, have a real effect on the interests of social groups and their bargaining power, 
independently of how discursive constructions influence the strategies by which actors 
confront these socio-economic challenges and opportunities. 
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1.4.2. Institutions and social relations 
Institutionalism may build on rational, ideational, or materialist explanations (e.g. 
Pollack, 2006; Schmidt, 2010; Hameiri, 2019). The uniting theme in institutionalism, 
particularly in its application to EU studies, is the premise that political processes and outcomes 
never start ‘from scratch’ and are always constrained by status quo (Matthijs et al., 2019, p. 
211). Commenting on the constraining role of institutional structures, Paul Pierson argues that 
‘the dead weight of previous institutional choices seriously limits’ actors’ desire and ability to 
change institutions (Pierson, 2000, p. 493; cited in Bell, 2011, p. 884). This gives institutional 
change a path-dependent character and increases the continuity of institutional development 
over time. Institutionalist EU studies are particularly useful for identifying path-dependency, 
institutional rigidity and political stability in European integration. Historical institutionalists, 
such as Simon Bulmer, have advanced ‘a middle-range theory’ to identify the institutional 
context of EU economic governance (Bulmer, 1998, p. 366). In the wake of the financial crisis, 
Bulmer has pushed for an improved incorporation of global dynamics within institutionalist 
analysis of European politics (e.g. Bulmer & Joseph, 2016). However, much historical 
institutionalist analysis of the Eurozone remains wedded to an exclusive focus on the dynamics 
within the EU institutional design (e.g. Verdun, 2015). 
Developing critical integration theory, in this thesis I incorporate the institutionalist 
notion of path-dependency and accepts the predisposition of institutions towards continuity. 
However, Pierson’s institutionalist notion that actors naturally prefer institutional continuity is 
problematic. This is because macro-structures and the inner structure of capitalism - and not 
only institutions - shape actor preferences. Following the way critical integration theory 
emphasises the structured reality of society, we should acknowledge that a broader range of 
conditions shape actor preferences for institutional continuity or change. The properties of 
macro-structures may well induce actors with strong preferences for institutional change. In 
addition, critical integration theory differs from the popular institutionalist assumption that 
institutional rigidity provides for political stability. Indeed, the multi-level character of the 
EU’s institutional structure gives rise to instability and opens up space for transformative 
agency. Multilevel governance makes public policymaking not only dependent on the political 
negotiations between policymakers, experts, and relevant socio-economic actors, but also on 
the structural constraints that shapes the preferences, strategies, and ideas of actors in the first 
place. Given the multi-level governance character of the EU’s institutional framework, 
contestation can take place at different levels, which in turn may interrupt or destabilise 
continuity throughout the institutional framework. The multi-level EU also takes part in 
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different experiments of re-scaling governance and de-nationalising statehood (Jessop, 2004; 
Larsen, 2018). European integration has also brought about a transformation of the member 
states themselves (Bickerton, 2012). In several countries, including the United Kingdom, 
questions about European integration have become the defining political issue. 
Following their attention to institutions, institutionalism has been hesitant to engage 
with the inner structure and institutions of capitalism per se. Bulmer’s seminal study on 
domestic politics in European integration does not address capitalism directly but national 
‘social and economic conditions’ (Bulmer, 1983, p. 354). Later, institutionalist scholars started 
treating these national conditions as varieties of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001), and 
recently, the literature has paid attention to the integration, diversity, and (in)compatibility of 
national capitalisms in the EU (Bickerton, 2019; Johnston & Regan, 2016, 2018). Johnston and 
Regan assert the incompatibility of the two ‘capitalist growth regimes’ that each exists in 5-6 
EMU member states (2016, p. 323; Hall, 2012).  
In the context of EU labour governance, institutionalism has informed studies of the 
relationship between trade unions, central banks and the EMU (Hancké, 2013), wage setting 
institutions and monetary integration (Johnston, 2016b), and the imbalance of Eurozone 
capitalisms (Regan, 2017). However, these studies, in line with wider varieties of capitalism 
literature rarely make capitalism as a system of social relations the object of analysis (Bruff, 
2011; Bruff & Horn, 2012; Streeck, 2011). For instance, institutionalist studies rarely discuss 
the nature of the social relationships that constitute wage bargaining institutions. Rather than 
interrogating the (uneven) conditions for workers and capitalists negotiating within capitalist 
institutions, institutionalist analysis confines their object of study to the inter-institutional 
dynamics that may discipline or empower strategic actors. In contrast, critical integration 
theory makes the relationship between social classes foundational to political conflicts and 
compromises. While political and economic conflicts, for instance over wage developments, 
are usually empirically identifiable, class relations do not have to be. Class relations have, in 
other words, a different ontological status than political coalitions, and they constitute a 
fundamental source of conflict within capitalist societies. A pertinent example is job creation. 
Alongside public employers, it is capitalists’ investment decisions that determine employment, 
while workers are on the receiving end of the social costs involved in unemployment. 
Capitalism creates an uneven relationship between workers, who depend on the market (i.e. 
investment patterns) for their means of income, while capital depends on the market merely for 
profit (Bruff, 2011).  
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1.5. Critical integration theory and competing hegemonic projects 
Among class-based approaches to politics and political, neo-Gramscian scholars have 
arguably left the greatest impact on European integration theory (van Apeldoorn, 2002). As 
Gramscian scholars, they are well aware of the importance of ideas and institutions, even if 
they ground these in the materialist conditions of capitalist production and reproduction (Bieler 
& Morton, 2008). Stephen Gill’s concept of new constitutionalism (Gill, 1998) sparked the 
neo-Gramscian debate on European integration, but it was the Amsterdam school’s emphasis 
on transnational agency that clearly distinguished this body of literature from other critical 
approaches (van Apeldoorn, 2002; van Apeldoorn et al., 2009). Recently, neo-Gramscian 
scholars have highlighted the authoritarian tendencies in European integration (Bruff, 2014; 
Ryner, 2015).  
Gill uses the concept of new constitutionalism to analyse the relationship between 
European integration and the global political economy. His approach suggests a historical-
materialist route to place European integration ‘in the context of global patterns of power and 
production, as features of the political economy of globalisation’ (Gill, 1998, p. 6). While 
lacking in empirical detail, Gill’s analysis of European integration nonetheless provides for an 
introduction to the analytical priorities in neo-Gramscian analysis of European integration. This 
includes the relationship between patterns of regional and global economic integration, 
particularly the rise of neoliberal governance in both spheres; the disciplinary nature of 
neoliberal governance (particularly towards labour and subaltern groups); and the role of social 
forces in the making of European integration and the dominant position of transnational capital.  
Van Apeldoorn brings the analysis further by interrogating in detail the ‘strategic 
alliance between the corporate executives of Europe’s leading [transnational corporations] and 
the political executives of the Commission’ (van Apeldoorn, 2000, p. 48). This alliance enabled 
the latter, under the presidency of Jacques Delors, to push forward an agenda of deeper market 
integration amid the general Euro-pessimism of the 1980s (van Apeldoorn, 2002). Van 
Apeldoorn specifically interrogates the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), an 
advocacy group of around 50 industrial leaders, representing large transnational corporations 
in Europe. For van Apeldoorn, this group has significant political power that it yields from the 
transnational nature of its members. Van Apeldoorn (2002) asserts that the ERT has pushed 
the neoliberal hegemonic project at the supranational level on behalf of the most 
transnationalised fractions of the capitalist class.  
Despite the ERT’s support for strongly neoliberal policy reforms, and their relatively 
central position within the EU political system, Van Apeldoorn does not treat European 
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integration as a process fully consumed by neoliberalism. Rather, the neoliberal project 
preferred by the most transnationalised and financialised corporations have had to compromise 
with a neo-mercantilist project - to allow some protectionism for European industry – and a 
social democratic project that maintains the importance of basic social protection (van 
Apeldoorn, 2002, p. 78). The result, van Apeldoorn (2002, p. 115) suggests, is the emergence 
of embedded neoliberalism in which pure market-enhancing neoliberalism mutates in the 
meeting with European neocorporatist industrial relations and welfare states.  
Van Apeldoorn’s study posits a considerably more sophisticated analysis of corporate 
power compared to supranational and intergovernmental explanations because it deals directly 
with the material and historical conditions under which corporations may advance political 
projects at the transnational level (van Apeldoorn, 2004; cf. Moravcsik, 1991). However, the 
subordination of domestic democratic politics vis-à-vis transnational economic actors is not a 
fully adequate portrayal of the EU’s political-economic structure or the process of integration. 
Bulmer and Joseph’s suggestion to focus more directly on the multilevel governance 
framework that conditions European integration provides an important contribution to the 
analysis of European hegemonic projects, and complements analyses fixing on the role of 
global (economic) structures. It is through the multilevel governance framework that various 
hegemonic projects seek to successfully upscale and extend their dominance over competitors 
– the outcome of which may very well be embedded neoliberalism. 
In the wake of the crisis, neo-Gramscian scholars have interpreted the evolution in EU 
economic governance as the consolidation of authoritarian or ‘iron cage’ neoliberalism (Bruff, 
2014, 2017; Ryner, 2015, p. 287). As the Eurozone crisis has revealed the contradictions of 
embedded neoliberalism, European leaders have tasked EU institutions with a mandate to 
impose neoliberalism through policy conditionalities, constitutional amendments, and 
contractual agreements. The main weakness of the literature on authoritarian neoliberalism is 
the lacking analysis of the weakening and development of neoliberalism since the crisis. The 
literature has mostly left it to others to interrogate the resilience, mutation, and/or 
transformation of neoliberalism as a political project (e.g. Davies, 2014; Schmidt & Thatcher, 
2013; Slobodian, 2018).  
 
1.5.1. Hegemonic projects and structural hegemony 
Following Bulmer and Joseph’s critical theory of European integration and adding to 
the predominant focus on class relations in neo-Gramscian theory, I will emphasise the 
importance of the political struggles between hegemonic projects. Bulmer and Joseph start by 
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repudiating that European integration in itself can be considered hegemonic in any structural 
sense (Bulmer & Joseph, 2016). This distinction harks back to Joseph’s earlier, and more 
theoretically detailed work on hegemony (Joseph, 2002). For Joseph, the distinction between 
structural hegemony and hegemonic projects is vital because it separates the functional 
requirements for “ensuing the reproduction of basic structural processes and relations” from 
the “conscious, political (...) projects and practices” (Joseph, 2002, p. 128).  
Structural hegemony represents a coherent social organization that can ‘forge a political 
and consensual unity and direction’ out of the stratified and differentiated nature of society 
(Joseph, 2002, p. 14). Hegemonic projects, on the other hand, refer to “concrete projects and 
intentional agency” (Joseph, 2002, p. 129). Following this distinction, there is arguably no 
structural hegemony of European integration; instead, the latter is an on-going process that 
remains incomplete, is in constant change, and is under continuous and severe pressure. This 
supports the argument that European integration tend to ‘fail forward’ through crisis (Jones et 
al., 2016, p. 1012). The reproduction of Europe’s ‘basic structural processes’ does not depend 
on a stable and coherent EU (Joseph, 2002, p. 128); arguably, quite often the crises of the EU 
give unity and direction to the process of European integration (Jones et al., 2016). While a 
dominant stream of European integration has certainly sought to forge unity and direction 
around the purpose of ever-closer market integration and intensified competition, this 
neoliberal trajectory is more akin to a hegemonic project of intentional agency, seeking to 
shape the structure of the EU, rather than structural hegemony. 
Arguably, European integration since the Maastricht treaty has been based on the 
economic principles of mutual recognition, competition, and monetarism, which is indicative 
of a broader crisis in post-war Keynesian economic policies (Bickerton, 2012). The breakdown 
of the era of embedded liberalism has indeed coincided with a deepening of European 
economic integration based on neoliberal principles (Höpner & Schäfer, 2010). However, one 
does not have to deny the existence and dominance of a neoliberal hegemonic project in 
European integration to question whether European integration is hegemonic itself.  
The difference between neoliberal dominance and hegemony rests on whether 
European integration is conceived as the outcome of neoliberal hegemony, or if hegemony is 
instead seen as a possible, contingent outcome of integration. Following the latter proposition, 
I argue that the extent to which European integration has brought together, and resolved, the 
struggles over both socio-economic and political objectives of European capitalism, should be 
tested empirically through relevant case studies. As I shall demonstrate throughout this thesis, 
EU labour governance continues to be far more contested, diverse and unstable than what 
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structural hegemony would entail. One major reason for the futile efforts at establishing 
continent-wide neoliberal hegemony is the continuous role of the nation-state as a site for 
political and economic struggles in the multilevel governance structure of the EU. 
The density of social relations and social embeddedness of politics and economics at 
the national scale means that major political projects are most often first developed at the 
national level, and subsequently lifted up to the EU level. At the level of EU institutions, major 
political projects – what I refer to as hegemonic projects – are aggregated projects consisting 
of several domestic projects. The primacy of domestic politics and the aggregated nature of 
European projects reveals in the organization of labour market interest representation. An 
example is the organisation of businesses and trade unions in Brussels. The European 
institutions encourage the European organisation of social partners, and the European 
Commission consults BUSINESSEUROPE and the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) on new initiatives, financially supports those organizations’ transnational projects, and 
facilitates social dialogue with them. While this is indicative of the institutional richness and 
political bureaucracy of the EU, it does not necessarily imply the Europeanization of key 
decision-making processes and socio-economic groups. Rather, crucial political decisions, 
such as wage settlement, remain the responsibility of member states.  
To the extent that the advocacy efforts of the BUSINESSEUROPE and the ERT have 
facilitated the ascending dominance of neoliberal policies (van Apeldoorn, 2002), I argue, this 
rests on the structural power of capital at the domestic level, which in turn is strengthened by 
the proliferation of transnational production networks and financial integration. European 
economic, monetary and financial integration have arguably entrenched neoliberal policies. 
Yet, without the structural power in domestic politics, the conscious strategies and practices of 
capitalists and employers within the European neoliberal hegemonic project would be 
significantly weaker. In terms of trade unions, their social role, and their influence through 
bilateral and trilateral agreements, the multilevel EU is fairly heterogeneous and trade unions 
are more socially and institutionally embedded at the domestic level (Erne, 2015).  
The diversity of member-states’ different social, economic and political struggles and 
compromises, and the plurality of labour market institutions and interest organizations, 
enhances the heterogeneity of ideas and projects at the EU level. This diversity has made that 
the dominant hegemonic project of neoliberalism forge compromises with neo-mercantilist, 
Christian democratic and social democratic visions for the project of European labour market 
governance.  
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In effect, what we have seen in EU social, employment, and economic policy is 
something akin to van Apeldoorn’s use of the concept embedded neoliberalism (van 
Apeldoorn, 2002; van Apeldoorn et al., 2009). A different phrasing for this phenomenon is 
‘roll-out’ neoliberalism, which denotes the extension and consolidation of the logic of the 
market alongside ‘active state-building and regulatory reform’ which does not so much roll-
back the frontiers of the regulatory and welfare state as transform the content of regulation and 
welfare (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 384). From the perspective of embedded neoliberalism, the 
rollout of ostensibly progressive government programmes like active labour market policies 
are not contradicting neoliberalism’s market logic. Rather, the modernisation and occasionally 
expansion of social policy in Europe supplements market integration, financial deregulation, 
monetarism, and fiscal discipline, and provides vital social and institutional embeddedness for 
the consolidation of the latter policy frameworks. The ongoing process of embedding 
neoliberalism through consensual and coercive state policies was a fundamental part of the 
endurance and resilience of neoliberalism through the crisis (Cahill, 2011; Schmidt & Thatcher, 
2013). 
However, the European integration project in its embedded neoliberal form has been in 
severe crisis for the last decade – arguably, it has been in crisis since the popular rejection of 
constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005. The project of embedded 
neoliberalism proved resilient facing the financial crisis and the initial, Keynesian urge to 
expand government spending, as it responded with a three-pronged attack of fiscal discipline, 
expansionary monetary policy, and government bailout programmes of wage cuts and social 
reforms. Yet, outside the alliance of the governments of Germany, its neighbours, and some 
Central and Eastern European member states, the embedded neoliberal project has proved 
highly fragile. The election of French President Hollande, the rise of Podemos in Spain, the 
Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) in Greece, and the Five Star Movement in Italy, and 
the outcome of the referendum on British EU membership, all point towards the contested 
nature of the current political-economic project of European integration.  
Van Apeldoorn and colleagues locate the ongoing crisis of European neoliberalism in 
the inner contradictions of capitalist restructuring (Drahokoupil et al., 2009), which manifest 
in European integration through ‘the fundamental contradictions inherent in the socio-
economic content and related substantive output of European governance’ (van Apeldoorn, 
2009, p. 21). Contradictions of European governance include the need for an active nation state 
to legitimise neoliberal restructuring that ‘continues to hollow out’ meaningful state activity, 
for instance by imposing limitations on fiscal sovereignty (van Apeldoorn, 2009, p. 22). In this 
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thesis, I argue that capitalist restructuring along neoliberal lines is not only an inherently 
contradictory process; it is also fiercely contested by alternative hegemonic projects. The 
superficial hegemony of (embedded) neoliberalism thus competes with alternative hegemonic 
projects to define European integration. This competition has not faded in recent years but has 
taken on new forms after the financial crisis. This is symbolised by the rise of anti-
establishment parties left and right in response to the economic crisis as well as the political 
crisis of EU economic governance.   
 
1.5.2. Competing hegemonic projects in European integration 
Despite the lack of structural hegemony to underpin and stabilise European integration, 
including European alignment of wage and labour policies, the concept of hegemonic projects 
is useful for addressing the formation of political compromises and contestations that is rooted 
in domestic state/civil society relations. This section therefore outlines a typology of the 
hegemonic projects of European integration, building on Bulmer & Joseph’s analysis (Bulmer 
& Joseph, 2016). The formation and competition of hegemonic projects does not depend on 
deeper structural hegemony. I thus propose to conceive European integration as the multi-
layered, geographically varied outcome of competing hegemonic projects. This can help us 
analyse the ‘particular hegemonic projects’ as the ‘product of the historical weakness of 
hegemony in general’ at the European level (Joseph, 2002, p. 126). Hegemonic projects are 
processes of ‘transformation/conservation (which) assumes a strategic character’ (Joseph, 
2002, p. 10) in order to secure broad social consensus on ‘a far-reaching programme of action’, 
not simply policy agendas (Bulmer & Joseph, 2016, p. 734) 
Following Bulmer & Joseph, we can delineate four competing political projects of 
European integration that are meaningfully hegemonic, which means they have at least a latent 
capacity to change the EU by mediating the structure and agency of European integration 
(Bulmer & Joseph, 2016). First, the neoliberal hegemonic project dominates European 
integration. Second, a social-democratic project that embraces European integration remains 
the most organised alternative to the neoliberals. Third, a Eurosceptic neoliberal project, which 
largely accepts the neoliberal economic doctrines, questions the legitimacy of both 
supranational governance and the logic of pooled sovereignty in intergovernmental 
agreements. Fourth, a Eurosceptic social democratic project rejects both the political liberalism 
that underpins the current form of European integration and the economic liberalism of the 
neoliberal project. Consequently, European integration, including monetary integration and EU 
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labour governance, is subject to contestation between social democrats and neoliberals, as well 
as between pro-European and Eurosceptic forces. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, recent European elections have involved not 
straightforwardly neoliberal or social democratic, pro-European parties. French President 
Macron ran his 2017 presidential campaign on the promise that he was neither left nor right, 
seeking to attract economic liberals and left-liberals at once. In Germany, the 2019 European 
elections confirmed the rise of the Green Party’s post-material, left-liberal vision at the expense 
of the German social democrats. Despite the evident challenges that exist for labour markets 
in the context of climate change and the need for a green transition, the left-liberal project has 
not yet decisively shaped the discussions on Eurozone wage and labour governance. Therefore, 
in my analysis I operate with the four identified projects. 
Hegemonic projects often succeed in bridging ideological divides. An example of this 
is the relatively successful co-existence of ordo- and neoliberal ideological currents within the 
neoliberal project. It may seem odd that ordoliberalism, emphasising the positive role of 
government in guaranteeing (fair) competition, can coexist with neoliberals much more 
suspicious of government interference. However, interstate federations, such as the EU may 
play a positive role in disciplining and restricting market interventions. For Friedrich Hayek, 
interstate federalism could help guarantee economic freedom from government interference 
(Hayek, 1939; Streeck, 2014). For some neoliberals, the EU’s guarantee of economic freedom 
legitimises its bureaucratic elements. Other neoliberals have turned decisively against the EU. 
European neoliberals have fought over whether the EU is a transnational guarantor of economic 
freedom or ‘a framework for socialist expansion’ (Slobodian & Plehwe, 2019).  
The dominance of the neoliberal project does not preclude the influence of other 
political ideas, also those outside ordoliberalism. An example would be Commission President 
Jean-Claude Juncker’s variant of Christian Democracy, which promotes the practice of 
political compromises and tripartite negotiations. Since taking office in the Commission 
Presidency, Juncker has promised to strengthen the EU’s social dimension and achieving ‘a 
social triple-A rating’ (Juncker, 2014). Most visibly, his Presidency has successfully pushed 
for the establishment of a European Pillar of Social Rights. However, the social pillar is not 
quite social democratic in nature and does not hold legal or political equivalence to the Single 
Market and the EMU. Juncker has sought to build a compromise between contrasting visions 
for European integration, but institutional and global macrostructures complicate his efforts. 
Critical integration theory, and the concept of competing hegemonic projects, helps explain 
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both how Juncker’s project emerges around 2013-14, and why it struggles to build more lasting 
political compromises (Chapter 5). 
Importantly, the concept of competing hegemonic projects takes into account the role 
neoliberal dominance in European economic policy-making (including the role of its German, 
ordoliberal version) emphasised by neo-Gramscian and historical materialist scholars without 
reducing political contestations and the resulting processes of (dis)integration to the pure 
function of capitalist social reproduction and neoliberal hegemony. It also acknowledges the 
influence of powerful member states, particularly Germany, but repudiates the static 
conception of structure and power underpinning theories of intergovernmentalism. 
Importantly, it situates political contestations within the institutional structure of the EU 
multilevel governance framework, in which the domestic level continues to occupy a privileged 
position, as well as the macrostructures of the European and global political economy.  
 
1.6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to discuss fundamental aspects of theories of 
European integration to improve the analysis of the structural conditions and political projects 
that shapes EU labour governance. Specifically, the chapter has discussed the contributions of 
mainstream and critical integration scholarship on European integration to assess their 
adequacy for explaining European integration and governance. I have argued that the process 
of change in European integration, including the evolution of EU labour governance is best 
conceived of as deeply social, contingent upon both institutional structures, macrostructures, 
and strategic agency. No matter how solid institutional and macro-structures appear, there is at 
least always a possibility for structural change through social and political struggle. For this 
reason, there is nothing in the overall structure of the EU that is inevitable or ahistorical. No 
functionalist spillover effect is strong enough to guarantee “an ever closer union” let alone 
safeguard the European project against disintegrative dynamics.  
European integration is always both political and economic processes, and despite 
mainstream integration theories’ ambition of building falsifiable hypotheses on formal 
governmental and institutional interaction, these theories tend to overlook the political-
economic content of European integration. Critical IPE has been the leading force in advancing 
this type of critique of the mainstream integration theories. However, critical IPE itself tends 
to conflate the structure of integration, i.e. multilevel governance conditioned by global 
capitalism, with the dominant political project in European integration over the last 30 years, 
namely neoliberalism. Acknowledging the open-ended and contingent nature of European 
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integration, critical IPE ought to recognize more clearly the limits to neoliberalism and the 
contested nature of European integration. 
This theory chapter has then sought to theorise – and outline the contours of – the EU’s 
structural context, acknowledging the conditioning role of European capitalism on policy-
making and EU institutional change in the context of labour markets. The chapter has argued 
that critical integration theory centres attention to the social and political processes of 
contestation that shape European integration at the intersection of macrostructural pressures, 
EU institutional structures, and the strategic agency of domestic social groups.  
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2. EU labour governance and the EMU 
In this chapter, I develop a framework for analysing the relationship between the EMU and 
EU labour governance in line with critical integration theory. This specific framework is 
necessary to study the fundamental changes to EU labour governance induced by European 
monetary integration since the 1980s. The advanced framework places the politics of wages 
and labour markets within the institutional and macro-structural constraints of Europe’s 
monetary union. The incomplete EMU institutions and global economic structures condition 
EU labour governance. The main institutions are the single currency, the centralisation of 
monetary policies, and the disciplinary fiscal rules. Through these institutions, the EMU puts 
the burden of adjustment to crisis on labour - but does not entail a framework for governing 
labour. Beyond the incomplete EMU institutions, macro-structural processes, such as the 
globalisation of financial markets and production networks, also puts pressure on European 
labour, and heighten the demand for EU labour governance. To develop a framework for 
analysing the relationship between the structures of monetary integration, global macro-
structures, and labour governance, I develop a critical integration theory for labour 
governance by engaging heterodox economics, Comparative Capitalism, critical IPE, and 
governmentality perspectives. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The introduction of the single currency to the project of European integration has 
changed the dynamics of labour markets in Europe. Inside the currency union, member states 
have centralised monetary policies under supranational and depoliticised authority, and follow 
detailed rules governing fiscal policy. The EMU removes monetary and exchange-rate policy 
instruments at the national level. With currency realignments and monetary policy instruments 
no longer at the disposal of national governments, labour markets become central to the process 
of economic adjustment. In other words, adjustment to economic cycles and crises is more 
likely to take place through the labour markets, through pressure on wages and/or employment 
levels. This means that whenever an economic crisis hits a country, austerity and wage cuts 
appears the principal treatment. Is the single currency therefore the tragedy of Europe’s 
workers? Or may monetary integration lead to the development of more ‘solidaristic’ wage and 
labour policies at the European level (Schulten, 2002, p. 173)? 
Since the agreement on EMU in 1991, European leaders have launched a range of 
initiatives to shore up the governance of wages and labour. Yet, when the financial crisis struck 
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Europe, there was no integrated framework for governing labour markets and the single 
currency. In the pre-crisis years, large current account imbalances accumulated alongside other 
macroeconomic imbalances inside the Eurozone. The monetary union and its member states 
were unable to respond to these imbalances. After the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis in 20092, 
it took three years until the EU had avoided an imminent collapse of its single currency. Even 
then, domestic crises continued, and in 2015, the recurring Greek crisis once again threatened 
the very existence of the Eurozone. These events have amplified the fragility of the EMU. 
Labour markets have been part of the evolution and crisis of the EMU. Yet, there are strong 
constraints on the development of labour governance within the EMU: the EU has no formal 
competence over wage questions, member states are unlikely to cede sovereignty in this area, 
and any redistributive initiatives at the EU level would face serious domestic opposition.  
This chapter addresses the question of how to study the development of EU labour 
governance in light of the creation and evolution of EMU. In line with critical integration 
theory, I argue that EU labour governance is an open-ended process that is nonetheless 
decisively shaped by the structural forces unleashed by the process of monetary integration. In 
this chapter, I outline the basic components of the political contestation that takes place over 
labour governance within the EMU framework. I discuss two existing mainstream approaches 
to EU labour governance and argue for the importance of a critical integration theory tailored 
to studying the class relations, ideas, and institutions that underpin Eurozone governance. 
Further developing the concept of hegemonic projects, and particularly emphasising the 
competition between the pro-European social democratic and neoliberal projects, I argue that 
domestic institutions, class relations, and the diffusion of governmentality practices are all 
underpinning EU labour governance. This feeds into the coming chapters of this thesis, in 
which I conduct an empirical study of EU labour governance, consider the structural conditions 
for contestation over labour governance, and discuss whether (attempted) reforms have 
addressed the crisis-ridden nexus of the EMU and EU labour governance. 
The chapter is organised as follow: first, I outline the puzzle of EU labour governance 
in the context of the EMU. Second, I review the mainstream economics and public policy 
literature, arguing that these bodies of literature either neglect or depoliticise the sources and 
solutions to macroeconomic instability in the Eurozone. Third, turning to the governance of 
 
2 In particular, two events mark the beginning of the Eurozone crisis: 1) the nationalization of the 
Irish-Anglo Bank on 15 January 2009, followed by bailouts of Ireland’s two largest banks in February 
2009; 2) the Greek finance minister’s announce of a government deficit of 12.5% of GDP on 19 
October.  
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European wages and labour, I propose that both Comparative Capitalism, post-Keynesian 
economics, critical IPE, and governmentality are all useful and necessary literatures to 
appreciate the interaction between class struggle, institutional change, and ideas that underpin 
EU labour governance. Finally, I conclude. 
 
2.2. Europe’s single currency and the puzzle of labour markets 
In the EMU, the centralisation of monetary policies, a single currency, and disciplinary 
fiscal rules are the fundamental institutions. Mainstream economics suggests that a monetary 
union with a single currency requires one of the following: either, it requires flexible labour 
markets with wages responding efficiently to economic cycles of boom and bust, or strong 
supranational wage coordination to help member states respond to economic crisis (de Grauwe, 
2014). Political constraints and opposition have prevented European leaders from delivering 
either. Put simply, there is no support for continent-wide implementation of neoliberal ideal-
type labour market reforms, just like there is strong opposition to the formation of a federal 
system of economic, wage, and labour governance. European monetary integration therefore 
faces a puzzle: there are strong political and institutional constraints to any system of wage and 
labour governance that would bolster the functioning of the EMU.  
This speaks to the fundamental contradiction of the EMU and EU labour governance. 
On the one hand, in a currency union without a central stabilisation mechanism, flexible labour 
markets should perform a vital, market-based adjustment role. From the perspective of 
neoclassical economics, wages should respond to aggregate demand, with wage cuts 
substituting lay-offs in recessionary times (Kleinknecht, 1998). From this perspective, the only 
viable alternative to wage flexibility is the one we have seen in the Eurozone periphery since 
2009, with exorbitant unemployment rates and costly adjustment for the member states (Belke 
& Gros, 2017). There is nonetheless ample political opposition to the economistic proposal of 
letting workers pay for financial crises, and the Eurozone remains some way off this ideal-type 
system of liberalised labour markets. Alternatively, in order to stabilise the monetary union, 
the EU could develop a regime of highly coordinated wage and labour governance combined 
with some centralised, budgetary stabilisation mechanism. This would involve member states 
ceding a significant degree of fiscal and macroeconomic sovereignty. Like the ideal of fully 
liberalised labour markets, centralised labour and fiscal policy have hitherto not materialised. 
The EU combines monetary centralization for EMU member states with national 
authority over labour markets (under the TFEU). In most European countries, legal and 
institutional regulations shape labour markets and wage-setting institutions are rarely fully 
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centralised or fully decentralised. Under these conditions, social partners are unlikely to act in 
accordance with economic models of market adjustment and economic rationality (Scharpf, 
2016). Therefore, labour market agents have heterogeneous identities and preferences 
depending on the class composition, political structure, and individual motives, within and 
across EMU member states. Economists worry about the inflationary bias and the persistence 
of unemployment in regulated labour markets (Calmfors, 2001). In the 1990s, a consensus 
among economists emerged on the necessity of structural labour market reforms to cut 
unemployment benefits, abolish employment protection legislation, and lower minimum 
wages.  
From the perspective of critical integration theory, the model of deregulated labour 
markets forms part of the neoliberal hegemonic project. Yet, the neoliberal project has not 
succeeded in fully deregulating European labour markets. While the recent crisis seemingly 
confirmed the undesirability of the current relationship between the EMU and Europe’s labour 
markets, the idea of wholesale deregulation as a cure for Europe’s woes appear improbable.  
That the neoliberal project has not been able to transform labour markets within the 
Eurozone is indeed slightly puzzling. The institutional context of the EMU, prioritising price 
stability above employment, is much more conducive to supply-side reforms and deregulation 
than to Keynesian demand-management. Yet, in the absence of institutional capacity and wider 
social legitimacy, far-reaching labour market liberalisation is difficult.  
In addition to the political and institutional structures of the EMU, global macro-
structural changes, particularly economic globalisation, have also seemed conducive to the 
neoliberal project. With economic globalization, I refer in particular to the integration of global 
financial networks and the transnational nature of production and trade. The development of 
transatlantic financial markets, through which European banks became heavily involved in the 
US mortgage and banking crisis in the late 2000s, made Europe particularly vulnerable to the 
fallouts of the financial crisis (Tooze, 2018). In the absence of a coherent European response, 
the structural pressure on member states in the Eurozone periphery to embark on a radical 
process of labour market restructuring was immense. However, the required restructuring was 
mostly politically unviable, and in many member states, the result has been partial 
restructuring, prolonged recession, and social hardship.  
The globalisation of trade and production is the other element of economic globalisation 
with decisive impact on EU labour governance. Globalisation means that Europe’s leading 
economies, notably Germany, have seen a transnational expansion of production and trade 
patterns, whereby Western European industries increasingly rely on Eastern European and non-
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European labour. Further, export performance increasingly relies on non-Western demand, not 
least demand from China. While transnational production and trade networks have been the 
strategic objective of some member states, these elements of economic globalization have 
become the structural conditions for others. As some member states in the Eurozone periphery 
have been unable to transform into export-oriented economic models, they have experienced a 
gradual weakening of their output performance.  
Despite the pressure of economic globalization, European labour markets do not 
correspond to the neoclassical ideal of perfectly competitive markets. In most countries, 
minimum wages exist. In some countries, the government indexes the minimum wage to follow 
general wage inflation. Even if declining in membership and influence, trade unions persist 
and exercise their power through collective bargaining, industrial action, etc. Therefore, most 
European governments still cooperate with social partners when reforming labour markets, and 
at the level of European integration, the governance of wages and labour remain deeply 
contested issues. 
The current relationship between European monetary integration and labour 
governance gives rise to a number of tensions and crises that social democrats would want to 
address. Particularly, we have seen that the EU has been unable to prevent economic 
divergence and macroeconomic imbalances. An alternative solution to Europe’s crisis-ridden 
monetary union would therefore be to improve the integration of labour governance in the 
institutional structure of the EMU. For instance, we could imagine the use of fiscal transfers to 
invest in regions with low productivity and high unemployment. A project using labour 
governance and fiscal transfers to fight imbalances would amount to a revitalisation of post-
Keynesian demand management at the European level. For critical integration theory, the 
revitalisation of organised capitalism and organised labour markets at the European level 
depends on the social democratic hegemonic project. An enhanced coordination of wage and 
labour market policy at the EU level, effectively a reorganization of a core pillar of the 
European welfare states at the supranational level, would be an effective instrument to fight 
unemployment, divergence, and macroeconomic imbalances. Despite the promise of social 
democracy, I argue, a progressive project for labour governance within the institutional 
structures of the EU and the EMU is unlikely.  
The social democratic hegemonic project has its most natural social foundation in the 
working class, but the political organisation of this social group has witnessed a severe decline 
in recent decades. There is little dispute that organised labour is in gradual decline. Among 
other indicators, industrial conflict has receded significantly across the European countries 
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(Baccaro & Howell, 2011). Correlating with the gradual weakening of organised labour, the 
distribution of income between capital and labour has dramatically changed. Since 1980, 
labour’s share of total income in 12 Eurozone countries has decreased substantially (Chapter 
4)3. Wages are, effectively, in relative decline. 
Critical integration theory emphasises the structural conditions underpinning the 
decline of organised labour and wages. EU institutional and global macrostructures are equally 
important for explaining this decline. Economic globalization and the increasingly dominant 
role of finance in European capitalism have weakened trade unions and the ability of the social 
democratic project in developing a transformative vision for the European integration. Within 
the EMU, the social democratic project has mostly accepted the neoliberal (or ordoliberal) 
nature of rules and institutions governing the single currency.  
The neoliberal project has been mostly unable to use the rules and institutions of the 
EMU to transform Europe’s labour markets. Stakeholders in the neoliberal project, including 
European business, have been hesitant to promote more ambitious labour market reform 
programmes at the EU level. Conversely, the social democratic project, while advancing the 
project of EU labour governance, has been unable to make an impact on the EMU rules and 
institutions. Alongside a long-term gradual weakening of organised labour, the pro-European 
social democratic political project of European integration has changed. In particular, along the 
wave of the social democratic resurgence in the late 1990s came the abandonment of the 
objective of social and economic harmonisation. The outcome of hegemonic competition 
between neoliberals and social democrats has been an evolution of EU labour governance 
unable to address the structural crisis of the EMU.  
Despite the crisis-ridden tendencies of EU labour governance, and its lacking 
institutionalisation within the EMU, only a minority of academic discussions on EU and EMU 
governance addresses the political conflicts over the development of labour governance within 
the EMU. Instead, mainstream economic literature tends to focus on the ideal conditions for a 
functioning EMU, while mainstream public policy studies have focused on EU labour 
governance in response to globalization and under the constraint of opposing policy advocacy 
coalitions. 
 
3 The 12 countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Greece. The former 11 countries joined the currency union in 1999, 
while Greece joined in 2001. These 12 countries are used as sample because they joined the currency 
union in close proximity and allows us to use a fixed set of countries when referring to ‘the Eurozone’ 
or ‘the Eurozone 12’.   
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2.3. The currency/labour puzzle in mainstream scholarship 
In this section, I engage with the mainstream economic and policy-focused scholarship on the 
single currency and European labour markets. First, I outline how the functioning of the EMU 
is treated in mainstream economics, focusing on the neoclassical emphasis on price stability 
and fiscal discipline, and the major controversy that has surrounded Europe’s inability to 
qualify as an optimum currency area (Mundell, 1961). Further, I discuss how neoclassical 
economics treat the role of labour in the EMU. Neoclassical economics provides a 
straightforward, but flawed, assessment of labour’s role in the evolution and crisis of the EMU. 
Second, I turn to mainstream studies of EU social and employment policy evolution to discuss 
their assessment of the evolution of EU labour governance under the condition of the single 
currency. However, these public policy studies insist on studying policy developments in their 
own right, and overtly or covertly disregard the institutional/structural context. Consequently, 
the single currency plays a very marginal role in these assessments of EU labour governance. 
The inability of mainstream economic and policy-focused scholarship to address the political 
relationship between the EMU and labour governance reflects an established distribution of 
labour in mainstream EU scholarship. This assertion follows Ryner’s (2012) argument on the 
established roles of the economics and the political sociology of European integration: 
economic studies address the ‘exchange relations’ between economic entities, whereas political 
sociology ‘reduces the question of integration to one of the density of interaction required to 
ensure the prevalence of administrative-managerial rationality, as required to ensure social and 
political equilibrium’ (Ryner, 2012, pp. 653–654). Absent from these two main streams of 
European studies are central questions of political economy: the relations between production, 
power, economic progress, and social stability.  
 
2.3.1. Mainstream economics, the EMU, and labour 
The essential institution of the EMU is the single currency. Introducing a single 
currency for all member states, the EMU differs significantly from its predecessor, the 
European Monetary System (EMS). The EMS had pegged national currencies but permitted 
fluctuation bandwidths of up to 15% and involved ‘the option of reaching a mutual agreement 
on exchange rate adjustments’ (Höpner & Spielau, 2018, p. 162). The EMU, on the other hand, 
permanently fixes joining member states’ exchange rates with a view to fostering further 
European economic integration. According to most economic reasoning, the EMU can 
contribute positively to economic performance, trade, and financial integration in Europe by 
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eliminating the exchange rate and thereby the currency risk that follows with cross-border 
investment (European Commission, 1990).  
Further, given its institutional framework, the EMU should help entrench a stability 
culture across the continent conducive for private economic activities. The stability culture, 
favoured in particularly by German political and economic actors, comes in particular from 
price stability and fiscal discipline. In the EMU, price stability has come to mean two things: 
first, the convergence of inflation rates among member states, and second, convergence on a 
low and stable level. Mainstream economics ascribes the convergence of inflation rates to the 
changing preferences of monetary policy-makers under the condition of a single currency: a 
monetary union ‘implies that a common central bank takes over, so that the preferences of the 
authorities become identical’ (de Grauwe, 1996, p. 6). For many mainstream economists, 
aiming for a low inflation rate below 2% cannot be explained by pure economic reasons. 
Instead, it stems from the political settlement that determined the terms of the EMU. Requiring 
central bank independence, Germany successfully entrenched the principle of low and stable 
inflation at the heart of the EMU, and negotiated a European central bank structured much like 
the German Bundesbank (Mody, 2018). This was the rational condition for a powerful, low-
inflation country Germany to concede monetary sovereignty (de Grauwe, 1996; Iversen et al., 
2016) 
Alongside monetary policy and the objective of price stability, the EMU governs 
through fiscal discipline. The rationale for fiscal discipline has at least two crucial aspects: an 
economic stability argument and a crowding out argument. The first argument posits that 
countries running “excessive” government deficits may inflect serious economic pain on other 
member states and the currency union at large through a series of externalities (see Buiter et 
al., 1993). The crowding out argument posits that expansionary fiscal policies negatively 
impact future investment levels as government spending crowds out private spending 
(Blanchard & Perotti, 2002).  
In economic debates over the viability of a single currency in Europe in the 1980s and 
1990s, two camps emerged. The “economists” believed that economic policy convergence 
ought to precede monetary integration. In effect, the single currency could only be introduced 
when member states fulfilled the economic criteria. The “monetarists”, conversely, believed 
that the single currency would induce greater economic coordination and convergence. The 
compromise position was to ensure parallel progress in monetary and economic integration 
(Maes, 2004). A view expressed by economists in the European Commission in the One 
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Market, One Money report from 1990, the compromise position gained growing popularity in 
over the course of the process of negotiating the EMU (European Commission, 1990).  
In addition to fiscal and monetary policy, the neoclassical economics holds that the 
EMU depends on flexible labour markets and mobile workers. Fully competitive labour 
markets should increase efficiency and maximise welfare, by for instance incentivising workers 
to change jobs to optimise earnings and working conditions. Allowing workers to move to the 
jobs that maximise benefits requires flexibility in the labour market. Much economic modelling 
therefore predicts trade unions, which often seek to improve pay and working conditions for 
workers in existing employment, to act detrimentally to the overall welfare of the workforce. 
Similarly, high minimum wages may distort market mechanism driving up wages and limit 
employment by reducing incentives of firms to hire (see Manning, 2004).  
However, these models tend to ignore a number of factors that question the idea that 
workers move seamlessly between jobs in search of welfare maximisation. For example, 
workers would be unlikely to have full information of alternatives to their current jobs and 
limited to time to improve their knowledge of alternatives. Further, workers may hold strong 
preferences in terms of e.g. commuting that would hinder mobility even in case of perfect 
information (Manning, 2004). In reality, employers are therefore likely to hold significant 
power over workers, known in economic language as monopsony power (Ashenfelter et al., 
2010).  
Currency unions, compared to an international system of floating exchange rates, seek 
to substitute labour markets adjustment for currency adjustment. In Mundell’s theory of 
optimum currency unions, labour flexibility is required for natural adjustment to asymmetric 
shocks in aggregate demand (Mundell, 1961). First, workers need to be willing or forced to 
accept lower wages if there is no longer sufficient demand to stimulate existing employment 
levels. Second, workers need to be willing to move to other member states with higher demand 
for labour.  
In reality, the EMU cannot comply with the neoclassical models of fiscal discipline, 
market flexibility, and labour mobility. The Maastricht Treaty, while unequivocally requiring 
fiscal discipline as a criterion for EMU membership, gave room for considerable political 
discretion and budgetary manipulation in interpreting the rules on government deficits. Once 
the common currency had been introduced, EU member states were unable to maintain fiscal 
discipline, despite the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Germany, the 
anchor of stability and discipline, was unable to maintain fiscal discipline as it rolled out the 
ambitious Hartz labour market and welfare reform plan. France, which had accepted the 
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German conditions for establishing a common currency, but had never conceded to the German 
ordoliberal principle of restrained and market-conforming government, also transgressed the 
thresholds for fiscal discipline in 2003-05 (on ordoliberalism, see Foucault, 2010; Siems & 
Schnyder, 2014).  
Because the rules of fiscal discipline have proven amendable, and the ideal of flexible 
labour markets bears little resemblance with the reality in much of Europe, mainstream 
economics can maintain that the problem is not the rules and ideals themselves, but their 
incomplete implementation. Noteworthy, the existing rules of economic governance, including 
post-crisis tightening of the rules, are compatible with standard macroeconomic theories 
(Franchino, 2020). Yet, the difference between the economic models and the political reality 
of the EMU, especially as it applies to the governance of labour markets, speaks to the 
limitations of mainstream economic analysis. Mainstream economics is unable to provide a 
historical and political account of the EMU’s puzzling relationship to labour.  
The compromise position between the monetarists and the economists discussed above 
suggests that economic and monetary integration progresses alongside each other. In 
neoclassical economics, progress, at least in terms of labour markets, means liberalization. Yet 
the idea that monetary integration leads to domestic labour market liberalization has hitherto 
proven fanciful (Vukov, 2016). To be clear, the EMU can use rules and institutions to exert 
enormous pressure on labour to cede the right to sectoral wage bargaining, for example, just 
like labour itself can put pressure on the EMU to facilitate e.g. a more employment-friendly 
monetary policy. Yet, the outcome of these political conflicts is unlikely to resemble the ideal 
models of neoclassical economics. The purely economic debates on the EMU are therefore 
poorly equipped to contribute to a political analysis of labour governance under the condition 
of a single currency. 
  
2.3.2. Mainstream public policy studies, the EMU and labour  
Whereas the economic models imply an ideal-type solution to political problems, a 
more policy-focused scholarship has evolved in recent decades to study the specific processes 
that go into policy-making in the post-Maastricht era of European integration. In the period 
after the Maastricht Treaty and up until the financial crisis, the main trajectories in European 
studies were either towards more normative assessments of the EU’s democratic credentials, 
or towards micro-level analyses of policy-making and domestic implementation (Bickerton et 
al., 2015b). A consensus seemed to exist on the utility of ‘theorising integration after the 
 74 
integration theories’ and building an alternative “governance” paradigm (Rosamond, 2013, p. 
85).  
Studying the development of EU social and employment policy around the turn of the 
century, a major body of scholarly work emerged to make sense of the experimental and rather 
unique character of EU governance in these policy areas (Trubek & Trubek, 2005). As shown 
below, the problem with this body of the literature is that it neglects the relationship between 
European integration, which involves political and structural transformation, and the 
development of specific policies and governance instruments. Neglecting this relationship, the 
literature struggles to assess the significance of developments in e.g. social and employment 
policy for the broader project of developing a comprehensive framework for governing labour 
markets in the EU and the EMU.  
As discussed previously, the EU faces a central contradiction in EU labour governance. 
A number of member state governments have fought hard to avoid handing over any authority 
to the EU on issues like wages and collective bargaining, as these remains salient domestic 
policy issues (Mailand & Arnholtz, 2015). Yet, the governance and coordination of labour 
market reforms nonetheless seem vital to the realisation of the EU’s economic policy 
objectives, as globalisation poses a number of social and economic challenges to Europe’s 
labour markets. The EMU, with the centralisation of monetary policy and deflationary rules on 
fiscal policy, greatly amplifies the tension that arises from decentralised wage and labour 
governance. Given the centralisation of monetary policy and rules-based fiscal policy, labour 
markets necessarily perform a key role in economic adjustment. 
 For continental, and especially Southern European, left-wing parties, the solution has 
traditionally been a more ambitious programme of social cohesion and regulation at the EU-
level (Hooghe, 1998). Yet this is generally opposed by neoliberals and employers across 
Europe, and all but unanimously opposed in Scandinavia (Mailand & Arnholtz, 2015). This 
opposition has forced the EU and its member states to think creatively about how to coordinate 
social and employment policies.  
EU policy literature has particularly focused on exploring the normative and empirical 
merits of the European Social Model (ESM) and the open method of coordination (OMC) (Citi 
& Rhodes, 2007). The European Social Model, conceptually pioneered by social democrats 
and socially oriented actors, praises the diversity of member states’ welfare systems, while 
highlighting the need for supranational action to preserve and modernise welfare in the face of 
globalization and European (monetary) integration (Jepsen & Serrano Pascual, 2006). The 
OMC is a set of codes, benchmark exercises, and declarations intended to spark policy reforms 
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and transnational coordination through processes of policy learning. The OMC emerged in the 
European polity in the mid-1990s, and acquired a prominent place in EU social, employment, 
and economic governance with the Lisbon Strategy (Porte, 2002).  
The policy-focused literature generally supports the hypothesis that economic 
developments in past decades, including globalization and European integration, have 
increased the need for labour market coordination, but that the salience of the policy issues 
imposes severe restrictions on member states’ willingness to commit to binding agreements. 
As the demand for labour market coordination is not met by governments’ supply of 
cooperation, or willingness to cooperate, stakeholders will look for politically less 
controversial methods of coordination. Thus, new modes of governance have been introduced 
in order to overcome problems of collective decision-making in the salient policy area of social 
and employment policies.  
From the perspective of critical integration theory, there are several problems with EU 
public policy studies. First, they tend to ignore or dismiss the idea that the ESM and the OMC 
themselves could be integral parts of the general process of neoliberal integration (Bruff, 2017; 
Parker, 2008). Thus, they have remained reluctant to investigate whether social and labour 
market policy governance itself has undergone a process of liberalization and become part of - 
rather than a counterpoint to - neoliberal European integration. This thesis’ critical integration 
theoretical perspective does not align the ESM with either the neoliberal project or its more 
social alternatives, but instead proposes that the ESM is best understood as a terrain for political 
contestation (see Jepsen & Serrano Pascual, 2005 who emphasise rhetoric). 
If we accept that the ESM is a political terrain (and/or a rhetorical device) for conflicting 
integration projects, then the OMC – the means for advancing social model(s) – is also a 
fundamentally political object. This leads to our second objection to the assumptions 
underpinning most EU policy studies. Focusing on policy-making and implementation, most 
of the literature on new modes of governance has generally subdued the question of why the 
new, more flexible, modes of governance emerged in the field of social and employment 
policies, instead prioritising studies of how, and to what degree, these new governance forms 
can deliver domestic change (Schäfer, 2004). Thus, the literature on European social policy 
and the OMC tends to be less focused on the external political coalitions behind governance 
innovations (e.g. among member state government), and more focused on the internal evolution 
of governance practices and networks (e.g. Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008). Schäfer (2004), reviewing 
the limits to the literature on the OMC, highlights in particular the coalition of social 
democratic governments capable of furthering the agenda on social policy and employment, 
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with conservative governments able to block attempts at firmer governance at the supranational 
level.  
Finally, public policy studies often implicitly assume that policy change is key to 
political and societal change. As part of the neglect of the political coalitions and institutional 
constraints that guide the evolution of EU wage and labour governance, including social and 
employment policy, the policy-focused literature more broadly neglects the wider societal 
contradictions not resolvable by selective governance practices. For Sabel & Zeitlin (2008), 
the functional performance of social policy innovation may solve important contradictions of 
European integration, including the distributional questions at heart of economic integration 
and wage-labour politics. In Sabel & Zeitlin’s (2008) assessment, the onus is on the EU’s 
regulatory successes through, as they put it, ‘the force of the better argument’ (Sabel & Zeitlin, 
2008, p. 272). The authors identify the ‘processes of framework making and revision’, such as 
the OMC, that enables the ‘profusion common deliberative techniques’ among and within 
member states (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008, pp. 274–275). Rather than replacing legislative politics, 
such processes may transform ‘distributive bargaining into deliberative problem solving’, thus 
acting as a ‘handmaiden’ to the passing of real law (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008, pp. 280, 276). Based 
on critical integration theory, and the emphasis on structural conditions, I would question 
whether deliberative techniques and the passing of real laws necessarily resolve underlying 
structural weaknesses in the relationship between European monetary integration and EU 
labour governance. Below, I turn to the development of critical integration theory to the task 
of analysing this relationship.    
 
2.4. An alternative framework for analysing labour and wages in the EMU 
Critical integration theory, as developed by Bulmer and Joseph (2016) and in this thesis’ 
Chapter 1, is fundamentally a theory of European integration (including disintegration and 
differentiation). To better grasp what is at stake at the intersection of the single currency and 
labour governance, in this chapter I have discussed the approaches and assumptions of 
mainstream economic and policy analysis. As both approaches highlight, the EU faces the 
challenge of coordinating economic and labour market policy in the absence of a clear EU 
mandate. In mainstream economic assessments, the lack of flexible labour markets to improve 
the functioning of the EMU is the main problem. In mainstream public policy studies, the focus 
is on the processes of policy coordination. From the perspective of a critical inquiry into the 
politics of EU labour governance, the two mainstream approaches both depoliticise the issues 
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at stake. Therefore, in the rest of this chapter, I focus on the institutional, distributional, and 
structural dimensions to the political problem of governing labour within the EMU.  
Public policy literature supportive of the OMC also neglects how institutional structures 
(e.g. Scharpf, 2002) and/or class relations (e.g. Bieler & Morton, 2001) condition political 
bargaining and policy processes. Political economy, emphasizing conflict and bargaining in 
both formal political and wider social institutions, puts the “who benefit” (qui bono) question 
front and centre. The qui bono question is important for adding a distributional perspective to 
political negotiations and change. Without the distributional perspective, it is difficult to assign 
interests and preferences to actors, and to locate their position within macroeconomic 
structures.  
Neoclassical economic analysis, which suggests that Europe’s regulated labour markets 
contribute to the fragility of the EMU, mostly ignores a key historical reality of Eurozone 
labour markets: the massive redistribution of total income from labour to capital since 1980. 
This suggests that distributional questions, and essentially class relations, are at the heart of the 
functioning of the EMU. Critical integration theory is attentive to these structural 
transformations but does not possess a fully-fledged framework for analysing distributional 
conflict and labour governance within the EMU. For purpose of developing this framework, I 
draw on the literature on Comparative Capitalism, post-Keynesian economics, critical IPE, and 
governmentality studies.  
Comparative capitalism provides a compelling assessment of Eurozone economic 
divergence, including divergent labour markets. Yet, the literature neglects the common 
redistributive trajectory in European capitalism. Therefore, I use post-Keynesian economics to 
point out a fundamental asymmetry of wages at the heart of the European economy. The 
inability of labour to secure a return on investment, i.e. their labour power, equal to that of 
capital investment, has led to a significant redistribution of income between capital and labour 
and a rise in economic inequality (Marx, 1981; Piketty, 2014). Marxist and neo-Gramscian IPE 
underpins how these trends are structurally rooted in contemporary capitalism, and 
governmentality approaches stress the difficulties involved in EU attempts to govern wages 
either directly or at a distance.  
 
2.4.1 Comparative Capitalism and Eurozone divergence 
Since the crisis, a scholarly agreement has emerged. According to the majority of 
scholarly observers, macroeconomic imbalances inside the Eurozone, and not fiscal deficits, 
were the principal trigger of the crisis (Collignon, 2013). By broadening the perspective from 
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government budgets to equilibriums across the macroeconomic area, the focus on imbalances 
has brought the question of wages and labour into the centre of discussions. While some 
observers maintain that labour governance is only of secondary importance to financial 
regulation, EU governance reforms have nonetheless brought in questions of wages, labour 
costs, and cost competitiveness to the discussion (Jones, 2015).  
Given this link between wages, labour and the Eurozone, observers on the political left 
and right posit the importance of Eurozone-level wage and labour governance (Flassbeck & 
Lapavitsas, 2015; Trichet, 2011). Nonetheless, despite the legal and institutional changes 
brought about by the Six-Pack reform of the EU’s economic governance framework in 2011, 
member states’ wage and labour market policies remain subject to domestic social and 
industrial relations.  
The literature on comparative capitalism has highlighted the relationship between 
labour markets, wage developments, and competitiveness trends, in the lead-up to the crisis 
(Johnston & Regan, 2018; Nölke, 2016). Hancké’s (2013) analysis of the relationship between 
wages, divergent growth models and monetary integration connects domestic institutions to the 
development and crisis of the EMU. In Germany, and similarly coordinated market economies, 
such as the Netherlands and Austria, but also France and most of Northwestern Europe, the 
social partners have imposed “beneficial constraints” on wage developments, which in turn 
tends to keep price inflation in check. Historically, as central banks have supported these 
constraints by “signalling” willingness to retaliate against excessive wage inflation, trade 
unions have turned to productivity gains to support wage rises (Hancké, 2013, p. 87). Central 
banks have similarly dissuaded governments from excessive fiscal expansion. The result has 
been two-fold: steady productivity gains and a rapid fall in the wage share as percentage of 
GDP.  
The constraints facing business and labour in core EU member states have had perverse 
effects on the stability and balance of the Eurozone economy, given the rapid losses to 
competitiveness in countries lacking the institutional fit between trade unions, monetary 
policies, and fiscal policies. Southern countries have suffered from lacking institutional 
coordination, and while firms in export/tradable sectors here have sought to restore 
competitiveness through downward pressure on wages, sheltered sectors have been protected 
from wage pressure, thus driving up labour costs relative to the Eurozone core (see also 
Johnston et al., 2014).  
While wage shares have fallen everywhere, nowhere is this truer than in coordinated, 
core EMU member states like Germany. In Germany, a combination of strong productivity 
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growth, increasing wage moderation, and favourable exchange rates against trade partners 
outside the Eurozone, gave rise to increasing profit shares in relation to GDP from 60.2% in 
1992 to 53.7% in 2007. Given the high proportion of trade within the EMU, divergent unit 
labour costs and real effective exchange rates ‘necessarily implies that the gains in 
competitiveness in the northern group find their counterpart in falling competitiveness in the 
south’ (Hancké, 2013, p. 102). As wages across the Eurozone generally stagnated in the years 
preceding the crisis, growth has depended on rising exports. This amplifies the problem of 
competitiveness losses in the Eurozone periphery. Pre-crisis divergences in competitiveness, 
more than anything, caused the macroeconomic imbalances and made the Eurozone so 
vulnerable to the global financial crisis (Hancké, 2013, p. 103).  
Hancké’s book supports the thesis of a bifurcation of growth models within the 
Eurozone. How did this bifurcation come about? Some authors, including Hancké (2013) and 
Johnston (2016), focuses on labour costs, differentials in wage inflation, and divergence in 
competitiveness. Others, including Jones (2015) and Dooley (2018) emphasise financial 
liberalization and rapidly rising credit flows. As argued by Johnston and Regan (2016), the 
labour cost argument fails to explain the timing of the crisis, since exchange rate policy 
constraints have been in place since Maastricht, but imbalances only accumulated during the 
2000s. The financial liberalization argument, conversely, fails to explain the intra-area dualism 
between lenders and borrowers. Since credit got cheaper for everyone, and you could get it 
anywhere – also outside of the EMU – why did so much of it move from north to south 
(Johnston & Regan, 2016)? Despite their disagreements, Hancké, Jones, Johnston, and Regan, 
all agree that the EMU institutional design is unfit to accommodate this diversity in the 
Eurozone’s economic models. 
Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of the role of wages and labour markets in 
the Eurozone crisis depends on a satisfactory account of the relationship between labour and 
capital to explain the relationship between wages and financial flows. This relationship is 
constitutive of critical IPE as reviewed below, whereas in Comparative Capitalism the 
relationship between wages and finance is institutional and purely empirical. Yet, empirically, 
comparative capitalism’s identification of wage divergence as the cause of the crisis also has 
flaws. There is limited evidence for the claim that wages in southern Europe increased 
excessively in the run-up to the crisis, and that a loss of cost competitiveness caused the build-
up of macroeconomic imbalances. As shown in figure 2.1, nominal unit labour costs (the 
average cost of labour per unit of output produced) in Italy and Spain were steadily growing 
between 2-4% per year between 1999 and 2007, while the nominal unit labour costs in 
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Germany first grew between 0-1% between 1999 and 2003, before turning negative in the years 
2004-2007. Over this period, Southern European countries were in fact much closer to the 
ECBs inflation target of 2% than Germany, otherwise known as the bastion of price stability. 
 
Figure 2.1. Nominal unit labour costs in selected Eurozone countries 
 
Source: AMECO database. 
 
Across the Eurozone, wages diminished in relation to total income, and increased 
Europe’s dependence on debt and trade imbalances. This phenomenon suggests that common 
patterns happen across the varieties of capitalism existing in the Eurozone. Within the 
comparative capitalism literature, there is acknowledgement of the tendencies to common 
trajectory in European capitalism, or as Thelen (2012) suggests, different ‘trajectories of 
liberalization’. Thelen observes two patterns: in some countries, ‘“market coordination” and 
flexibilization’ coexist with ‘continued high social solidarity’; while in other countries, 
continued ‘“strategic coordination” and traditional protections’ coexist alongside rising 
inequality (2012, p. 155). 
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Germany has arguably followed the latter path, whereby industrial relations are still 
organized centrally at the regional and sectoral level, but the numbers of workplaces and 
employees covered by industry-wide collective bargaining are in steady fall (Streeck, 2009). 
Streeck (2009) notes a similar trend for work councils with legal mandates to enforce collective 
agreements. These trends have resulted in an increased dualisation of the German labour 
market, in which co-ordination and liberalization become complementary. In the context of a 
German growth model reliant on exports and price competitiveness, ‘sustained co-ordination 
[for core, manufacturing workers] requires increasing liberalization for the labour market 
fringe’ of service workers (Hassel, 2014, p. 75).  
These processes are not isolated to Germany. In a comparative study of 15 advanced 
capitalist countries, including Germany, France, and Italy, Baccaro and Howell (2011, p. 522) 
find that: 
‘… industrial relations systems are being transformed in a common direction, a 
direction that we characterize as neoliberal. (…) This does not mean that 
industrial relations institutions in each advanced capitalist country are 
necessarily coming to resemble those of an archetypal liberal market economy, 
though there is certainly movement in that direction.’ 
While ‘macrocorporatism’ remain intact in most countries, meaning that bargaining 
centralization and bargaining coordination remain high, industrial conflict slowly vanishes in 
most countries between the two periods 1974-1989 and 1990-2005 (Baccaro & Howell, 2011, 
p. 530). Trade unions and employers may still agree to social pacts that resemble the grand 
bargains of the heydays of neo-corporatism, but modern social pacts reflect the weakened 
power of unions and tend to install wage moderation in name of competitiveness (Erne, 2008).    
In Southern Europe, the process of liberalization has arguably accelerated under the last 
decade of economic recession and austerity measures. In Spain, studies indicate that labour 
market reforms have included radical de-centralization of collective bargaining, deregulation 
of employment protection and higher internal flexibility for employers, whereas the Italian 
reforms have combined attacks on collective bargaining with improvement of the coverage of 
unemployment benefits (Picot & Tassinari, 2017) 
What tensions arise in EU labour governance as a result of these processes? In later 
chapters, I demonstrate in more detail the often-contradictory manner in which the Commission 
has approached the question of collective bargaining and wage coordination in the wake of the 
crisis. However, the Eurozone’s macroeconomic imbalances – broadly perceived as the 
proximate cause of the crisis – added a new problem of common concern for EU’s hegemonic 
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projects. For the neoliberal hegemonic project, the question of wage developments and labour 
costs became an urgent matter of concern in the wake of crisis. Yet, pushing for liberalization 
of collective bargaining, the neoliberal project would only add to Europe’s underlying woes of 
low growth and falling wage shares. 
A key question is which social forces are driving the common neoliberal trajectory in 
European labour markets, and how they translate into European-level politics. Picot and 
Tassinari (2017) emphasises the involvement or exclusion of centre-left parties as determining 
the social balance in (neoliberal) reforms. Streeck and Hassel highlight the institutional 
composition of German labour markets. Here, I want to stress the value of adding a class 
perspective to the party political and institutional dynamics identified above.  
 
2.4.2. Post-Keynesian economics and distributional conflict  
Post-Keynesian economics highlight the distributional struggle of labour and capital 
that shapes European political economy. In recent decades, European workers have continued 
to improve productivity at work, but have been unable to secure pay rises to match the growth 
in productivity. This imbalance between workers’ return on investing labour power, and 
capitalists’ return on capital investment leads to a rise in inequality between those acquiring 
income primarily from wages, and those whose income depends on the return on invested 
capital (known as functional inequality, Glyn, 2011). For post-Keynesians, falling wage shares 
further destabilises the functioning of the Eurozone by depressing consumption and demand. 
For Stockhammer (2015), the accumulation of imbalances between the Eurozone’s 
member states was not the root cause of the crisis; instead, the rise of these imbalances were 
themselves caused by falling wage shares and rising inequality. Post-Keynesian economists 
Stockhammer, Onaran and Ederer (2008) argue that the wage share is of paramount importance 
to aggregate demand in the Eurozone. Wage increases are the most effective policy tool for 
stimulating demand and growth. Under monetary integration in the EMU, the policies of fiscal 
discipline and price stability have helped suppress wages and demand, and the EMU has 
instead accommodated pro-capital distributional changes from wages to capital (Stockhammer, 
2011, 2016). 
Post-Keynesian economists typically operate with a distinction between wage- and 
profit-led economies. In wage-led economies, the ‘total effect of the increase in the wage share’ 
on aggregate demand is positive, whereas an increase in the profit share will have a positive 
effect in profit-led economies (Stockhammer et al., 2008, p. 143). Onaran and Galanis (2012) 
find that Germany, Italy, and France all have a negative correlation between increasing profit-
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shares and aggregate demand, and that the same relationship applies for the Eurozone overall. 
Thus, the Eurozone is a wage-led economy (Onaran & Galanis, 2012). Smaller Eurozone 
countries may well be profit-led, but given the overall Eurozone’s wage-led economy, they 
find themselves in a ‘prisoner’s dilemma-type situation’ concerning suitable wage policies 
(Stockhammer et al., 2008, p. 155).  
In response to the falling wage shares across the Eurozone economies, EMU member 
states searched for sources of growth to replace wage-led demand and developed along lines 
of either export-led or debt-led growth models. Exports and debt-led consumption have become 
increasingly fundamental components of the Eurozone’s political economy. The growing 
current account imbalances preceding the Eurozone crisis reveal the establishment of two 
divergent growth models. The strong productivity growth and the restrained wage development 
improved the global competitiveness of northern European economies, particularly Germany, 
who have managed to sustain a solid trade and current account surplus with the rest of the 
world since the early 2000s.  
In southern Europe, where productivity increases have been comparatively weak, there 
has been more divergence, but the overall trend is towards falling wage shares either in the 
lead-up to joining the Euro (Italy), throughout the process (Spain) or concentrated in the period 
after joining the common currency (Portugal). Greece is in many ways the exception to the 
rule: with a history of very low wages relative to total income, Greece managed break the 
general trend by increasing wage shares from 1992 to 2008. However, since 2009, the Greek 
wage share has fallen at a high pace, as real wages have contracted by approximately 20% 
(Chapter 4).  
The post-Keynesian critique of neoclassical and mainstream economics redirects 
attention to the long process of wage depression relative to total income that characterises 
developed capitalist economies inside and outside the Eurozone. Further, it provides a useful 
starting point for analysing the specific structural constraints in the Eurozone that turned the 
strategy of wage moderation into a crisis of macroeconomic imbalances by deepening financial 
integration and embedding debt-led growth models in southern and peripheral Europe. Thus, 
post-Keynesian economics provide a strong corrective to the broadly popular explanation of 
how fiscal profligacy in southern Europe caused the Eurozone crisis. Further, post-Keynesians 
historicise the rise in Eurozone macroeconomic imbalances in the 2000s as the consequence of 
long-term trends in functional inequality. As policy-makers, increasingly concerned with 
profit-squeezes and wage inflation, abandoned aggregate demand management in the 1970-
80s, they also abandoned important instruments for shaping the distribution of income between 
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capital and labour. As the political project of financial liberalisation gathered pace with the 
creation of the EMU, member states underwent processes of financialisation to counter the 
effects of contracting wage shares and declining aggregate demand.   
Post-Keynesian economics also has limitations for a study of EU labour governance: 
post-Keynesians are not primarily interested in the politics of governing wages and labour. 
Despite their proposals for policies supporting wage-led growth, the fact that the politics of 
labour governance is of secondary importance to the economics of different growth models, 
causes at times a naïve optimism for ‘wage-led growth’ among post-Keynesians. Post-
Keynesian economics contains, in other words, an insufficient discussion of the social and 
political conditions for the reproduction and possible transformation of Europe’s allegedly 
neoliberal/profit-oriented structural framework and a lacking engagement with 'the geopolitical 
dynamic of the European integration project' (Bieler et al., 2019, p. 2).  
Overall, post-Keynesian economics does not study the domestic struggles that shape 
wage developments. Often, it relies on schematic representations of e.g. ‘pro-labour’ and ‘pro-
capital’ distributional changes to support econometric models (Stockhammer, 2016, p. 368). 
Drawing on critical industrial relations and critical IPE can help focusing on the social relations 
and class struggles that underpin distributional changes, cause macroeconomic imbalances, and 
induce instability to the EMU framework. 
 
2.4.3. Critical IPE and hegemonic competition 
The very different industrial relations across the Eurozone member states that depend 
on different class compromises contribute to a fundamental tension in the EMU. The Marxist 
and neo-Gramscian perspectives in critical IPE further emphasise the tension between inter-
capitalist rivalries, the transnationalisation of capital, and formation of transnational classes. In 
neo-Gramscian analyses of European integration, it is hegemonic projects that ‘are able to 
transcend the particular economic-corporate interests’ of different social groups (Bieler, 2005c, 
p. 518). Allowing for political alliances across specific social groups, hegemonic projects are 
thereby able to provide political stabilisation to the projects of European monetary integration 
and labour governance.  
Since the 1980s, European states, trade unions, and employers have concluded a 
number of social pacts, often in response to economic downturns, high unemployment, and 
with an eye to limiting inflation rates. Unlike earlier, post-war tripartite agreements, social 
pacts in recent decades have sought to install wage moderation and improve the supply-side 
institutions and competitiveness of national economies. Harking back to the era of stable 
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corporatist agreements across the continent, the phenomenon of social pacts takes the form of 
what Rhodes calls competitive corporatism (Rhodes, 2001).  
Most of the industrial relations literature and the Political Economy of labour positions 
itself within variants of new institutionalism, which shapes its research design and assumptions 
(e.g. Avdagic, Rhodes, & Visser, 2011). Avdagic, Rhodes, & Visser (2011) focus on the 
institutional requirements for the emergence and evolution of social pacts. Studies emphasising 
class struggle are less frequent, as are studies explicitly studying social pacts as integral to 
European integration. Bruff (2008a, p. 89) links the study of social pacts to class struggle 
through the Gramscian concept of ‘common sense’. Erne (2008) studies social pacts to address 
the possibility of building democratic institutions like trade unions at the European level.  
Like the comparative political economists reviewed above, Bruff (2008a) studies 
tripartite negotiations and social pacts to analyse labour market and welfare transformations in 
Europe. The originality of Bruff’s study is his insistence on the objective, material relationship 
between social groups (e.g. capital and labour) and the cultural processes that shape the 
struggles of hegemonic projects. Interest groups, like trade unions, play a decisive role for the 
organization of a shared understanding – a ‘common sense’ - among a social group, which 
could be German metalworkers. Bruff frames the role of social partners as ‘organic 
intellectuals’ in the Gramscian sense, which designates the organizing and directing activities 
of social groups’ varied ideas and ideologies (Bruff, 2008a, p. 53). At the EU level, the ETUC 
and BusinessEurope seek to organise the relationship between domestic trade unions and 
employer associations, but at least ETUC, it seems, struggles to carry forward a strategy for a 
European wage and labour policy regime. BusinessEurope appear overall more content with 
the current status quo of European economic governance and primarily domestic wage and 
labour governance (Interviewee #1; Interviewee #2). 
In short, industrial relations and critical IPE scholars have analysed national conflicts 
and compromises on wage restraint – particularly through ‘social pacts’ – and their importance 
for European integration. Based on their analysis, I propose studying EU labour governance as 
the struggle of scaling up domestic class compromises to the European level under the 
condition of the single currency. The process of scaling up these compromises takes place 
through hegemonic projects capable of forming alliances across social groups.  
Instead of hegemonic projects, Erne (2008) operates with four competing scenarios for 
EU labour governance. In particular, he tackles the prospect for a democratic regime of 
European labour governance – what he calls a process of Euro-democratization – to replace 
the disciplinary regime inherent to the EMU. Therefore, he interrogates labour as an active 
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strategic player at the domestic level that could potentially play a similar role at the European 
level. For Erne, the phenomenon of falling wage shares may be caused by trade unions’ 
strategic choice to accept wage moderation, or structural factors, such as outsourcing and other 
features of capitalist restructuring in an era of economic globalization. Another possible factor 
behind falling wage shares is state strategies, whereby governments and central banks may 
offset unions’ inflationary wage strategies. European leaders have viewed anti-inflationary 
strategies at the domestic levels as both conducive and necessary for the proper functioning of 
the EMU, as per the Maastricht Criteria. However, as Erne demonstrates, once enough member 
states embark upon a process of competitive restructuring based on wage restraint, whether for 
structural or strategic reasons, contradictions may arise for European labour as a whole.  
These contradictions include the rise of intra-Eurozone macroeconomic imbalances as 
an outcome of member states’ increasing reliance on exports and finance, the deflationary 
pressures of wage moderation, as well as the problem of political legitimacy in a context of 
permanent low growth and wage moderation. The EU has addressed the rise of macroeconomic 
imbalances since the financial crisis through reforms to EU labour governance, but 
simultaneously has to deal with questions of deflation and political legitimacy. However, as I 
demonstrate in the following chapters, the EU’s initiatives have been unable to solve a 
fundamental contradiction of EU labour governance. The EMU requires flexible labour 
markets or highly coordinated governance but continues to lack either.  
Critical (IPE) authors like Bailey (2008), van Apeldoorn and Hager (2011), and Bruff 
(2017), have interrogated the contradictions of EU labour governance through an emphasis on 
the social purpose of governance. Adding to the perspectives of the new modes of governance 
and comparative capitalism literature, Bailey (2008) offers a stratified account of the obstacles 
to the realization of Social Europe. Underneath the institutional and political obstacles 
identified by authors such as Schäfer (2004), Bailey detects a set of social constraints to the 
advancement of EU social and labour market policy. While the institutional and political 
obstacles are arguably important for the development of EU labour market governance, these 
‘are themselves generated by the capitalist relations of production and the relations of 
representative democracy that constitute EU-wide social relations’ (Bailey, 2008, p. 237). In 
other words, the project of European integration inevitably struggles to transcend the 
contradictions of democratic capitalism, as the project rests on the increasingly unstable 
relationship between domestic policy-making and transnational capitalism.  
Van Apeldoorn and Hager (2011) also pay attention to the dominant social forces that 
shape the form and content of social and economic governance. The Lisbon strategy and the 
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OMC deepen and legitimise the EU’s asymmetric multilevel governance framework (in which 
supranational liberalization facilitates neoliberal adjustment at the domestic level) to the extent 
that it seeks to modernize welfare systems while maintaining market liberalization as the core 
engine of supranational integration. Because the Lisbon strategy and the OMC did not represent 
any challenge to the dominant transnational capitalist class, while being symbolically appealing 
to the ‘transnational social democratic project’, it gained broad consensus in European policy-
circles in the 2000s (van Apeldoorn & Hager, 2010, p. 219). However, in terms of substantially 
reforming European labour markets, there was also quickly a sense of disappointment among 
policy-makers (Kok, 2004). However, the fact that the Lisbon strategy did not decisively alter 
the trajectory of European labour markets is of no surprise as van Apeldoorn and Hager see the 
Lisbon strategy as a largely symbolic gesture to deepen the processes of European integration 
already in place.  
There was, in other words, a social purpose to the innovation of new, non-binding 
modes of governance for labour market policies. Therefore, these critical IPE scholars argue, 
it has only been logical for the EU gradually to strengthen non-binding forms of governance in 
the wake of this perceived crisis of implementation - rather than completely reconfiguring them 
to enforce new social and labour market policies unto member states. Bruff (2017, p. 149) has 
traced the process of a gradual ‘hardening’ of the ‘soft’ laws governing the European Social 
Model. For Bruff (2017), while EU elites in the wake of the crisis further emphasize the 
importance of broad, socio-economic governance directly aimed at labour markets and welfare 
states, this comes through an increasingly authoritarian neoliberal mode of governance. 
In short, critical IPE as outlined here addresses the evolution in EU labour governance 
through distributional conflicts and the hegemonic projects through which actors seek to assert 
their economic and class interests. To this extent, critical IPE is consistent with the approach 
pursued in this thesis. However, critical integration theory has much more focus on institutional 
structures and path-dependencies of EU labour governance. Critical integration theory also 
leaves open whether economic and class interests dominate other political preferences of actors 
in competing hegemonic projects. For example, while the neoliberal hegemonic project seeks 
to push European governance towards greater deployment of market discipline and pro-capital 
distribution, other concerns, motivated by e.g. social conservatism may trump those efforts. 
 
2.4.4. Governmentality 
Governmentality also complements critical integration theory by providing a theoretical 
framework for EU labour governance in practice. Michel Foucault’s studies of governmentality 
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are concerned with the development of Western democratic rule in a broad sense, and how 
advanced governance technologies was forged over the 19th and 20th centuries to govern 
populations in line with market reason (Foucault, 2010). I interpret governmentality to mean 
the active use of techniques and practices of government to facilitate economic activity and 
provide the political basis for a market society. In Foucault’s words: ‘the market, or rather pure 
competition, which is the essence of the market, can only appear if it is produced, and if it is 
produced by an active governmentality’ (Foucault, 2010, p. 121). While this emphasis on pure 
competition points to neoliberal governmentality, it is equally possible to detect social 
democratic welfare governmentality (Dean, 1999, p. 42).  
In recent decades, the development of advanced liberal democracies has given rise to a 
number of performance-led and managerial practices that use surveillance, persuasion, and 
sometimes sanctions, to stimulate economic activity and growth-oriented policies. The OMC, 
epitomized in the Lisbon strategy, always had a strong performance management element, 
which grew dominant over time (Zeitlin, 2008; Chapter 3). Within EU labour politics, an 
important constituent part of the Lisbon and associated strategies, a popular performance 
management has been the measurement of supply-side policies to increase the workforce. 
Supply-side policies concern the population in a broad sense, targeting not only the 
unemployed and those outside the labour market, but also the skills and work incentives of the 
employed. To the extent supply-side policies use financial incentives that seek to change 
individual behaviour, they may reasonably be considered the epitome of neoliberal 
governmentality. 
Fiscal and labour governance are comparable forms of governmentality. The EMU’s 
SGP and Fiscal Compact constitute, in Vanessa Bilancetti’s words a ‘fiscal governance 
machine’ that brings together domestic and EU-level procedures in a rules-based, yet 
discretionary political process. The efficiency of this process rests not least on its 
circumvention of popular-democratic politics (Bilancetti, 2019, p. 245). EMU fiscal 
governance targets a relatively clearly defined “population”, namely the state bureaucracy of 
civil servants concerned with tax collection, public spending, and economic modelling and 
accounting. In comparison, targeting the European population in a broad sense, labour 
governance faces a range of tensions that limit the feasibility of implementing binding ‘Pacts’ 
for wages and labour. One such tension arises in the relationship between ‘competitiveness’ 
and economic stability. The legal basis of EU intervention in wage and labour questions is 
found in the EU member states’ commitment to collectively ‘achieve the strengthening and the 
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convergence of their economies’ and ‘promote economic and social progress for their peoples’ 
(TEU, Preamble).  
At least since the early 1990s, the EU has developed the concept of competitiveness as 
the basis for progress and convergence, in line with neoliberal ideas of market competition as 
the basis of human progress. This means that EU institutions continuously encourage all 
member states to pursue wage-moderating strategies to strengthen their cost competitiveness, 
even when this effectively widens the economic gap between ‘the peoples of Europe’, 
facilitates economic divergence and imbalances, and exposes the population to the risk of 
“sudden stop” crises like the Eurozone crisis (Chapter 4). From a governmentality perspective, 
the tension is between the EU’s responsibility to allow all of its peoples the possibility to 
prosper by improving their competitiveness, and the responsibility to provide collective 
stability and safety. The crisis amplified the difficulties of reconciling these objectives, but the 
EU policy response often consolidated and accelerated neoliberal governmentality by 
performance management. This acceleration did little to circumvent the contradictions of EU 
labour governance, and some of the most ambitious agreements, like the intergovernmental 
Euro-Plus Pact for competitiveness resulted in minuscule domestic change (Chapter 5).  
 
2.5. Conclusion  
This chapter has sought to advance critical integration theory to analyse EU labour 
governance and its relationship to the EMU. Whereas chapter 1 concerned the core mechanisms 
of European integration from a critical integration theory perspective, this chapter has 
discussed the conceptual preconditions of a critical integration theory analysis of the 
relationship between monetary integration and labour governance. As chapter 1 laid out, 
critical integration theory is fundamentally a theory of European integration in general. It does 
not contain a fully-fledged analytical framework for analysing the evolution of EU labour 
governance in the context of the EMU. On that basis, this chapter has discussed how 
Comparative Capitalism, post-Keynesian economics, critical IPE, and governmentality help 
guide this thesis’ analysis. This chapter has outlined how these approaches add up to an analysis 
of EU labour governance that develops and strengthens critical integration theory.  
This chapter will end with a word of caution, and some reflections on the use of these 
diverse literatures. The four accounts do not seamlessly blend as they each emphasise different 
aspects of the interaction between Eurozone, wages, and labour. Post-Keynesian economics 
focus on the distributional struggle between capital and labour, but strongly emphasise its 
economic rather than political aspects. Comparative capitalism identifies the institutional 
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determinants of Eurozone economic diversity, but mostly fail to locate the role of class struggle 
within institutional and distributional change. Critical IPE, as well as critical industrial 
relations, strongly emphasise class relations, particularly the transnational elements of capital. 
Governmentality points to the contradictions of EU labour governance in practice. Are the 
positions even compatible? Can all four accounts inform empirical analysis of EU labour 
governance without stumbling in the diverse set of assumptions they hold? 
I argue that critical integration theory, as outlined in chapter 1, functions as a four-
legged bridge between these accounts and their assumptions by bringing together the class and 
institutional perspectives. Post-Keynesians identify recent decades’ redistribution of income 
from labour to capital. The distribution of total income between capital and labour, I posit, is a 
fundamental aspect of hegemonic competition over EU labour governance. Structurally, the 
contraction of the wage share destabilizes the Eurozone economy through the acceleration of 
macroeconomic imbalances and has caused economic crisis. Further, persistent wage 
moderation and rising inequality together question the legitimacy of the project of European 
integration. Empirically, we find such destabilization in industrial conflict (albeit 
decreasingly), in social movements, as well as in political fragmentation within member states 
and in the democratic institutions of the EU (arguably increasingly). The literature on 
comparative capitalism has captured important aspects of the economic and political 
instabilities that flow from the EMU. Critical IPE focuses on the social struggles and the 
resulting hegemonic projects that may potentially transform European integration. Economic 
crisis and political fragmentation do not imply infinite possible changes to EU integration and 
labour governance. Political and social change requires the advancement of comprehensive 
programmes of actions. The concept of governmentality further points to the difficulties of 
translating these programmes into social change. Critical integration theory brings these 
perspectives together to assess the competition of hegemonic projects in light of the structural 
conditions of hegemonic competition and strategic political contestation in the EU. Hegemonic 
projects play a decisive role in mediating structure and agency, hereunder class struggle and 
policymaking of EU labour governance. In this thesis, we look for such hegemonic projects in 
a specific way: in terms of how they connect economic reasoning, political practice and 
institutional and legal transformation. 
For political projects to provide hegemony to EU politics, they need to operate within 
the existing set of EU institutions and Europe’s wider institutional structure, including the 
institutions of European labour markets. Conversely, political projects that generally oppose 
the EU tend to exercise less influence over negotiations on institutional and policy change. 
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Instead, these Eurosceptic projects often influence the trajectory of EU governance through 
ruptures and fissures to the integration project (such as the UK decision to leave the EU or the 
Italian government’s budget standoff with the European Commission in 2018). 
Mediating structure and agency, I propose that hegemonic projects allow actors to 
translate economic ideas, through political practice and negotiations, into institutional and legal 
transformation of EU wage and labour governance. Yet, in the absence of deeper hegemony, 
such transformations are difficult and exceptional. In the following chapter (chapter 3), I use 
critical integration theory to study the parallel developments in European monetary integration 
and EU labour governance from the 1970s up until the turn of the 21st Century. In chapter 4, I 
analyse the governance of labour market and wage policies in the Eurozone in the first decade 
after the introduction of the single currency. Chapter 5 analyses the governance of wages and 
labour in the new European institutions of the MIP and the European Semester, as well as the 
extraordinary case of Greece.  
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3. The politics of labour and monetary integration  
In preceding chapters, I have outlined a critical integration theory and its perspective 
on the EMU and labour governance. In chapter 2, I highlighted that EU labour governance 
and European monetary integration stand in a difficult relationship. According to basic 
economic theory, monetary union requires wage flexibility and labour mobility, but the reality 
of Europe’s political economy is undeniably very different. Moreover, the EMU institutional 
framework did not extend to the governance of labour. In the absence of a labour governance 
framework, the EMU has no direct instruments for tackling, inter alia, unemployment or wage 
rigidity. I also advanced a critical integration theory, and the concept of competing hegemonic 
projects for studying how EU labour governance has evolved in light of European monetary 
integration. In this chapter, I deploy this theoretical approach to study the development of 
European monetary integration and labour governance from the 1970s up until the turn of the 
Century. 
 
3.1. Introduction  
Europe’s different labour markets and its low labour mobility make a monetary union 
non-optimal according to standard economic models (Chapter 2). From an economic 
perspective, the proper functioning of the EMU depends on the convergence of Europe’s 
economies, the adjustment capacities of labour markets, financial integration, and intra-area 
trade openness. Given the importance of labour market adjustment for a functioning monetary 
union, Europe’s regulated labour markets and diverse social models have always posed a 
potential problem for the EMU. Conversely, and from a distributional perspective, it seems 
that the single currency puts the burden of adjustment on Europe’s workers and welfare 
recipients by requiring them to adjust to crises, which could come with devastating social 
consequences. Despite these inherent obstacles posed by Europe’s labour markets and 
macroeconomic setting to a functioning monetary union, in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
European leaders reached an agreement on establishing the EMU. Europe’s leaders reached 
this historic agreement without promising to reform Europe’s labour markets or its governance 
framework at the EU-level.  
French and German state actors, led by government executives and central bankers, 
were predominantly powerful in setting the terms of deeper monetary integration (Dyson & 
Featherstone, 1999, p. 2; Feldstein, 1997, p. 24; Martin & Ross, 2004, pp. 5–11). The French 
President Francois Mitterrand, frustrated with the recurring rounds of devaluations under the 
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EMS in the early 1980s, pushed the proposal for EMU in a French-German bilateral meeting 
in August 1986 (Dyson & Featherstone, 1999, p. 334; Mody, 2018, p. 68). Satisfyingly for 
German actors, the negotiations on EMU showed the willingness of France and other 
prospective members of the EMU to accept the German interpretation of price stability and 
monetary conservatism. 
 In many ways, the push for monetary union was a remarkable act of political 
realism by German and French state actors. Monetary union with a single currency relied on 
France accepting the relative weakness of its own currency and the necessity of a European 
anchor to promote French economic interests. Conversely, monetary union would require 
Germany to abandon not just its strong currency, but also the international role of the 
Bundesbank, arguably Europe’s dominant central bank at the time.  
 At the same time, monetary union was a radical move towards deep political and 
economic integration, and indeed, a big political and economic gamble. Abandoning not just 
national currencies, but also the governing capacities of national monetary policy, the EMU 
was thus a radical move in European integration based on political realism. Potentially, 
introducing a single currency could come with severe economic costs for Europe. In particular, 
proponents of the theory of optimum currency unions would emphasise the importance of wage 
flexibility, labour mobility, and fiscal transfers for a functioning monetary union (Chapter 2).  
For Baldwin and Wyplosz (2009), it was exactly the lack of labour mobility and fiscal 
transfers which exposed the weakness of the EMU. Yet, in the EU institutional rationale for 
monetary integration – exemplified by the Delors Commission’s ‘One Money, One Market’ 
(1990) report – the overall focus was on the benefit of monetary union for the existing plans 
for market integration under the Single European Act. As such, the Commission did not so 
much test the sustainability of a large and diverse monetary union, but rather laid out the 
benefits of a monetary union for the wider project of European economic integration. 
How and why monetary integration has evolved in the absence of political and 
economic centralisation has been subject to extensive academic interest (e.g. Collignon, 2004; 
Hodson, 2009). For some observers, the Eurozone crisis was a vindication that Europe’s 
monetary union was a mistake that would lead to more harm than good (Mody, 2018; cf. 
Sandbu, 2015). Yet, the specific relationship between the EMU and EU labour governance has 
received less attention (Chapter 2). In this chapter, I trace the evolution of the EMU and EU 
labour governance, focusing on the two decades leading up to introduction of the euro currency 
on 1 January 1999 - the 1980s and 1990s.  
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Based on the importance ascribed to EU institutional structures and global 
macrostructures in constraining and enabling political projects, the chapter stresses the role of 
competing hegemonic projects that may promote various programmes of EU labour 
governance. In the period covered in this chapter, the neoliberal and social democratic 
hegemonic projects did not seek to integrate labour governance within the EMU framework. 
For example, the social democrats that spurred the proliferation of EU social and employment 
policy in the 1990s did not press for EMU governance reforms.  
The main part of this chapter is structured to follow the evolution of EU labour 
governance and European monetary integration. However, first I briefly outline how a critical 
integration theory for EU labour governance under the condition of the EMU, as outlined in 
chapter 1 and 2, is used in this chapter. Second, I trace the evolution of European monetary 
integration from the 1970s ‘snake in the tunnel’, over the agreement on EMU in 1991 to the 
1997 SGP. Third, I turn to domestic strategies of wage moderation under the condition of 
monetary integration in the 1980s-1990s, which facilitated general redistribution of income 
from labour to capital. Fourth, I analyse the evolution of EU labour governance in the 1990s 
and discuss the discourses and practices of labour governance developing in this period.  The 
chapter ends with a conclusion. 
 
3.2. A framework for analysing the evolution of the EMU and EU labour governance 
The theoretical framework of this thesis asserts the importance of hegemonic projects 
in mediating structure and agency. Focusing on the relationship between structure and agency 
in European integration, I maintain that European politics consists of a dialectical relationship 
that ‘leads from structure to interests to motives to action and finally back to structures’ 
(Porpora, 1998, p. 344; Chapter 1). Following the path of this dialectic, the process of European 
monetary integration since the 1970s has depended on the ongoing constitutive relationship 
between the structures of European integration and the interests, identities, and motives of 
European political and economic actors.  
The EU institutional structure can be summarised as a federal union of member-states 
that privileges domestic politics in a multi-level governance framework (Bulmer & Joseph, 
2016). The federal union of states constitute its member states with a new political existence 
of constrained democracy (Larsen, 2018). Therefore, European integration also constitutes a 
dialectical relationship between domestic and union-level politics (Bickerton, 2012). 
Developments in European integration are grounded in domestic political legitimacy, from 
where European leaders primarily develop identities, interests, and preferences. Yet, domestic 
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politics has been radically transformed by European integration, particularly in spheres of 
economic policy. Historically, European integration has been based on the EU’s constitutional 
commitment to ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Treaty of Rome, 1957). 
Ever since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the EU institutional structure has required member states 
and the EU institutions to coordinate economic policies in accordance with the objectives of 
the union (Treaty of Rome, 1957). 
In addition to domestic politics, EU institutional structures and the broader global 
macro-structures shape the interests and motives of European leaders. Transformations in the 
global macrostructures may alter the interests and motives of European leaders in relation to 
EU institutional change. For instance, European leaders decided to insert a no bailout clause in 
the EMU framework. The no bailout clause was a rational act of self-interest as it signalled the 
importance of fiscal discipline and helped bring down borrowing costs. Yet, the severe 
financial stress induced by the unwinding of the global financial system in 2008-2009 altered 
established preferences in favour of the clause. In spring 2010, Europe’s leaders eventually 
agreed to bail out Greece, and to the institutionalisation of financial assistance for member 
states in economic difficulty, under the European Financial Stability Facility, the European 
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, and later, the European Stability Mechanism. 
Within the EU institutional framework, domestic actors have been at the forefront of 
monetary integration. To facilitate monetary integration, Europe’s domestic actors would need 
to assert their interests at the European level. Critical integration theory stresses how 
hegemonic projects offer domestic actors the possibility of altering the pace and direction of 
European integration. Hegemonic projects are grounded in domestic politics, are shaped by 
global transformations, and operate in the EU institutional structure. Both the pro-European 
neoliberal and social democratic project have decisively shaped the evolution the EMU and 
EU wage and labour governance in recent decades. Eurosceptic neoliberal and social 
democratic projects have operated mostly at the margins of the evolving governance 
framework, though at times in direct opposition to the existing framework.  
Political actors in different hegemonic projects hold very different ambitions for 
Europe’s framework for labour governance. In the early stages of European monetary 
integration, this stretched from the position of the UK Conservatives, which not only rejected 
a social union but also opposed monetary integration, to factions within continental social 
democratic parties unconvinced by the EMU’s insistence on discipline and exclusion of social 
objectives (Sandholtz, 1993). In general, there was persistent disagreement over EU labour 
governance, but outside Denmark and the United Kingdom a remarkable degree of political 
 96 
consensus developed between social democratic and conservative governments in the early 
1990s on the desirability of monetary union (Hooghe et al., 2002).  
While in the negotiation process towards the EMU, various leaders talked up the 
prospect of a European political union, they were, as Ashoka Mody notes, ‘playing with the 
phrase’ (Mody, 2018, p. 53). In Germany as well as in France – arguably the two most powerful 
member states – political leaders were strongly opposed to the idea of centralizing economic 
policies to improve the functioning of the coming monetary union. Instead, references to 
political union invoked the longstanding idea of closer security and foreign policy cooperation, 
arguably largely irrelevant to the radical idea of centralizing monetary policy and installing a 
common currency. 
Theoretically, for pro-European social democrats, European integration remains a 
potentially viable route to restore the strength of organised, social market economies. This 
route may also involve a greater role for organised labour at the European level. However, in 
practice, the governance of the EMU has increasingly turned against the type of 
macroeconomic and industrial policies required to strengthen labour and union power, as 
emphasis has been mostly on flexibility and deregulation.  
European monetary integration, and EU wage and labour governance, also poses certain 
dilemmas for neoliberals. For neoliberals, more integration in some areas (i.e. stricter fiscal 
and macroeconomic governance; a potential European constitution of fiscal discipline) could 
be desirable if it promises disciplining excessive domestic government action. Yet, building an 
integrated economic governance framework does not come without its potential dilemmas for 
neoliberals. Elite and popular expectations to EU interventions may grow if the 
macroeconomic governance framework expands, potentially opening up for more ambitious 
and progressive social and employment policies at the EU level. 
In reality, the hegemonic projects stand in a dialectical relationship with the processes 
of European integration and are in as much shaped by integration as they shape integration. In 
other words, the processes of European integration shape the ideologies and agendas of 
hegemonic projects. An example of this process of hegemonic-ideological development is the 
increased support for European integration among social democratic parties in the decades 
following the economically liberal Maastricht Treaty (Bailey, 2005). Despite the liberal turn in 
European integration, Europe’s social democrats remained committed to European integration 
and the EMU. Within the neoliberal project, Margaret Thatcher’s (neoliberal) quest for a single 
market had the unintended consequences of a monetary union, as well as the ensuing 
proliferation of social and employment policies at the EU level. For neoliberals outside Britain, 
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this was mostly an acceptable compromise. Recently, neoliberal actors reaffirmed their 
commitment to socially balanced market integration. In November 2017, the European Council 
heavily dominated by centre-right governments even endorsed the European Pillar of Social 
Rights, effectively agreeing that European integration depended on social legitimacy and an 
element of inclusion and protection. However, (pockets of) neoliberal scepticism towards the 
EU and the EMU has persisted throughout recent decades (Slobodian & Plehwe, 2019). 
The importance of hegemonic projects has far from precluded the importance of 
political and instrumental leadership at the supranational level (Smeets & Beach, 2019; 
Verdun, 1999). The European Commission plays a pivotal role in the EU’s political 
development. First, it drafts the legislation of the EU. Sometimes in direct competition with 
national governments, and various ‘task forces’ under the European Council, the Commission 
identifies weaknesses in the EU governance framework, outlines reforms paths, and proposes 
legislative reform. 
Indeed, the Commission has played a coordinating role in EU labour governance 
throughout the period covered in this chapter. The Commission has neither exclusive nor 
shared competence on wage and labour governance but must resort to coordination among 
member states. Yet, this does not imply a weak Commission in terms of policy activity. The 
policy initiatives of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) and the EES, the Lisbon 
strategy, and after the crisis the European Semester, have all implied a central role for the 
Commission. Given the lack of hard enforcement mechanisms, pre-crisis EU wage and labour 
governance has been described as agenda setting, peer reviewing, benchmarking, and other 
adjectives pointing to its ‘softer’ impact on domestic policies (Kröger, 2009). In this mode of 
governance, the Commission’s instrumental leadership is significant for conducting 
surveillance of member states, issuing reports and recommending policy reform. 
A result of the dynamics of the relationship between hegemonic projects and European 
integration, monetary integration and EU labour governance has developed in different 
institutional settings. Dyson argues that Europe’s monetary union ‘was a stimulus to an 
intensified process of policy benchmarking, transfer and lesson-drawing’ in the areas of wages, 
labour markets, and social policy (Dyson, 2000). Yet, as this chapter demonstrates, monetary 
integration in the final decades of the 20th Century did not lead to an integrated framework for 
governing the single currency and the Eurozone’s labour markets.  
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3.3. Domestic politics, global reconfiguration, and early European monetary integration 
Europe’s first ventures in monetary integration took place in the global context of the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods order of fixed exchange rates. At the 1969 Hague summit, 
the European Economic Community (EEC) member state governments agreed for Europe’s 
finance ministers in the ECOFIN Council to prepare the establishment of a monetary union. In 
order to lead the preparatory work, an expert group was set up, led by Luxembourg’s Prime 
Minister Pierre Werner (Dyson & Featherstone, 1999, pp. 102–114). In 1972, the governments 
of the six member states in the EEC established a ‘snake in the tunnel’ to limit the bandwidth 
of European currency fluctuations. This agreement came less than a year after the Nixon shock 
had spelled the end of Bretton Woods. Europe’s currency snake proved an ineffective 
instrument for providing exchange rate stabilisation against the new international system of 
floating exchange rates. Within two years, all major European currencies had let their 
currencies float, and despite successive rounds of member states re-joining during the 1970s, 
the snake arrangement failed to stabilise Europe’s exchange rates (Mody, 2018, pp. 53–55).  
 The 1978 agreement on the EMS fared better. The EMS imposed fixed exchange 
rates on its members, with narrow bandwidths for exchange rate fluctuations. The EMS also 
allowed for currency devaluations, or ‘realignments’ in the parlance of the EMS (Höpner & 
Spielau, 2018; Mody, 2018). The experiences of two member states were decisive for the 
direction of European monetary integration: France and Germany. The two had different 
experiences with the EMS. For France, particularly in the first half of the 1980s, the EMS 
involved successive rounds of devaluations in order to maintain France’s external 
competitiveness. The EMS, these devaluations suggested, did not do much to increase France’s 
economic dynamism. For Germany, the EMS allowed a more expansive and international role 
for the Bundesbank, followed by, inter alia, substantial current account surpluses, especially 
in the second half of the 1980s (Neuthinger, 1989; Oatley, 1997).  
 Critical integration theory asserts the importance of domestic politics, the EU 
institutional structure and global macrostructures as part of the explanation for the development 
in monetary integration. Other accounts, such as Thomas Oatley’s study of the domestic 
politics of European monetary integration, highlights the central domestic distributional 
conflicts that stood at the centre of the European contestation over monetary integration in the 
1970s-80s (Oatley, 1997, p. 2). Oatley’s account draws attention to the domestic and 
redistributive conflicts that shaped the motives of EEC member state governments negotiating 
the EMS. Like its successor, the EMS emphasised price stability and implied monetary 
restrictions. These stabilising effects quelled the reservations of businesses and centre-right 
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governments against monetary integration. Overall, more neoliberal actors supported monetary 
integration. 
Yet, early monetary integration rested greatly on the support of social democratic actors 
and organised labour. Critical integration theory puts the competition between hegemonic 
projects as the core explanatory model of European monetary integration. Adding to Oatley’s 
redistributive account of the social and economic objectives reflecting the interests of 
competing domestic social groups, critical integration theory also adds an explicit class 
perspective. Therefore, the role of organised labour is an expression of the balance of power 
between fractions of classes at the time of early monetary integration. Across Europe, the 
domestic context in the late 1970s was one of relatively powerful trade unions and strong social 
democratic parties. Organised labour and centre-left governments identified with a set of 
interests in opposition to business and right-wing politics. This social democratic hegemonic 
project was influential in facilitating the EMS. In Germany, trade unions had pushed 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s social democratic government ‘to deliver a more dynamic 
economic environment’ through monetary and fiscal expansion (Oatley, 1997, pp. 19–20). The 
EMS implied a greater international role for the Bundesbank, and could also facilitate a 
Germany with a more competitive exchange rate (Oatley, 1997). As such for Germany, 
monetary integration offered a route to balance domestic preference for stability with a more 
expansive and international economic strategy. In France, President Francois Mitterrand came 
to accept monetary restrictions as precondition for furthering European integration and 
reaching economic parity with Germany (Mody, 2018; Oatley, 1997). For France, monetary 
integration balanced the domestic preference for expansionary economic policy with a firmer 
international framework of stability.   
In addition to the domestic factors in France, Germany, and beyond, the reorganisation 
of the global political economy after the collapse of Bretton Woods also played a decisive role 
in facilitating the growing support for closer monetary cooperation in France and in other 
European countries. The strength of the national support for deeper monetary integration 
greatly depended on the role of different currencies in the emerging international system of 
floating exchange rates. The German Deutschmark was undoubtedly Europe’s hard currency, 
wielding significant power from its domestic sources of price and macroeconomic stability. 
This, in turn, shaped the interests and identities of German political and economic leaders as 
more sceptical towards monetary union compared to their French and Italian counterparts. The 
softer currency of the French franc, conversely, helped the formation of a strong cross-class 
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and cross-party preference for deeper monetary integration as successive rounds of devaluation 
took their toll on French real wages.  
Critical integration theory highlights the decisive role of labour and capital interests and 
the preferences of social groups. Distributional questions of wages and profits were chief 
concerns for both capital and labour when assessing the likely consequences of monetary 
integration. Despite the important role of distributive questions in shaping preferences for 
European monetary integration, the EMS and the EMU developed without a clearly defined 
role for the governance of wages and labour markets at the European level. In effect, in the 
creation of the EMS, domestic actors competed over the direction of European monetary 
integration in order to further their socio-economic interests in the absence of a European 
institutional framework for governing economic production, wages, and labour markets.  
Besides floating currencies, one more transnational context was decisive for early 
monetary integration, which followed immediately after the post-World War economic boom 
period that lasted for 3 decades. Between 1945 and the mid-1970s, in a period known as the 
Les Trente Glorieuses in French, growth rates were not only consistently high in much of 
(Western) Europe; Europe also witnessed a stable distribution of total income between capital 
and labour. The average wage share in the 12 countries that adopted the euro around the 
millennium reached its peak of 65.9 in 1975 (Chapter 4, figure 4.1). In the period since, the 
share of total income that workers have received as wage income has significantly decreased. 
According to official AMECO data, wages’ share of total income has been falling in most 
Eurozone member states over the last 40 years. The effective transfer of income from wages to 
profits transformed the relationship between European capital and labour. This distributional 
transformation has coincided with a steady decline in European growth rates. As compared to 
the period from the Second World War and the next 30 years, the period since the 1970s has 
produced considerably lower growth rates. In the 1960s, the EU produced average annual GDP 
growth rates at between 4-6% every year, while since 1975, average annual EU GDP growth 
has only reached 4% once, in 1988.4  
 Next, I turn to the simultaneous, but institutionally separated trajectories of 
monetary integration and wage and labour governance in Europe. The following sections 
highlight the complicated relationship between monetary integration and EU labour 
governance.  
 
4 Source: World Bank Database:  
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=EU 
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3.4. Agreeing on monetary union, deferring labour governance 
The political momentum arising from the concerted efforts to build the single market 
in the 1980s facilitated not just the eventual adoption of a monetary union but also the explosion 
of social and employment policy activity in Europe in the 1990s. At the Milan European 
Council meeting in June 1985, Europe’s leaders agreed on the Cockfield White Paper’s 
proposals that would lead to the adoption of the Single European Act in February 1986 
(Bulmer, 1998). In January 1985, former French finance Jacques Delors had entered the 
Commission Presidency with an ambitious package of policy objectives to revive European 
economic integration. This included trade liberalisation, supranational institutional reform, and 
monetary union (Goetschy, 1999; Moravcsik, 1991). Counteracting Thatcher’s neoliberal pitch 
for a free and single European market, Delors wanted to use the completion of the single market 
to push for a social and monetary union (Ross, 1994). 
Domestic and supranational actors pushed for a single currency to accompany the 
European single market agreed in 1986. There were explicit political objectives for a single 
currency, even if these were often symbolic: across Europe, there was a sense of frustration 
with the dominant role of Germany’s Deutschmark currency, and the power of the Bundesbank, 
Germany’s central bank. As such, moving from a monetary system with national currencies 
and central banks to a monetary union with a single currency and a European central bank 
would be of great symbolic importance. Beyond the importance of Europeanising the symbols 
and institutions of monetary cooperation, French political leaders in particular were unhappy 
about the recurrent rounds of devaluations of their currency. The idea that moving to a single 
currency with centralised monetary policy would install France’s economy on par with 
Germany, and allow France to assert their economic interests on European economic policy 
was widespread in France (Feldstein, 1997). 
The domestic and global context is central to understand Delors’ European project. 
Delors’ push for a social union to embed the single market was preconditioned by Mitterrand’s 
abolition of Keynesianism in 1983 (Moravcsik, 1991). In turn, Mitterrand’s decision was 
spurred by a global political economic context that had intensified the contradictions of 
European welfare states during the 1970s (on the contradictions of the welfare state, see Offe, 
1982).  
In the late 1980s, the redistributive trend from labour to capital was well entrenched in 
Europe. Within this context of falling wage shares, the European institutional rationale for 
monetary integration was fully subsumed in the logic of market efficiency. Introducing a 
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monetary union with a single currency in Europe involved a number of big political-economic 
trade-offs, with significant dangers for Europe’s economy and social models. Europe’s diverse 
labour markets, social security systems, and broader welfare states raised the potential costs of 
a monetary union and complicated the objective of installing ‘one market, one money’ within 
the region. ‘One market, one money’ was the Commission’s central ‘evaluation of the potential 
costs and benefits of forming an economic and monetary union’ and established the core 
economic rationale for the EMU (European Commission, 1990). The report’s central claim 
purports that the single market in goods, services, capital, and labour – to be completed in 1992 
– required a single currency. In particular, the report viewed the elimination of ‘exchange 
uncertainty and transaction costs’ brought about by monetary union as necessary for efficient 
capital liberalization (European Commission, 1990, pp. 9–15). Bolstered by the supranational 
assessment of the market efficiency gains from monetary union, Europe’s leaders deferred the 
question of how to govern labour markets within the prospective monetary union. This 
inevitably created a tension at the heart of European integration, whereby monetary integration 
would create the conditions for exacerbating economic divergence in Europe, rather than 
bringing forward the anticipated convergence of Europe’s domestic economies. 
Within Europe’s diverse political economy, it was not only among the core powers of 
Germany, France, Italy, and more ambivalently, Britain, that there was a newfound desire for 
deeper European integration in the 1980s. Processes of Europeanisation also unfolded in the 
European periphery. One of these peripheral countries were Greece, in which the centre-right 
government under Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis had successfully negotiated 
Greece’s accession to the EEC in 1981. Later that year, the social democratic PASOK 
government, led by Andreas Papandreou, came into power. Papandreou’s electoral victory 
marked the beginning of two decades of all but PASOK dominance: over the period 1981-
2004, PASOK would lead the government in 19 years. At the time of PASOK’s ascendency to 
power, the Greek public sector expenditure stood at 28% of GDP, much smaller than e.g. 
France (47%). In 1981, the expenditure-revenue deficit was already at a significant level, as 
government revenues stood at just 21%. During Andreas Papandreou’s first 8 years as prime 
minister, government expenditure would rise to 34% of GDP in 1989, bringing Greece’s public 
spending more in line with other European countries. Yet, revenues would only rise to 23%, 
contributing to a steady rise in government debt, from 27% to 60% of GDP (figures 3.1. and 
3.2).  
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Figure 3.1. Greek government revenue and expenditure  
 
Source: OECD database on government spending 
 
Figure 3.2 Greece government debt and GDP per head of population 
Sources: Debt: IMF, Historical Public Debt Database. GDP: AMECO. 
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The PASOK reign in the 1980-1990s was marked by a tension between the party’s roll-
out of a distinct type of populist nationalism and the ambitions of modernization in the mirror 
of their (Western) European counterparts. Papandreou’s first years in power were characterised 
by more classic socialist initiatives, often condemned in the international press as cases of state 
control, nationalisation, and profit squeezes (Revzin, 1986). In the context of the slowdown of 
global economic activities in the early 1980s, growth rates severely diminished. The negative 
growth rates registered in 1981-83 further contributed to the rising levels of debt that was to 
continue through the 1980s. After the economic crash in October 1984, Papandreou’s policies 
‘zigzagged’, having abandoned a number of its more radical positions on economic 
nationalization (The Economist, 1996, p. 90). Hereafter, Papandreou’s PASOK developed a 
peculiar populist nationalism that combined a gradual expansion of the welfare state, which 
included a comprehensive pension provision, large-scale public sector employment, and 
selective industrial nationalisation, with more neoliberal reform elements. The PASOK rule of 
the 1980s was also characterised by a number of cases of corruption and the strategic nurturing 
of a culture of clientelism (Featherstone, 2005).  
 
3.4.1. The Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact 
At the European level, the agreement on the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991 
culminated a two decade long process to bring about monetary cooperation that could ‘fill the 
international economic vacuum created by the collapse of the Bretton Woods System’, 
permanently stabilize European inflation rates, and – eventually - complement the Single 
Market with a single currency (Eichengreen, 2009, pp. 284, 346). In the process, German state 
actors in the federal government and the Bundesbank had been able to secure that the new 
European central bank would be politically independent and committed to price stability and 
low inflation (Mody, 2018).  
Despite British opposition to the advancement of social policy, the agreement on the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1991 also contained a social protocol that stipulated the co-decision 
powers of social partners on social policy (Streeck, 1994). With the inclusion of social policy 
and social partners in the treaty concluding the Single Market and launching the currency 
union, Delors, as well as like-minded social democrats and other non-neoliberals, could argue 
that the European project was bringing both labour and capital on board (Streeck, 2018). The 
Maastricht Treaty specified that the Council would draft ‘broad guidelines of the economic 
policies of the Member States’ (Maastricht Treaty, Art. 103.2). The European Commission was 
responsible for providing recommendations of the economic guidelines, and the Council would 
 105 
report its decisions to the European Council. Later, the Lisbon Treaty would emphasise the 
European Council’s position in the ‘control room’ of European politics by establishing it as an 
institution of the Union (Smeets & Beach, 2019).  
Under Maastricht and later treaties, EU member states and institutions have had a 
common responsibility to coordinate economic policies to facilitate ‘ever closer’ integration 
under the single market and monetary union. Yet, how much autonomy member states have in 
the context of governing their wage systems and labour markets has remained politically 
contested ever since Maastricht. The EU treaty is clear that its provisions ‘shall not apply to 
pay’ (TFEU, Art. 154). However, the EU has wrestled with how to square this commitment 
with the requirement for coordinating economic policies. The result has been a fragile and 
politically contested evolution of EU labour governance since the 1990s.  
As the Delors Commission sought to redirect the economic benefits of the European 
Single Market and the prospective single currency into employment and job creation, EU 
leaders wrestled with the requirements for membership of the currency union. EU member 
state governments, led by French President Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 
concluded that economic convergence was prerequisite to bolster the single currency against 
‘social and economic tensions’ as well as ‘monetary and financial instability’ (Buiter et al., 
1993, p. 2). In order to secure sufficient convergence, all prospective member states had to 
fulfil four criteria to qualify for Euro membership: 
1) Low inflation rates (no more than 1.5% points above the rates of the three Member 
States with the lowest rates),  
2) exchange rate stability for at least 2 years, 
3) interest rate convergence (no more than 2% points above the rates of the three 
Member States with the lowest inflation rates), and  
4) sustainable public finances (government budget deficits below 3%, government 
debt below 60%).  
Notwithstanding these efforts to create monetary and fiscal convergence, there were no 
policy plans for generating real economic convergence among EMU member states. Instead, 
Europe’s leaders relied on the assessment that monetary union, complementing the single 
market, would promote convergence by increasing competition, facilitating financial market 
integration, and enhancing microeconomic efficiency (European Commission, 1990). Together 
with the convergence of inflation, interest rates, and public finances, the impetus of 
microeconomic efficiency was supposed to induce market-based convergence among Europe’s 
diverse economies. The non-development of deeper EU labour integration was at least 
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implicitly justified by referring to the prospect of microeconomic incentives for 
macroeconomic convergence. 
The broad consensus on establishing monetary union on the basis of the four 
convergence criteria reflected the unwillingness of actors in either major hegemonic project to 
contemplate a major reorganisation of Europe’s political economies, as well as the salience of 
the idea that Europe’s (diverse) social models were something to protect (Martin & Ross, 
2004). As it turned out, Europe’s structurally diverse economies would likely divert within 
uniform rules, as capital flows and growing imbalances would exacerbate the costs of member 
states surrendering monetary policy rather than bring about the anticipated real convergence.    
Of the four Maastricht criteria, the criterion on public finances received the greatest 
political and academic attention. Here, domestic politics was clearly dominant: achieving 
(short-term) budget balance, for instance, required dealing with politically salient questions 
around tax rates or expenditure levels. Unlike the convergence of interest rates and exchange 
rates, governments are in direct control over budgets, while central banks, financial markets, 
and international monetary cooperation play only an indirect role. Because fiscal policies hold 
considerable political salience, most of the subsequent political negotiations to enforce the 
Maastricht criteria centred on the fiscal criteria.  
The fiscal criteria spilled over into EU labour governance. The EES, covered in more 
detail below, rested on the agreement that only a ‘macro-economic policy which will restore 
public finances [can] give room for business to grow and create new jobs’ (European 
Commission, 1995, p. 4). The EU’s stability-oriented framework, set in treaty form with the 
Maastricht Treaty, was therefore not only the condition for monetary integration, but also the 
basis for the emerging project of EU labour governance. The Commission stressed the 
relationship between ‘the consolidation of public finances’ and ‘sustained medium-term 
growth process which, in turn, is a sine qua non for employment creation’ (European 
Commission, 1995, pp. 4–5). In short, the Delors Commission made clear its ambition to foster 
a project of EU labour governance that strictly adhered to the principles of price stability and 
fiscal discipline. Delors’ plan was for a comparatively weak project of EU labour governance. 
For enforcing budget discipline on profligate member states, the Maastricht Treaty 
relied on voluntary arrangements (Heipertz & Verdun, 2004). In the process leading up to the 
introduction of the euro, the prospect of EMU membership was the central incentive for fiscal 
discipline. In the period 1993-1997, through a combination of cyclical upswing, which reduced 
the need for fiscal consolidation, and fiscal convergence, whereby low-expenditure countries 
raised taxes and high-tax countries cut expenditures, the average member state budget deficit 
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fell from 6.1% of GDP in 1993 to 2.4% in 1997. However, these averages reside over 
significant differences in the performance of individual member states. In response to the 
significant differences in prospective EMU member states’ fiscal performance, and the 
voluntary nature of the Maastricht criteria, European leaders converged on the idea of the SGP 
to uphold discipline once the incentive for membership would cease upon introducing the euro. 
With the SGP, EU member states reiterated their commitment to fiscal discipline as a 
precondition for all other aspects of European integration, including greater labour governance. 
Notwithstanding the general decline in government deficits in the 1990s and the 
commitment made with the SGP in 1997, in reality only few prospective member states 
adhered to the four Maastricht criteria. Eventually, widespread transgressions of the criteria 
were no hindrance for the introduction of the single currency. That France and Germany would 
be among the initial member states introducing the euro was self-evident. In addition, Austria 
and the Benelux countries adhered to the stability-oriented framework of the EMU. The real 
controversy surrounded the southern and peripheral European countries. While, for instance, 
Italy succeeded in bringing its government deficit in line with the fiscal criteria from 1997, 
government debt remained above 100% of GDP, at a higher level than at the time of the 
agreement in Maastricht. Beyond discussions over the Maastricht criteria, the political drive 
towards the introduction of the euro was also met with opposition from observers worrying 
about Europe’s diverse political economies and social models (Dornbusch, 2015). Despite the 
controversies over introducing the single currency at all, a decision was reached not only to 
move to the final stage of the EMU, but also to grant membership to all 11 prospective states. 
Given the inability as well as the questionable fiscal manoeuvres to adhere to the convergence 
criteria, this decision was hardly a rules-based governance procedure. Despite the lack of 
convergence even on fiscal positions, European leaders seemed determined to progress with 
monetary integration.  
Once again, domestic politics played a decisive role. During the 1994 German federal 
elections, Kohl started to frame the introduction of a single currency as a European peace 
project. Without a single European currency, Europe would simply collapse, Kohl asserted 
(Mody, 2018, p. 110). This offensive was intended to push back against the significant popular 
opposition to EMU in Germany. Adding more pressure on the EMU and highlighting the 
popular resistance against the regressive stability culture embodied in the institution, French 
workers went on strike in 1995 and again in 1996 over the government’s plans to adhere to the 
EMU rules. Against growing political and social contestation, delaying the introduction of the 
euro was clearly risky. Therefore, the preference among European leaders was to adhere to the 
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initial deadline of 1999. In addition, Kohl’s invocation of the language of “war and peace” in 
response to political adversity meant that Italy had to be included. Introducing the euro while 
excluding one of the founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
could hardly pass for a European peace project. With Italy included despite its large and 
growing government debt, the door was open to the rest of the 11 prospective member states. 
While the agreement on the SGP in 1997 was intended to prolong fiscal discipline 
beyond the introduction of the single currency, the divergence in public budgets started to grow 
after 1999. Germany, France, and Italy all loosened their fiscal policies, for various reasons, 
and quickly transgressed the 3% excessive deficit threshold. The SGP, and particularly the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure established a division of labour whereby the Commission would 
issue warnings of excessive deficits, but with the responsibility of member state governments 
(in the Council) to enforce the rules. In effect, more powerful member states could resist 
sanctions, and over time, the evolving deficit procedures became discretionary instruments of 
powerful governments - void of meaningful political accountability (Braun & Hübner, 2019).  
Despite the inability to enforce sanctions for excessive deficits on powerful member 
states, the Maastricht fiscal criteria played an important role in delineating the space for EU 
labour governance. Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, EU member states had agreed to 
coordinate economic, social, and employment policies. In 1993, European Commission 
President Jacques Delors had outlined the Commission’s strategy for promoting employment 
and social cohesion ‘within a macroeconomic reference framework for both economic and 
monetary convergence’ (European Commission, 1993, p. 12). Delors’ white paper urged 
compromise between the main political forces of European integration, as ‘neither 
protectionism’ and job-sharing, nor ‘a drastic cut in wages’ would prove economically sound 
or ‘politically tenable’ (European Commission, 1993, p. 9). Expressing scepticism of the 
neoliberal dogma of unleashing market forces, it stressed the importance of not only relying 
‘on market forces to resolve the highly complex problems of achieving higher economic and 
employment performance’ (European Commission, 1993, p. 129). Yet, it stressed, Europe’s 
‘long-term, strategic responses’ to unemployment could only be realised within the constraints 
of fiscal discipline and price stability (European Commission, 1993, p. 129). This realisation 
depended on a ‘new solidarity’ between capitalists, workers, and the unemployed (European 
Commission, 1993, p. 123). Delors’ proposed project of EU labour governance asserted its 
intention to resolve distributional struggles by bringing capital and labour on board on a 
programme of fiscal discipline, wage moderation, and productivity growth. 
However, far from resolving the contradictions between social-democratic, pro-labour 
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and neoliberal, pro-capital policy priorities, the white paper highlighted the tensions that arise 
from a programme of wage moderation and productivity growth. It proposed a European 
incomes policy where ‘real wages increased in the Community on average by one percentage 
point less than productivity.’ This would mean that profits would permanently grow at a faster 
rate than wages, and this way, the paper suggested making a redistribution in favour of capital 
the ‘rule of thumb’ in EU economic governance (European Commission, 1993, p. 123).  
Eurozone economic governance and the ambitions of improving employment, equality, 
and social inclusion caught EU labour governance in what appeared an asymmetric trap. The 
principles of fiscal discipline and price stability set the conditions for EU labour governance, 
which in the Commission’s interpretation translates to permanent pro-capital redistribution. 
Yet, within these tight institutional conditions, the white paper marked the beginning of an 
explosion of EU employment policy activity. Facilitated by the introduction of qualified 
majority voting within the EU institutional framework, and the election of a number of social 
democratic governments during the latter half of the 1990s, the EU institutions embarked on 
the project of solving Europe’s persistent problems with high unemployment (Ashiagbor, 
2005; Schäfer, 2004). However, the link between monetary integration and EU labour 
governance was never fully realised. The continuing political contestation over labour 
governance at the domestic and EU-level played a part in preventing closer integration of 
labour governance within the EMU. At the domestic level, as I highlight below, social pacts 
for wage moderation had become a widespread compromise in many EU member states. While 
leading to a general redistribution from labour to capital, often it did not involve extensive 
liberalization of labour markets. At the EU-level, policy-makers disagreed on whether to push 
for labour liberalization or wage coordination. 
 
3.5. Social pacts and wage moderation in Europe’s labour markets 
At the domestic level, political settlements had emerged across the EU to support wage 
moderation and export-oriented growth strategies in the two decades leading up to the 
introduction of the euro (Regan, 2017). In many European member states, labour markets were 
characterised by extensive cooperation between partners, and institutionalised systems of 
interest representation. Since the 1970s, the academic literature has captured this phenomenon 
by the concept of corporatism (Molina & Rhodes, 2002). Over recent decades, organised 
labour, labour market institutions, etc., have been under pressure from, inter alia, economic 
globalization, capitalist restructuring, and hostile governments. The social pacts in many 
European countries in the 1980s and 1990s rose as a result of ‘the new macro-economic 
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framework associated with EMU’, and before that, the EMS (Hancké & Rhodes, 2005, p. 198).  
The Netherlands was an early example of how social pacts could help induce a 
deflationary pressure on the economy. The 1982 Wassenaar social pact marked the beginning 
of an era of wage moderation and flexibility in the Dutch labour markets, sustained by labour 
market reforms in the 1990s (Wilthagen & Tros, 2004). Further, after 1984, when government 
expenditure reached 55% of GDP, the Netherlands undertook significant fiscal tightening, with 
government expenditure reduced to 41% of GDP by 2007.  
The rise of social pacts for competitiveness and wage moderation in the 1980s and 
1990s depended - by definition – on the active involvement of both organised labour and 
business. These social pacts were, therefore, symbols of class compromises, no matter how 
tentative and subject to further contestation these pacts and compromises may have been. From 
the perspective of critical integration theory, what was at play in the Netherlands and in other 
countries was the formation of new hegemonic compromises under the condition of monetary 
integration (see Bruff, 2008a; Bruff deploys the concept of ‘common sense’). The result was 
deeply institutionalised class compromises that placed many European countries on a 
deflationary route. The commitment to price stability, which institutionalised in these countries 
in the 1980s, was part of the alignment of preferences in Europe that allowed for monetary 
union and a single currency. As such, domestic hegemonic projects emerging from the field of 
labour governance laid the foundation for the EMU. 
In situations where the social partners could not reach agreement on social pacts, such 
as in Germany in the late 1990s, there was even greater pressure on governments to reform 
labour markets in an effort to stimulate employment creation. The gravity centre of European 
economic integration, Germany, had experienced sluggish growth rates in the 1990s, and was 
portrayed as ‘the sick man of the euro’ (The Economist, 1999). The economic crisis that 
Germany experienced in the wake of reunification increased the pressure for decisive labour 
market reforms to liberalise German industrial relations and the welfare state (Streeck & 
Trampusch, 2005). Germany’s social partners had long struggled to agree on a social pact that 
would reform German labour markets and reinvigorate the economy. In the late 1990s, German 
employers had also started unilaterally withdrawing from sectoral collective bargaining 
institutions. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s social democratic government eventually rolled 
out a comprehensive restructuring of domestic labour markets and the welfare state through 
Agenda 2010 and the Hartz reforms. Together, employer strategies and labour market reforms 
contributed to the continued wage depression of low-end service sector workers (Palier & 
Thelen, 2010). Hartz IV, and the wider process of liberalization in Germany at the time, has 
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since buttressed Germany as an export-led growth model. This took place through a sustained 
downward pressure on labour costs, the associated contraction in aggregate demand and thus 
increased dependence on exports and foreign demand (Baccaro & Benassi, 2017). Chapter 4 
will return to the issue of German wages and their impact on the financial crisis.  
Outside the Eurozone core, peripheral member states were wrestling with the 
competing pressures from domestic stakeholders, the requirements for euro membership, and 
the powerful narrative of ‘modernisation.’ In Greece, while Papandreou’s PASOK government 
had many traits of nationalist-populist movements, the party evolved and adopted the social 
democratic commitment to a “modern” welfare state. Promising to deliver a modern welfare 
state, the prospect of Europe and European integration came to play a decisive role in PASOK’s 
ideological and rhetorical development from the early 1980s (Nafpliotis, 2018). Yet, Greece 
lacked the institutional setup characteristic of industrial relations in the Eurozone core, which 
complicated the idea of modernisation. Particularly, observers noted, ‘the Greek political 
economy is characterised by under-institutionalisation and increased – even if diminishing – 
party domination in the representation of organised interests’ which manifests itself in a lack 
of institutionalized social partnership (Antoniades, 2010, p. 39).  
Following the script of such a politicized institutional setup, Greek governments were 
the natural initiator of social dialogue and structural reform. The combined rhetoric of 
modernisation and Europeanisation intensified with Simitis leadership election after 
Papandreou’s death in 1996. Importantly, Simitis promised to join Europe’s currency union 
(Kalaitzidis, 2010). Simitis’ PASOK government (1996-2004), nonetheless struggled to shore 
up consent among social partners. This contributed to a lack of direction to the structural reform 
efforts in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2008). Simitis’ 
government initiated the 1997 social pact, aligning its vision for Greece’s industrial relations 
with the European consensus on the virtues of a competitive, social market economy. Despite 
overcoming severe tensions between social partners, the government managed an agreement, 
and two reform packages followed in 1998 and 2000. The economic and employment impacts 
of the 1998 labour market reform were disappointing, and the 2000 reform was unable to bring 
radical change to Greece’s labour and/or install a common purpose among social partners 
(Papadimitriou, 2005). 
Despite their limited success, Simitis’ efforts at reforming Greece’s labour market 
played a constitutive role in his government’s plea to adhere to the Maastricht criteria in the 
late 1990s. Greece’s diminishing government deficit confirmed the impression of 
macroeconomic convergence. When Greece adopted the Euro, the size and expenditure level 
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of the Greek government, which was at a very low level in 1980, had achieved considerable 
convergence with other Eurozone member states. In 1995, Greek expenditure levels as 
percentage of GDP reached those of Spain; in 1997, Greece and the Netherlands’ expenditure 
levels were on par. By 2008, Greek government expenditure exceeded 50% of GDP for the 
first time in modern history; at this point, Greek government expenditure was the second 
highest in the EU, only surpassed by France.5 
Accompanying the rapid expansion of the Greek public sector was a dramatic 
redistribution of income away from the working class in the early 1990s.  This followed the 
European trends of competitive corporatism (especially in Germany and neighbouring 
countries) and neoliberal marketization (especially in the UK and some Eastern European 
countries). After the mid-1990s, Greece was a remarkable exception to the European rule of 
wage moderation, as Greek wage shares steadily increased, and followed this path up until the 
2009 Greek crisis. This trend was more than anything caused by the failure of improving 
productivity in the Greek economy (Chapter 4). 
It was therefore on the back of very divergent domestic experiences with modernisation, 
Europeanisation, and adaption to globalization that European leaders sought to develop a 
common strategy for reforming and improving Europe’s social models and labour markets. At 
the European level in the mid-1990s, there was a growing sense of the urgency of the task of 
reforming Europe to improve its resilience in the face of accelerating technological innovation 
and globalization. The round of reform deemed necessary was less about European integration, 
and more about domestic reforms.   
 
3.6. The emergent project of labour governance through performance management 
At the European Council summits between 1994 and 1997, European leaders 
progressed the agenda on EU employment policy based on Delors’ 1993 white paper. First, the 
1994 Essen summit initiated a strategy for coordinating member states’ employment policies 
(the EES), launched a surveillance procedure for employment and policy, and recommended a 
policy mix of education, deregulation, and wage restraint. Second, the 1997 Luxembourg 
Summit introduced the OMC as a new strategy suited to deliver reform in the area of social, 
employment, and welfare policy. Third, the Amsterdam Treaty’s employment chapter 
committed the EU to ‘a high level of employment’ through a ‘coordinated strategy’ of 
 
5 From the OECD database on government spending: https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-
spending.htm. Retrieved 25-09-2019. 
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employability and flexibility measures. The Amsterdam Treaty came largely in response to 
French domestic struggles and strike waves over the employment prospects of the monetary 
union, but was shaped by the British governments’ preference for supply-side measures 
(Goetschy, 1999).  
The European Commission had been the instrumental force behind the advancement of 
the EES, while the election of Tony Blair as British Prime Minister created the opportunity for 
the Amsterdam Treaty’s employment chapter. In 1996-1998, Europe experienced a new 
political wave of social democrats gaining power across Europe, including in the ‘big four’ of 
Germany, France, Britain, and Italy. This wave included Schröder in Germany, Lionel Jospin 
in France, Romano Prodi in Italy, and Tony Blair in Britain. Blair’s Third Way social 
democratic vision had particular effect on the emergence of the EU project for labour 
governance. Together with Blair, Schröder, Jospin, and Prodi’s governments, social democrats 
headed 11 out of 15 EU member state governments by 1999.  
In order to assess this project of labour market reforms through policy coordination 
emerging among European leaders in the mid-1990s, it is worth considering the project’s social 
content and its mode of governance. For some observers, including many trade unionists, 
Europe’s new strategy for employment in the 1990s amounted to a ‘Maastricht for welfare’ – 
a (potential) watershed moment for the future of European social models to complement the 
one-sided economic focus of the Maastricht Treaty (Rhodes, 2000). For others, it represented 
a ‘workfarist reorientation of social policy at the EU level’, in which workers’ rights have 
become subordinated and aligned with ‘the demands of labour market flexibility’ (Jessop, 
2006, p. 149).  
These divisions in the academic assessment of the emerging EU project for labour 
governance reflect the wider academic and political disagreement over the reorientation of 
social democracy in the 1990s. Here, I follow Milena Büchs’ choice to approach the strategy 
as decisively ‘third-way’, shaped in particular by the rise of a new wave of social democrats 
including Tony Blair and Gerhard Schöder’s neue mitte (Büchs, 2007).  
This reformed version of social democracy was mostly supportive of welfare state 
activity, underlined the use of activation and training for the unemployed and investment in 
education, but was adamant that economic, social and labour governance all had to change. In 
a common report outlining the European third-way vision, Blair and Schröder abandoned forms 
of social democracy that in their view ruined ‘economic dynamism’ (Blair & Schröder, 1998, 
p. 2). Instead, and in line with both new public management lingo and Blair’s domestic political 
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project, Blair and Schröder called for EU member states to ‘steer’ rather than ‘row’ Europe’s 
social and economic development (Blair & Schröder, 1998, p. 4):  
‘We need to strengthen our policies by benchmarking our experiences in Britain 
and Germany, but also with like-minded counterparts in Europe and the rest of the 
world. We must learn from each other and measure our own performance against 
best practice and experience in other countries (Blair & Schröder, 1998, p. 2). 
Underpinning this change in the preferred mode of governance, a social philosophy of 
the third way emerged to transform the objectives of governance. Rather than fighting 
economic inequality through class struggle or redistribution, third way advocates promoted 
social inclusion through timely and limited state interventions (Giddens, 1999, pp. 101–111; 
Lister, 1998). 
At the EU-level, this was translated into a commitment to policy coordination and the 
end of a strategy of social harmonization. Together with Schröder, Blair’s vision eschewed 
plans for social harmonisation across Europe, as traditionally promoted by French socialists 
(Blair & Schröder, 1998). To advocate the end of harmonization as a strategy for promoting 
and safeguarding social protection was a momentous change in social democratic emphasis. 
This change reflected strategic decisions developed at the national level to reformulate social 
democracy in opposition to enduring conservative governments. Schröder’s turn to third way 
also came after the resignation of Oskar Lafontaine as finance minister in 1998, which led 
Schöder’s government to embracing a supply-side agenda domestically and in Europe much 
more forcefully.  
The 1997 and 1998 European Councils summits in Luxembourg and Cardiff promoted 
quantitative indicators to benchmark state economic and employment performance (European 
Council 1997 Luxemburg, European Council 1998 Cardiff). Benchmarking came to feature 
prominently as a core regulatory principle in the OMC (Arrowsmith et al., 2004). The focus on 
the process of collecting evidence from member states and benchmarking performance neither 
implied nor precluded that EU employment regulation should follow.  Scholarly debates reflect 
this openness. Owen Parker (2008, p. 409) has warned against a ‘neoliberal EU by other 
means.’ The Maastricht criteria and the institutional design of the EMU (may) impose austerity 
through external constraint; however, the EMU design leaves a considerable policy space of 
domestic politics, and gives member state the option of resisting the rules and criteria by 
running excessive deficits and advocating reforms (Parker, 2008, pp. 403–406). Based on the 
OMC, the EU labour market strategy operates not by imposing discipline in the form of 
external constraint; rather it works on and moulds the practices and ‘mind-sets’ of member 
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state governments, bureaucracy, social partners, and – perhaps - the wider population. 
Streamlining the procedure for how governments evaluate their own labour market policies 
may, for instance, lead governments to embrace the EU strategy because it ‘extends a 
rationality of competitiveness, flexibility, enterprise and the market into domains beyond the 
economic, including into the arena of government itself’ (Parker, 2008, p. 413). More 
supportive scholars emphasized the necessity of the flexibility and voluntary nature of the 
Lisbon strategy, arguing that the strategy allowed for ‘experimentalist governance’ (Sabel & 
Zeitlin, 2008) and ‘cross-national policy learning’, and eased policy coordination in sensitive 
policy areas (Mosher & Trubek, 2003, p. 70).  
The turn to performance management far from foreclosed the wider implications, and 
academics and policy-makers have since wrestled with the precise implication of this turn. It 
was exactly this openness over the content of EU policy that helped shore up consent among 
European social democrats. The openness of EU labour governance also broadened its appeal, 
securing consent of political actors otherwise hostile to the idea. Critical integration theory 
suggests that a hegemonic compromise between social democratic and neoliberal projects 
depended on this openness. 
In practice, the EU governed European labour at a distance. The fact that it was only 
possible to govern labour at a distance shows the relevance of the governmentality approach 
(Chapter 2). Under the EES, the EU institutions started issuing annual employment guidelines 
and evaluations of implementation after the Amsterdam Treaty. The employment guidelines 
were issued alongside the broad economic policy guidelines (BEPGs). The BEPGs were 
introduced in 1993 to coordinate member states’ economic policies under the EMU and survey 
member state performance in key economic policy areas, including price stability, public 
finances, and wage developments (Deroose et al., 2008). The BEPGs should help member 
states achieve the economic policy objectives of the EU (particularly around job creation and 
employment) and prevent member states pursuing policies that might jeopardise the 
macroeconomic stability of the EU/EMU (Council of the European Union, 1998; Goetschy, 
1999). The 2000 Council Summit in Lisbon outlined the ‘new strategic goal (…) to become 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’ by focusing 
economic governance on the objectives of ‘sustainable economic growth’, ‘more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion’ (European Council, 2000). The Lisbon strategy signalled the 
height of the ‘enthusiasm for European-level cooperation’ on labour market policy (Goetschy, 
2005, p. 64).  For Europe’s trade unions, Lisbon represented a break with the deflationary 
pressure of the SGP (Hyman, 2011). While this hope was eventually defeated, the Lisbon 
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strategy involved a broad spectre of political and social actors, with social democrats and trade 
unions playing a central role in the policy process.  
The new social democratic pitch for European labour markets under the Lisbon strategy 
sought to reconcile the objectives of economic integration, monetary and fiscal discipline, and 
social cohesion. Compared to the 1993 Delors White Paper, the Lisbon strategy had abandoned 
the idea of incomes policy as defining strategy, giving way instead to the formalisation of the 
OMC as the core, strategic tool. The OMC should support market liberalisation and thereby 
reinforcing Europe’s ‘active welfare states’ by using performance management tools such as 
benchmarking, the exchange of best practices, etc.  
The prominence of Third Way EU labour market policy at the turn of the century is 
significant for a number of reasons. First, the EU’s Employment and Lisbon strategies have 
rightly been criticised for ignoring the fundamental imbalances that developed in the European 
economy under the EMU (Dyson & Quaglia, 2012). I deal with the development of these 
imbalances, their relationship to global, macroeconomic structural factors, and their impact on 
EU labour governance in chapter 4.  
Second, the formation of new policy instruments around the launch of the Lisbon 
Strategy would also significantly shape reforms in the wake of the crisis. Of particular 
importance was the emergence of performance management as a strategy for EU wage and 
labour governance. Between the Cardiff Process, set up under the Blair government’s EU 
Presidency, and the agreement on the Lisbon Strategy, EU leaders scaled up principles of New 
Public Management to EU policy coordination by introducing macroeconomic dialogue and 
member state peer-reviews based on quantitative indicators measuring state performance. 
These practices, turned into a core regulatory principle at Lisbon, have continued to shape the 
politics of EU labour governance in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Hansen & Lovering, 
2019b; Chapter 4 and 5).  
The EU project for labour governance that emerged in the late 1990s has since 
continued to shape European integration, creating institutional path-dependency on governance 
reforms in the 2000s and 2010s.  Despite the proliferation of political compromises, most 
ambitiously in the Lisbon Strategy in 2000, this emergent labour governance project placed 
itself uneasily within the EU institutional framework. In particular, this emergent project had 
no bearing on Europe’s monetary union. This uncomfortable institutional position was partly 
the consequence of the resistance of centre-right governments unwilling to contemplate 
reforms that would more fundamentally alter the framework for EU labour governance. Critical 
integration theory questions whether the emergent labour governance project could overcome 
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opposition from the neoliberal hegemonic project. The competition between EU hegemonic 
projects made labour governance an uneasy fit for European integration.  
Yet, the uncomfortable position of the emergent labour governance project was also the 
unintended consequence of the third way social democratic decision to discharge the ambition 
of social harmonization and instead concentrate on governance at a distance. Having made this 
strategic decision, social democratic leaders no longer needed EU institutional reform to push 
their project of EU labour governance. Proponents of this emergent project did not pursue EU 
institutional reform, but focused instead on developing and streamlining best practices for 
governance, benchmarking techniques, etc. From the perspective of critical integration theory, 
this wave of social democrats sought to circumvent hegemonic contestation over institutional 
reforms by developing new modes of governance within existing institutional frameworks. Yet, 
as was highlighted by the rise of Eurozone imbalances, the redistribution away from labour 
across Europe, and eventually the Eurozone crisis, this was ultimately a strategy unable to 
address the broader crises tendencies in European capitalism. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the early stages of EU labour governance and its 
complicated relationship with European monetary integration. The chapter has analysed the 
evolution of these two different aspects of European integration from the experiments with 
currency bandwidths in the 1970s up until the introduction of the single currency in 1999. From 
the outset, European monetary integration faced difficult questions on labour and labour 
markets. Domestic hegemonic competition in France and Germany laid pressure on those 
governments to increase economic dynamism. During the negotiations on the EMU, the 
neoliberal hegemonic project that had come to dominate Germany successfully insisted on 
founding the single currency on an institutional framework of price stability. Inducing a 
deflationary pressure on Europe’s economy, and translating into an EU commitment to the 
strategy of wage moderation, the EMU was bound to raise criticisms for inflating employment, 
lowering output growth and increasing inequality. In the 1990s, and in response to growing 
popular discontent with high unemployment in Europe, a wave of social democrats gained 
power across Europe. This wave decisively pushed forward the policy agenda for EU labour 
governance. Reluctant in pursuing Treaty changes, and adamant to move beyond “old” social 
democratic objectives of social harmonization, the wave of social democrats sought to govern 
labour from the EU-level through techniques of performance management. These techniques 
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included benchmarking, the diffusion of best practice, and procedural streamlining, all 
institutionalised in the OMC and later the Lisbon Strategy.  
 Drawing on the concept of competing hegemonic projects, the chapter has argued 
that hegemonic competition at the domestic and EU level can explain the evolution of labour 
governance. Unintended consequences of monetary integration and changes to the global 
political economy, such as the growing divergence among EMU member states, shaped 
political contestation over EU labour governance. In the 1980s, domestic compromises on the 
need to reconfigure the relationship between macroeconomic dynamism and stability came in 
response to the global macro-structural context of floating exchange rates and slowing growth. 
In the 1990s, European leaders established the EMU’s stability-oriented institutions amidst 
accelerating economic globalization. In response to the EMU’s deflationary pressure, and the 
pressure of globalization on European labour, a strengthened social democratic project 
advocated the development of new modes of governing employment, labour market 
institutions, and wages. Yet, EU labour governance as pushed by the social democratic project 
of the late 1990s did not address the weaknesses of the EMU. Offering a compromise between 
the social democratic concern for employment policy and the neoliberal concerns for cost 
competitiveness, the emergent project of EU labour governance avoided confronting the 
question of the EMU. In effect, the social democratic project for labour governance accepted 
the EMU’s institutional deficiencies, which included the lack of policy instruments for 
promoting convergence among member states. The inability to address these deficiencies 
highlights the fragile hegemonic compromise on which EU labour governance rested.  
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4. Dangerous divergence in the Eurozone  
The preceding chapter analysed the developing relationship between EU labour 
governance and European monetary integration in the 1980s and 1990s. The chapter 
highlighted how domestic politics shaped contestation over EMU and EU labour governance. 
In return for monetary union, Germany required European integration to rely on rules-based 
governance aiming at deflation and fiscal discipline. In the latter half of the 1990s, European 
social democratic forces promoted a framework for EU labour governance that avoided the 
question of reforming the EMU’s institutional framework. Structural transformations reshaped 
domestic and European political contestation. In particular, the innovation of the EMU’s 
institutional structures interacted with economic globalization to put pressure on employment 
and wages. In this chapter, I argue that once the single currency was introduced, these 
structural changes would again reshape political contestation over EU labour governance. 
The nature and persistence of political contestation made the EU unable to reform the 
governance of labour markets within the EMU before the financial crisis hit Europe in 2008. 
To advance this argument, I analyse the development of EU labour governance from the 
introduction of the euro in 1999 until the peak of the Eurozone crisis in 2010. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Since Europe’s leaders agreed on establishing a monetary union, there has been 
extensive analytical interest in the relationship between Europe’s labour markets, the 
institutions that govern wages, and the EMU (Calmfors, 2001; Calmfors & Johansson, 2006; 
Erne, 2008; Hancké, 2013). Signing up to EMU membership, EU member states had 
centralised monetary policy, and committed to the principle of price stability. With a common 
objective of inflation rates below 2%, member states had in principle also agreed to keeping 
wage developments broadly in line with productivity growth. This is because wage 
developments closely correlate with inflation (Flassbeck & Lapavitsas, 2015). Yet, from the 
beginning, the EMU did not involve a loss or pooling of sovereignty over the setting of wages 
and wage policies for its participating member states. Policymakers and observers questioned 
the sustainability of a centralised monetary union with national wage setting institutions 
(Glassner & Pochet, 2011). What happens in case of persistent divergence in wage inflation 
between member states? Would the EU have to intervene at some point? 
In this chapter, I analyse the development of EU labour governance in the first decade 
of the EMU. The EMU provided a new, formidable challenge to labour governance for several 
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reasons. First, the EMU was structurally and institutionally unable to address the development 
of the EU’s wages and labour markets, even when EMU seemed to bring about ever-increasing 
divergence rather than convergence among its member states. Second, under the condition of 
global economic restructuring and domestic strategies of wage moderation, the EMU facilitated 
member states’ increased dependence on finance, credit, and debt. The first decade of the EMU 
witnessed an intensification of wage moderation and an acceleration of redistribution away 
from income, conditioned by economic globalization and constrained European political 
leadership. The interaction between domestic wage strategies, the EMU institutional structure, 
and structural changes in the global economy reshaped the EU project for labour governance 
that had emerged in the 1990s (Chapter 3).  
Taking a point of departure in critical integration theory’s emphasis on macro-structural 
conditions, this chapter seeks to make the above restructuring in European and global 
capitalism intrinsic to the analysis of EU labour governance. Unpacking the argument, I 
identify the transnational causes behind the long-term trend of wages falling relative to total 
income in Europe and emphasise how wage moderation gained prominence as a domestic 
strategy with particular strength in Germany. As wage shares came under pressure across 
Europe, EMU member states relied increasingly on debt to maintain economic growth. The 
EU/EMU institutional structure facilitated the rise of wage moderation and competitiveness as 
the major strategies of domestic labour governance in the pre-crisis period. Yet, and following 
the framework of critical integration theory, the chapter stresses how the recurring hegemonic 
competition between social-democratic and neoliberal forces hindered the formation of a firm 
framework for governing labour markets and wages at the supranational level.  
The chapter proceeds by following the evolution of EU labour governance in the first 
decade of the EMU. First, I briefly discuss how wage bargaining and redistributive questions 
affect the EMU and outline how critical integration theory may inform our analysis of wage 
developments, EU labour governance, and the EMU. Second, I analyse how long-term 
distributional changes in income turned into macroeconomic imbalances in the Eurozone in the 
2000s. Third, I show in more detail the domestic sources and multilevel character of these 
distributional changes and the ensuing Eurozone imbalances. Here, I highlight the case of 
German labour market restructuring, and use Greece to illustrate Eurozone core-periphery 
dynamics. Fourth, I analyse the evolution of EU labour governance in relation to the problem 
of Eurozone imbalances from the introduction of the single currency to the outbreak of the 
financial crisis. Fifth, I analyse how the problem of Eurozone wages evolved from the first 
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efforts to fight the financial crisis in 2008 to the reform of EMU institutions in 2010-11. I end 
the chapter with a conclusion. 
 
4.2. Critical integration theory, the Eurozone economy, and the crisis 
In this thesis, I have bolstered my analytical framework of critical integration theory 
with a Political Economy understanding of the EMU (Chapter 2). This framework stands in 
contrast to the baseline theory of the economics of the EMU, i.e. neoclassical economics. 
Neoclassical economics suggest that Eurozone wage developments should respond efficiently 
to market pressures or be subject to centralised wage coordination in line with low-inflation 
policy objectives (Calmfors, 2001; Calmfors & Driffill, 1988; Interviewee 15). From the 
perspective of neoclassical economics, the Eurozone’s main wage-related woes therefore stem 
from inability of wages to respond to market pressures and to keep inflation in check.  
For members of a monetary union, rigid wages come with several problems. The most 
severe of these problems is magnified in times of so-called asymmetric shocks, or country-
specific crises. If an EMU member state, like Spain, is hit by a demand shock, its exports may 
quickly and severely contract. In this case, the Spanish economy would need adjustment. If 
Spain had floating exchange rates, market pressures would likely push down the rate to restore 
at least some of Spain’s competitiveness. If its currency were fixed, but adjustable, like under 
the EMS, the Spanish government would be able to devalue the currency to improve the 
country’s external balances (for a favourable assessment of the EMS, see for instance Höpner 
& Spielau, 2018).  
For an EMU member, competitive devaluation necessarily takes place through the 
labour market, improving competitiveness by lowering labour costs through wage cuts or 
moderation and improved productivity. It would be a process of internal devaluation, through 
domestic institutions, rather than an external, exchange rate devaluation. From an 
(neoclassical) economic perspective, the most efficient way to adjust labour markets is through 
nominal down-wards wage flexibility. Nominal wage flexibility allows wage costs to adjust 
quickly, even in the absence of price inflation. Under the condition of perfect market 
competition, the hallmark of neoclassical economics, nominal wage flexibility would also 
allow for up-wards wage adjustment on the back of an economic recovery. Conversely, down-
wards wage rigidity prolongs adjustment processes, and leads to a significant rise in 
unemployment as domestic firms lose competitiveness and export markets (Blanchard & 
Wolfers, 2000). In textbook assessments of the conditions for currency unions, wage flexibility 
is key in determining the costs and benefits of currency union membership: more wage 
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flexibility gives greater benefits (de Grauwe, 2014). Empirical studies in run-up to the financial 
crisis, often conducted by European Commission officials, highlighted an ‘insufficient degree 
of wage flexibility in the euro area’ (Arpaia & Pichelmann, 2007, p. 300). 
These textbook and official EU assessments of the EMU’s problems with wage rigidity 
have all but systematically neglected distributional conflicts between labour and capital in 
Europe’s political economy. To be clear, neoclassical economists have studied the distribution 
of income between capital and labour through the prism of factor shares. Yet, the connection 
between the politics of income distribution and the economics of the Eurozone is left 
unexplored. Economists of the European Commission’s DG ECFIN have located the causes of 
falling wage share in the ‘interplay of demand and supply conditions for capital,’ in the 
‘increasing weight of those sectors with structurally lower labour shares’, and in ‘technological 
forces’ (Arpaia et al., 2009, pp. 2, 35, 37).  
Sectoral and technological changes are indeed likely to affect the relative distribution 
of income between labour and capital. However, neoclassical economics ignore how political 
processes, social conflict, and institutional change shape sectoral and technological factors. 
The rise of the low-paid service sector, and the prominence of innovation in financial and 
telecommunication sectors, are both sectoral and technological factors. Yet, they are also very 
prominent features of Europe’s political economy under the conditions of late capitalism. For 
instance, the rise of the low-paid sector in Germany following the Hartz reforms in the early 
2000s helped stimulate Germany’s growing current account surplus. Further, government 
reforms and employer strategies have pushed service sector wage cuts (Hassel, 2014). Critical 
integration theory questions the explanatory power of neoclassical economics in assessing how 
micro-level changes in employment and technology connect to global processes of capitalist 
restructuring and social change. 
Based on critical integration theory’s emphasis on structural explanations, I interpret 
income redistribution as the strategic outcome of global economic macro-structural conditions. 
Various labour class fractions have pursued strategies of wage moderation in reaction to 
economic globalization, while some capitalist class fractions have pursued strategies of 
financialisation. Critical integration theory highlights two forms of structures, which in the case 
of EU labour governance operate as structural conditions for European labour and wage 
strategies. First, institutional structures, which designate the formal political relationship 
between trade unions, employer associations, and state actors, including central bankers. 
Second, global macrostructures, which include the properties of capitalist competition, modes 
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of production and exploitation under global capitalism, and generally, economic globalization 
and the rise of finance. 
The strategic agency of European actors, such as trade unionists or political executives, 
thus takes place under these structural conditions. Given the existence and power of these 
structures, domestic processes closely relate to the evolution of EU-level policy, as well as 
global processes of economic and social restructuring. For instance, domestic strategies of 
wage moderation and the formation of social pacts closely relate to the evolution of European 
integration under the condition of global economic transformations. In chapter 3, for instance, 
I highlighted how domestic demands for employment creation interacted with European 
monetary integration in the global context of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. 
Below, I unpack how economic globalization has shaped EU-level and domestic strategies of 
wage moderation and distributional conflict.   
 
4.3. Wage shares and distributional conflict in the EMU 
For about 30 years following World War II, the European economy experienced high 
growth rates and rising productivity. Workers received wages that rose in line with productivity 
and inflation. The political-economic order of full employment and Keynesian demand 
management characterised this period. Eventually, the historic settlement between labour and 
capital in the post-war period produced its own set of contradictions, which tested and 
eventually undermined the institutional foundations of the Keynesian welfare state. Since the 
mid-1970s, the wage share has steadily declined, except for brief interruptions in the early 
1990s and in 2007-2009. While the general trend is clear from Figure 4.1, it also shows that 
the wage share tends to fall most rapidly in periods with higher growth rates, such as in 2004-
07, whereas it tends to be considerably more stable in periods of recession (the period since 
2010). In the event of a sudden economic bust, like in 2007-08, the wage share rises due to the 
relatively ‘sticky’ nature of wages. 
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Table 4.1 Wage shares selected countries and Euro area (12 countries) 
Country Wage share as % of GDP, five-year interval 
Year 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012    20176 
Germany 60.2 57.9 57.7 53.7 56.5 56.5 
Italy 58.3 54 51.5 52 53.7 52.8 
France 57.9 56.1 56.2 55.3 58.1 58.1 
Spain 62.4 59.5 57.4 56.0 55.6 54.5 
Portugal 60.3 60.1 59.8 56.1 54.0 52.3 
Euro area (12 countries) 59.9 57.2 56.3 54.3 56.5 55.7 
Source: AMECO 
Figure 4.1 Wage shares in the Eurozone 1960-2018 (12 countries) 
 
Source: AMECO 
 
6 Forecast (AMECO data updated 9 November 2017) 
 
19
60
19
63
19
66
19
69
19
72
19
75
19
78
19
81
19
84
19
87
19
90
19
93
19
96
19
99
20
02
20
05
20
08
20
11
20
14
20
17
50
52
54
56
58
60
62
64
66
68
Eurozone (12 countries) Percentage of GDP
Eurozone 12 (including West Germany) Percentage of GDP
 125 
Figure 4.2. Wage shares in selected countries 1980-2008 
 
 Source: AMECO  
The general trend towards a seemingly ever-lower wage share in the Eurozone contains 
some significant geographical variations. Table 4.1 and figure 4.2 highlight some of these 
variations. The fall in the wage share was particularly pronounced in Germany in both the 
1990s and 2000s, whereas for southern European countries, the tendency has been towards 
stable, and in Greece’s exceptional case, increasing wage shares up until the crisis.  
Economic globalization, including the expansion of global financial markets, has 
shaped domestic social groups’ strategies of wage moderation and/or expansion. Critical 
integration theory focuses on macro-structural changes that have shaped the strategic reasoning 
of domestic agents. In some member states, the domestic institutional setup and the 
opportunities offered by changing geopolitical and global economic developments facilitated 
very strong wage moderation that resulted in great redistribution of income from labour to 
capital. Nowhere was this the case more than in Germany, Europe’s economic powerhouse. 
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From 2004, in the immediate run-up to the financial crisis, wages started to fall when measured 
against productivity (resulting in falling unit labour costs).  
Germany managed to build a large trade and current account surplus as a result of stable 
or declining unit labour costs, rapidly falling wage share, advanced value chain integration with 
central and Eastern Europe, and strong non-cost competitiveness (Baccaro & Benassi, 2017). 
The austere approach to economic and wage development throughout the last couple of decades 
most likely subdued German growth rates in the pre-crisis years. However, coupled with the 
institutional complementarity between German economic policies and the Eurozone 
framework, this strategy made the German economy exceptionally resilient, both in the face of 
the financial crisis and the following Eurozone crisis (Hancké, 2013).   
 
4.3.1. Wage shares and Eurozone divergence 
A result of the austere wage developments in Germany and the Eurozone core, and the 
comparatively more expansive wage rises in Southern Europe, the development in unit labour 
cost has diverged significantly within the EMU since the introduction of the euro. Figure 2.1 
depicted the development in unit labour costs in 5 Eurozone member states in the period 1999-
2019, with 2010 as index=100 (Chapter 2).7 Greece has had the most pronounced rise and fall 
in unit labour costs over this period. The comparatively rapid rise in unit labour costs in the 
period 1999-2010 corresponds to the fact that Greece were the only of the five countries to 
experience a rising wage share in the same period (Figure 2.1). Italy and Spain both 
experienced unit labour costs growing by about 33% in nominal terms over the 11-year period, 
corresponding to a 2,6% annual increase8. Germany, on the other hand, had stagnant or even 
falling unit labour costs during this period, a result of the strict wage moderation taking place 
after the Hartz reforms and the 2004 eastern EU enlargement.  
Under the condition of economic globalisation and capitalist restructuring, wage 
moderation became entranced as political strategies in many Eurozone member states. A 
number of social democratic governments pushed for wage moderation as a European strategy 
for employment creation (Chapter 3). The wage moderation strategy, however, severely 
underestimated the economic effects of wage moderation in Europe, as post-Keynesian 
scholars have demonstrated (Onaran & Galanis, 2012; Stockhammer, 2011). Under the 
condition of wage moderation, corporate profitability increases, but private consumption 
 
7 AMECO estimates for 2017, 2018, 2019. Data from November 2017.  
8 Formula: (100/75)^(1/11)-1 = 0.0265 
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inevitably suffers. As demonstrated by a number of post-Keynesian studies, falling wage shares 
significantly weaken aggregate demand (Lavoie & Stockhammer, 2013). While higher profit 
margins may be good for long-term growth through higher corporate investments in the 
productive facilities, this is outweighed by the negative demand effects of a corresponding fall 
in the wage shares. Because domestic aggregate demand shrinks when wage shares fall (Onaran 
& Galanis, 2012), national output and income suffers. Summarising a large number of studies, 
Onaran and Galanis (2012, p. 1) state that ‘consumption is expected to decrease when the wage 
share decreases, since the marginal propensity to consume out of capital income is lower than 
that out of wage income’.  
A result of the contraction in the wage share, and the associated compression of 
aggregate demand, Eurozone member states have been compelled to target foreign demand 
through exports, predominantly to be found outside Europe. Arguably, the EU agenda on 
competitiveness has both advocated and responded to the predominance of wage moderation 
strategies in Europe. However, the competitiveness agenda has come with several internal 
tensions. If all Eurozone member states were capable of increasing exports, this would logically 
lead to a significant trade surplus with the rest of the world. Most likely, the euro’s exchange 
rate would adjust and rebalance trade. Alternatively, a permanent trade surplus could cause 
geopolitical tensions, depending on the reaction of Europe’s major trade partners.  
Returning to the period preceding the financial crisis, it became clear that some 
Eurozone countries were less well positioned to adjust their economies to the institutional 
demands required by a successful export-led growth model (Hall, 2012). An alternative to 
relying on foreign demand through exports, economies with falling wage shares could 
substitute aggregate demand for future income via debt issuance. The variety of domestic 
strategies reflects the uneven positions of member state economies within global patterns of 
capitalist restructuring and depends on domestic struggles over the terms and conditions of 
wage moderation/expansion. As long as wage moderation exists in all member state economies, 
the only alternative to a growth model based on exports is one based on debt-fuelled 
consumption. Some Eurozone countries have embarked on the latter path, resulting in a 
growing divergence in export performance between Eurozone core and periphery (Johnston, 
Hancke, & Pant, 2014). This has in turn prevented Germany’s strong export performance to 
turn into higher exchange rates with the rest of world.  
Conversely, despite a relative higher level of wage inflation, southern Europe was 
unable to prop up demand, and debt-led private and public consumption increasingly 
compensated for limited wage-led development and growth (Stockhammer, 2011). Europe’s 
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consumption- and debt-led economies may have tamed the trade imbalance between the 
Eurozone and the world. Nonetheless, due to the acceleration of large current account deficits 
and the ensuing debt levels, Southern Europe was most heavily exposed when government 
yield spreads relative to Germany rapidly picked up as global financial markets started to 
speculate on the ECB’s willingness to act as a lender-of-last-resort for the Eurozone. This line 
of events suggests that the interests of state actors in the core Eurozone aligned with the EMU 
institutional structure and the structural forces unleashed by the global financial crisis.  
In the pre-crisis era, the low-interest rates secured by the EMU institutional structure 
had helped sustaining Southern Europe’s debt-led consumption model. However, this was also 
a tremendously unsustainable economic model once international financial markets dried up as 
part of the global financial crisis. The ensuing Eurozone crisis did everything to highlight how 
a few member states’ export success, rapid financialisation, and the build-up of public and 
private debt in the remaining states, had propped up an otherwise unfeasible Eurozone growth 
model. A key aspect of Eurozone economic development in the lead-up to the crisis was thus 
the divergence between export-oriented economies at the core, and debt-led economies at the 
periphery (Dooley, 2018). While competing hegemonic projects had aligned on the domestic 
strategy of wage moderation, the institutional development of an EU project for governing the 
consequences of this strategy was still lacking. We return to this dilemma below. 
Since the crisis, the Eurozone’s external position has dramatically changed as the result 
of the crisis and the effects of austerity. Since 2013, the Eurozone has run a constant trade 
surplus with the rest of the world. The dramatic depression of domestic spending in crisis 
countries in the Eurozone periphery facilitated by strict austerity has contributed to this 
achievement. Despite the overall turn to a trade surplus since the crisis, the core-periphery 
divide still characterises the Eurozone. The core consists of (even stronger) net exporters where 
persistently high exports in Germany and the Netherlands ensures an overall trade surplus for 
the Eurozone. On the demand side, sharp increases in exports to the US and China sustains 
Europe’s trade surplus (Eurostat, 2019). Conversely, the periphery has turned into low-demand, 
low growth economies due to austerity. I return to the issue of the Eurozone’s political economy 
in the post-crisis era in Chapter 5 and the Conclusion. 
All European hegemonic projects pursue strategies of economic growth. The downward 
pressure on wages lowers aggregate demand, and raises the importance of alternative growth 
strategies, such as export- or debt-led growth. Offering access to cheaper credit, and new avenues for cross-
border trade, the EMU combined with the failure of the EU to coordinate wage policies to deepen 
member states’ reliance on exports and debt and helped exacerbate the Eurozone crisis. Given 
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the rise of debt and macroeconomic imbalances, European integration was increasingly in a 
state of crisis that called for an enhanced framework for governing labour markets. Yet, within 
the political and institutional constraints of the EU and the EMU, European leaders were unable 
to deliver. 
 
4.3.2. From falling wage shares to the Eurozone crisis 
The creation of the EMU facilitated its member states with new sources of growth 
through financial integration, the elimination of currency risk, and the convergence of interest 
rates (Sinn, 2014). Germany benefitted from the common euro exchange rate, in addition to 
the opportunities offered by EU enlargement. Southern member states experiencing relatively 
higher growth rates before the crisis, experienced a rapid increase in capital inflows, 
particularly from northern Europe (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 2015). The convergence and decline 
of interest rates in the Eurozone, enabled these economies to finance private and public debt 
for longer (European Commission, 2008a). Thus, the EMU institutional structure supports and 
solidifies export- and debt-led growth models in the Eurozone through financial and monetary 
integration. The effect was to transfer the underlying wage and growth crisis into an imbalance 
crisis by expanding capital flows and thereby establishing other sources of (temporary) growth 
(Hansen & Lovering, 2019a). 
In addition, the EMU amplifies the dangers of the resulting macroeconomic imbalances 
by removing key adjustment tools. The EMU and the Maastricht criteria have matured and 
‘constitutionalised’ the principles of price stability and fiscal discipline that had started to direct 
the economic strategies of European governments in the decades preceding the creation of the 
EMU (Gill, 1998) . 
To sum up the evolution of Europe’s macroeconomic development in the lead-up to the 
crisis, economic and financial integration under the EMU protected member states against 
some immediate threats from the acceleration of macroeconomic imbalances, for instance by 
stabilising interest rates at relatively low levels. In effect, European leaders had provided an 
important level of stability into otherwise imbalanced economies and injected a temporary 
source of growth for most Eurozone member states. Yet, the currency area’s growth model in 
the lead-up to the crisis was almost exclusively built on financialisation and the acceleration of 
imbalances. Institutionally, the single currency had eliminated the option of ‘promoting 
economic adjustment through currency depreciations/devaluations’, and the EMU effectively 
exacerbated the severity of the ensuing imbalance crisis (Johnston & Regan, 2016, p. 320). 
Perhaps most importantly, the fiscal discipline imposed by the EMU had limited the ability of 
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member states to pursue expansionist policies and restore wage-led growth while restricting 
the feasibility of trade unions pursuing policies for wage expansion (Hancké, 2013; 
Stockhammer, 2016).  
 
4.4. Sources of instability: German domestic politics and European political economy 
The general redistribution in Europe from labour to capital points to the broad trends 
that undermined Eurozone stability and convergence before the crisis. However, it does not 
explain the domestic conflicts that generate instability and shape potential EU-level 
governance. Following the argument of critical integration theory, transformations in European 
integration rely on hegemonic projects anchored in domestic politics. In the case of the pressure 
on wages preceding the Eurozone crisis, the domestic context of German labour market reform 
was highly consequential. German reforms would not only change the preferences of German 
state actors in European integration, but also more fundamentally alter European political 
economy.   
For Germany, domestic and international political transformations proved highly 
conducive to a strategy of wage moderation. This domestic strategy would decisively shape the 
acceleration of imbalances in the Eurozone. Transnational factors were important for 
consolidating wage moderation in Germany. Export-oriented industrial firms, the backbone of 
German capitalism, intensified transnational restructuring after German reunification, and 
again following EU Eastern enlargement, as German business expanded eastwards to 
consolidate the wage moderation strategy. East expansion would create new business 
opportunities through integrated trade and production networks, while limiting labour conflict 
opportunities (Baccaro & Benassi, 2017; Simonazzi et al., 2013). Baccaro and Benassi (2017, 
p. 86) argue that the strategic restructuring of export-oriented firms whereby they ‘reduce costs 
and regain price competitiveness’ increases the pressure on domestic wages and consumption. 
The eastwards orientation of German trade and expansion of its industry’s supply chains also 
helped raise German competitiveness relative to the European south (Simonazzi et al., 2013).  
Macro-structural changes, including the breakdown of communism in Eastern Europe, 
helped the economic restructuring of German business and thus the formation of an 
increasingly strong political-economic project around low wage developments and high 
exports (a neoliberal hegemonic project). In addition, the impasse of tripartite negotiations on 
a social pact provided the background for the German government’s implementation of the 
Hartz reforms in 2003-05. The Hartz reforms constituted the core of a wider process of 
liberalisation in German industrial relations in advance of the financial crisis (Hassel, 2014). 
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The reforms transformed Germany’s labour markets and unemployment systems, and 
facilitated the creation of a number of new, low-paid jobs. As such, the reforms created a new 
section of low-paid jobs at the core of the Eurozone, and that way, changed the context of EU 
labour governance from the ground.   
In response to the failure of the tripartite Alliance for Jobs (Chapter 3), in February 
2002 Schröder’s government took charge of the process of labour reforms and appointed 
Volkswagen’s personnel director as head of a committee to modernise Germany’s labour 
markets. In March 2003, Schröder announced a wide range of reforms as part of the ‘Agenda 
2010’. Of the reforms rolled out between 2003 and 2005, the Hartz IV reform particularly 
targeted labour market and welfare state institutions (Bruff, 2008b). The Hartz reforms came 
at a time of prolonged economic stagnation in Germany. Unemployment and sluggish growth 
were enduring problems in Germany, and Schröder’s government followed the reasoning of 
both neoliberal and Third Way social democracy that liberalization was conducive to economic 
dynamism. However, a strategy of fiscal expansion followed the Hartz reforms. It was ‘exactly 
because the Hartz reforms were injecting a serious ordoliberal dose of market-enhancing 
competition into the German economy’ that Schröder ‘could justify large fiscal deficits’ 
(Matthijs, 2016, p. 381). 
Despite the strengthening of the neoliberal project in Germany that the Hartz reform 
symbolised, there has remained ample domestic opposition to continuous labour market 
liberalization. Competing hegemonic projects have complicated the path towards German 
labour market liberalization. Recently, Germany’s coalition government has introduced a 
minimum wage in 2014 and pursued a ‘policy orientation (…) of moderate re-regulation of the 
labour market and welfare state expansion’ since the crisis (Eichhorst & Hassel, 2018, p. 116). 
The combination of neoliberal Hartz reforms and German fiscal expansion had decisive 
impact on EU economic governance during the 2000s. Germany was among a group of EMU 
member states, notably France, which transgressed the rules of the SGP in the early 2000s. 
Instead of Germany and France facing the consequences of such transgressions, the credibility 
of the SGP was severely damaged and was waiting for reform (Munchau, 2004). Over the 
period 2002-2005, Germany and France consistently violated the SGP. In January 2002, the 
Commission had first proposed issuing an early warning for Germany (European Commission, 
2002). In January 2003, the ECOFIN Council of finance ministers decided to support the 
Commission’s recommendations on the existence and the need for action on an excessive 
deficit in Germany (Council of the European Union, 2003b). A similar process for France led 
to the Council decision in June 2003 on the existence and need for action on an excessive 
 132 
deficit (Council of the European Union, 2003c). Yet, at an ECOFIN meeting in November 
2003, Germany and France blocked the Commission’s recommendations to proceed with the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure and created an institutional crisis in the EMU. Having effectively 
suspended the SGP, France and Germany relied on a European Commission initiative to reform 
the fiscal framework for the currency union (Fischer et al., 2006).   
Placing greater emphasis on medium-term budgetary balance, the EU reformed the SGP 
in 2005. The reformed SGP created ‘the possibility, when assessing progress towards the 
medium-term budgetary objectives, to take account of structural reforms that are fiscally costly 
in the short run but yield longer-term gains in terms of growth and fiscal sustainability’ 
(European Commission, 2008a, p. 10). The reform allowed domestic structural reforms to have 
short-term, negative fiscal effects, as reforms aimed at increasing the supply and flexibility of 
workers would now permit member states to transgress the 3% deficit rule. Further, the SGP 
was becoming an increasingly political and discretionary policy tool, and the reform watered 
down its original rules-based elements. In October 2008, before the full repercussions of the 
global financial crisis had reached Europe, the ECB concluded that ‘the implementation of the 
[Stability and Growth] Pact has lacked sufficient rigour and political will’  (European Central 
Bank, 2008, p. 64). 
The 2005 SGP reform points to the contested nature of the neoliberal hegemonic project 
that dominated European integration in the 2000s. Given France and Germany’s multiple 
transgressions of the deficit threshold, the reform was a relaxation of supranational neoliberal 
rules for the purpose of domestic political objectives. Yet, the reform did not weaken the 
neoliberal project. Multiple visions and ambitions for European economic integration guided 
Europe’s leaders, and at times contradicted each other – after all, the neoliberal Hartz reforms 
were part of the reason why the SGP reform was initiated in the first place. 
Germany’s labour market reforms would eventually have decisive impact on the 
Eurozone crisis and its governance. Given the lack of a response from the EU institutions, 
Germany was not only able to suspend the EMU’s fiscal rules, they were also able to profit off 
– and arguably contribute to – growing Eurozone imbalances through domestic labour market 
liberalizations. The interaction between the German government and the EU underpins the 
power and limitations to the neoliberal project in the early 2000s. The fact that a social 
democratic government would legislate to limit unemployment benefits and introduce new 
low-wage jobs shows testament to the growing importance of the neoliberal project at the time. 
However, the reforms also involved a fiscal stimulus that transgressed the EMU’s rules on 
fiscal discipline and effectively forced European leaders to adjust EU governance. As such, 
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German domestic politics opened up the space for suspending and relaxing the EMU fiscal 
rules in 2005.  Over time, the liberalization of German labour markets also contributed to the 
crisis itself. Due to persistent wage depression, the export countries, Germany and most of 
North-western Europe, started to run ‘persistent current account surpluses, and in turn capital 
account deficits, with their Southern Eurozone trading partners’, who build up massive private 
and public debt as a result (Johnston & Regan, 2018, p. 149).  
Whereas Germany registered growing current account surpluses during the 2000s, 
current account deficits were growing in Southern Europe, which in the latter case increased 
reliance on foreign credit for growth and consumption. As a result, the relationship between 
Germany (and neighbouring states) and Southern Europe took on an increasingly uneven 
character. The relationship between German economic restructuring and the Greek crisis serves 
to illustrate the dynamics of North-South relations in the Eurozone.  
Greece entered the crisis era in an extremely vulnerable position. The most popular 
explanation for Greece’s growing current account deficit focuses on wage and debt-fuelled 
inflation (Belke & Dreger, 2013). The actual development in Greek wages in the decades 
preceding the crisis stresses the importance of a class-relational perspective on the causes of 
the Greek and wider Eurozone crisis. When compared to the Euro-average - and despite above-
average growth in productivity - Greece’s political economy was overall characterised by 
relatively low wages and relatively low productivity. In itself, contrary to widespread belief, 
the growth in Greece wage and labour costs in the decade preceding the crisis could hardly 
constitute a competitiveness crisis. In the decade preceding the financial crisis (1998-2007), 
Greek nominal unit labour costs grew by an accumulated 22.4% (AMECO data). Only by 
taking into consideration the sources of Greece’s productivity crisis, we can start to assess the 
causes of Greece’s eventual fiscal and economic crisis (Dooley, 2018). 
Further, by comparing Greece with Germany’s extraordinary feat of depressing 
nominal unit labour costs in 1998-2007 we can better understand the relative crisis of the Greek 
economy. In Greece, the capitalist class was unable to raise profitability in the critical years of 
EMU, and the Greek corporate sector’s competitiveness was falling behind Germany and core 
Eurozone member states. These trends suggest the importance of a class dimension to the 
combined crisis of competitiveness and debt in Greece. While centralised collective bargaining 
provided impetus for continuing wage growth in the public sector (Giordano et al., 2011), a 
very high level of self-employed and a business sector characterised by low-skill small and 
medium–sized businesses was unable to push up productivity and wages in the tradable sectors. 
Inevitably, a gap was opening up between the public sector and private sector wages 
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(Christopoulou & Monastiriotis, 2014). From the perspective of international competitiveness 
as well as fiscal prudence, ‘large cuts in public wages and pensions [were therefore] inevitable’, 
according to the European Commission’s 2010 assessment (European Commission, 2010f, p. 
15). Some economic studies have backed this up, finding Greece’s public sector wage premium 
to be unexplainable, and thus concluding that ‘the Troika’s preoccupation with public pay 
reductions may be justified’ (Christofides & Michael, 2013).  
However, mainstream economic analysis of wage levels, and the wage premium for 
public sector workers, can justifiably be criticized for ignoring the key question of why private 
sector wages and productivity was unable to converge with European standards over the years 
preceding the crisis. There have been domestic-political, European-institutional, and broader-
structural reasons for this unsuccessful convergence. First, as Dooley makes clear, the failed 
industrial modernization strategy of Papandreou’s PASOK facilitated the emergence of the 
Greek debt-led growth model (Dooley, 2018). The failure of this strategy is both a symptom 
and a cause of Greece’s inability to renew the competitive basis of their economy. 
With German trade with southern Europe deteriorating over the decade preceding the 
financial crisis, Greece was unable to compensate through existing or new trade markets 
(Dooley, 2018). Therefore, Greece had to internalise the stimulation of aggregate demand 
through wage and debt growth. As public sector wages occupied a significant part of Greek 
total government expenditure, wage growth also complicated any efforts to install firmer fiscal 
discipline and reduce government debt. As has become evident during the period of severe 
austerity following the crisis, curbing and cutting wages have grave effects on the Greek 
economy. 
While the competitive decline preceded Greece’s membership of the Euro, the flows of 
cheap credit saturating the economy because of EMU financial integration helped push up 
Greek inflation rates (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 2015). Credit flows to the Greek economy did not 
primarily come in the form of productive investment but materialized through rapidly 
increasing levels of indebtedness of non-financial corporations and households, adding a surge 
in private debt to the existing problem of government debt (Ebner, 2013; Reinhart & Trebesch, 
2015). To sum up, Greece’s developments were indicative of the dynamics of European 
political economy: Greece’s competitive decline mirrored Germany’s competitive 
improvement, and as a result, Eurozone imbalances started to build up.  
 
4.5. Macroeconomic imbalances and hegemonic competition in the Eurozone 
A consequence of the general pressure on labour costs in Europe, wage-led aggregate 
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demand diminished across Europe in the decades before the financial crisis. The continent 
witnessed a bifurcation of its economies into export- and debt-led growth models. The 
combination of financial deregulation and the fixing of exchange rates was of short-term 
advantage to debt-led growth models that attracted greater investment. Yet, European financial 
flows in the 2000s would rapidly increase public and private debt levels, and create sectoral 
bubbles, in southern Europe. Institutionally, the EMU reproduced the formation of export- and 
debt-led growth models by facilitating private credit flows from North to South. As Engelbert 
Stockhammer (2016, p. 370) states:  
‘The debt-driven and export-driven growth models (…) were in symbiotic 
relation, where credit-driven growth in the south pulled in exports from the north 
and Nordic trade surpluses were recycled as private credit flows to southern 
Europe, where they financed property bubbles and rising household debt.’  
In the first place, domestic strategies of wage moderation had facilitated the need for 
exports and debt to sustain Eurozone economic growth. How did EU institutions and political 
leaders react to the twin phenomenon of falling wage shares and growing divergence in labour 
costs between EMU member states? In line with critical integration theory, I here briefly 
outline an account of how competing hegemonic projects wrestled with the development in 
domestic wage levels and competitiveness in the decade before the crisis. Arguing that the pro-
European social democratic and neoliberal forces settled on the dual strategy of 
competitiveness and employment, this section then focuses on wage policy recommendations 
issued under the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) from 1998-2003. The next 
section then interrogates how this employment-competitiveness compromise fared under the 
condition of strengthened neoliberal hegemony in the immediate years preceding the financial 
crisis.  
In the first years of the EMU, Europe’s leaders showed little concern for the divergence 
among European labour markets, and their interaction with potentially dangerous financial 
flows. One indicator of the Eurozone’s divergence that would eventually enter the centre stage 
of the crisis negotiations was unit labour costs. Essentially an indicator of the relationship 
between productivity and wage developments at the national level, it would become one of the 
key discussions in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and a cornerstone in the struggles to 
reform EU labour governance. Early on, European institutions attached little importance to role 
of divergent rates of unit labour costs across the common currency area. The Commission 
found that, ‘(i)n terms of unit labour costs, there is relatively little variation across the Union 
and, certainly, no tendency for unit costs to be lower in places where the average cost of 
 136 
employment is also low’ (European Commission, 1997).  
For neoliberals, European wage moderation in the 1990s and 2000s was a positive 
contribution to the project of restoring competitiveness. Yet, many major reform initiatives 
were taken by social democrats, hereunder by Schröder and Blair’s governments. For the social 
democratic project, which wielded significant power around the turn of the millennium, talk of 
competitiveness was acceptable to the extent that it led to job creation. Further, once the 
premises of the single market and the common currency had been accepted, social democrats 
largely saw their role as ensuring employment under the conditions of market liberalization 
and fiscal discipline. Examples of this new devotion to a neoliberal context of European 
integration include the Delors Commission’s commitment to fiscal discipline and supply-side 
reforms as well as the Blair and Schröder’s belief in individual, rather than collective 
responsibility for social and economic wellbeing (Blair & Schröder, 1998; European 
Commission, 1993). In line with this reasoning, wage moderation, welfare reforms, and 
deregulation were acceptable policies if followed by a political commitment to new jobs. 
Underpinning the social-neoliberal compromise on competitiveness and employment 
was the promise of the EMU to deliver real convergence in living standards. That is, if poorer 
member states made sure to abide by the rules of fiscal discipline, economic integration under 
the EMU would make wages and living standards approach those of North-West Europe. 
Therefore, European leaders would be hesitant to treat the divergence in wage developments 
as anything but an element of real convergence.  
The seminal contribution of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) did much to bring academic 
evidence to settle the consensus of neglecting the growing divergences in wage developments 
and current account imbalances. For Blanchard and Giavazzi, current account imbalances and 
competitiveness divergence should be treated with ‘benign neglect’, because the accelerating 
current account deficits in the Eurozone in the early 2000s were caused by successful 
economic, financial, and monetary integration (Blanchard & Giavazzi, 2002).  
In essence, the economic argument goes, as poorer countries with higher growth rates 
get easier access to cheaper goods, services, and credit abroad, their current account deficits 
grow. Not only does cross-border trade increase, domestic savings are falling and investment 
increases. Growing trade and investment make a positive contribution to economic growth but 
inflates the current account deficit. For lower-income countries, current account deficits may 
be considered benign if they can be explained by the ‘catching-up effect’, where growing 
deficits are natural phenomena for open economies catching up and converging with its richer 
trading partners. Consequently, Blanchard and Giavazzi argue that while ‘benign neglect [of 
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the growing deficits] may not be optimal, it appears to be a reasonable course of action’ for EU 
policy-making (Blanchard & Giavazzi, 2002, p. 186). 
From this perspective, benign neglect of wage and current account deficits was 
necessary to allow the monetary union to bring about economic change in the poorest countries. 
Countries like Portugal and Greece, who exhibited growing and persistent current account 
deficits, exemplified  ‘exactly what theory suggests can and should happen when countries 
become more closely linked in goods and financial market’ (Blanchard & Giavazzi, 2002, p. 
148). Instead of tackling imbalances, in the decade preceding the financial crisis, the EU rolled 
out a strategy of wage moderation, even where such a strategy would be counterproductive to 
macroeconomic stabilisation.  
The main framework for EU wage strategy in this period was the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines (BEPGs). Member states had explicitly ruled out EU competence in the area 
of wage policy in the Social Protocol of the Maastricht Treaty. Through the BEPGs, the EU 
focused on global or absolute competitiveness, while neglecting relative competitiveness and 
macroeconomic imbalances within the Eurozone. In line with the hegemonic compromise at 
the turn of the millennium, competitiveness was the means to achieve job creation, rather than 
an end in itself. 
In 1998, the Council approved the first set of BEPGs. Member states committed to 
pursue a ‘growth- and stability-oriented’ macroeconomic strategy, which required of 
governments and social partners to ‘make all the required efforts to support the stability 
objective of the single monetary policy’ (Council of the European Union, 1998, p. 26). Even 
prior to EMU, price stability had already been a key monetary policy objective in most 
capitalist economies (Bernanke & Mishkin, 1997). The price stability objective meant keeping 
inflation below 2%, as specified by the ECB’s governing council in 1998 (European Central 
Bank, n.d.). Having set price stability as the precondition for macroeconomic policy-making, 
EU member states would remain vigilant against increases in real wage developments 
exceeding productivity growth, given the close correlation between unit labour costs and 
inflation (Flassbeck & Lapavitsas, 2015).  
The BEPGs most of all represented a forum for the dissemination of macroeconomic 
ideas. Together with EES, and from 2000, the Lisbon Strategy, the BEPGs developed a strategy 
for wage and labour market governance based on positive experiences primarily in core 
Eurozone member states, as well as the UK. For instance, based particularly on the Dutch 
experiences, the social-liberal agenda of ‘flexicurity’ gained prominence in EU economic 
governance during the 2000s (Viebrock & Clasen, 2008; Wilthagen & Tros, 2004). Flexicurity 
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prescribes a socio-economic model that combines labour market flexibility with social security. 
The social security dimension necessitates a relatively expensive welfare state, arguably made 
difficult under the conditions of fiscal discipline, particularly so since the crisis (Hastings & 
Heyes, 2018)  Around the turn of the century, a clear strategy for wage moderation developed 
through the BEPGs. Member states agreed to keep ‘nominal wage trends consistent with the 
price stability objective’, with the objective of keeping ‘real wage developments’ in line ‘with 
increases in productivity’ (Council of the European Union, 1998, p. 26).  
While the BEPGs consistently argued for the importance of keeping wage 
developments in line with productivity, the implicit message of the BEPGs was to encourage 
wage moderation that would cause redistribution from labour to capital as productivity 
increased. For the EU, productivity growth should define the ‘available room for real wage 
developments’ but the latter did not need to mirror the former (Council of the European Union, 
1998, p. 31). Thus, the BEPGs disseminated the idea that coordinated efforts were required to 
secure a general redistribution of income from labour to capital in order to improve 
competitiveness. Therefore, governments and social partners were expected to ‘take into 
account the need to strengthen the profitability of investment in order to create more jobs’ when 
negotiating wage developments (Council of the European Union, 1998, p. 26). The BEPGs did 
not encourage generic liberalization of all labour market institutions, but rather the mobilisation 
of these institutions for the purpose of redistribution away from labour. Part of this strategy 
was also to encourage greater wage differentiation. Wages should ‘properly reflect productivity 
differences across skills and local labour-market conditions’ (Council of the European Union, 
2003, p.  65). In other words, the EU encouraged greater redistribution away from labour in 
general, and away from low-skill, low-productivity labour in particular. 
The priorities of strengthening profitability and differentiating wages also applied to 
countries where wage moderation was already the practice. The wage moderation and 
differentiation strategy applied to countries on divergent trajectories. At a time when 
Germany’s unit labour costs were trailing far behind the inflation target of 2%, the BEPGs 
warned Germany that ‘labour costs of low-skilled workers or people in depressed regions risk 
exceeding their productivity due to the application of coordinated tariff wages’ (Council of the 
European Union, 2003a, p. 73). Thus, the BEPGs recommended Germany to deregulate labour 
markets and lower wages for job starters in order to activate low wage earners (Council of the 
European Union, 2003a, pp. 73–74). Experiencing more gradually rising unit labour costs, 
Spain and Italy received similar policy recommendations (Council of the European Union, 
2003a, pp. 78, 85). 
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Of the EMU member states, Greece’s labour markets caused particular concern. 
According to the European institutions, Greece had had a consistent problem with 
implementing structural reforms that would strengthen its supply-side institutions, such as the 
employability of its unemployed workforce, and fiscal consolidation in the decade preceding 
the crisis. Starting with the 1998 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, the Council had 
consistently pushed for expenditure cuts, privatisation, public sector reform, and social welfare 
reform (Council of the European Union, 1998). The Council underpinned the importance of 
labour market reforms aimed at enhancing the flexibility of contracts and working hours in the 
1999 BEPGs, and recommended ‘loosening restrictive employment protection legislation’ 
through 2001-2005 (Council of the European Union, 2001, p. 85, 2002, p. 93). Through 2000-
2005, the Council further recommended reform of the wage formation system to avoid 
excessive wage inflation and align wages with productivity.  
Despite the concern over Greece’s labour markets, European institutions mostly 
assessed Greece’s economic development positively in the lead-up to the crisis. In particular, 
the European Commission noted that Greece had ‘performed well over the period’ since 1999, 
with its total factor productivity outperforming the Eurozone average in the same period 
(European Commission, 2008a). 
 
4.5.1. Neoliberal domination and the growing concern for imbalances 
In the first decade of the new millennium, social democrats’ political fortunes changed. 
The political development and the change of leadership in all EU institutions strengthened the 
power of the right wing EPP and neoliberal economic and monetary visions. At the domestic 
level, a number of major governments shifted left to right, which also altered the composition 
of the European Council and the Councils. Examples include the Italian 2001 general election 
that allowed Silvio Berlusconi to replace the centre-left Olive Tree coalition, and the formation 
of the grand coalition in Germany after the 2005 election, led by Chancellor Merkel. In 2003 
came the appointment of the Bank of France Governor Jean-Claude Trichet to replace Wim 
Duisenberg, a former Dutch Labour minister, as President of the ECB. Finally, the EPP group’s 
strong performance in the 2004 European Parliament election led to the nomination and 
approval of José Manuel Barroso.  
Within this context of a significantly strengthened neoliberal project in the EU 
institutions, European leaders eventually came to terms with the dangers of macroeconomic 
imbalances. The dominance of the neoliberal project is mirrored in the emphasis on market-
based solutions to the problem of Eurozone imbalances. Reviewing the EU economic 
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development of 2006, the European Commission assessed EMU member states’ capacity in 
adjusting to ‘to country-specific economic disturbances’ (European Commission, 2006, p. 5). 
In the report, the Commission analysed ‘the marked and persistent divergence of growth 
and inflation among euro-area economies’ and ‘what factors lay behind such divergences’ 
(European Commission, 2006, p. 5). The analysis found that with wages and price levels being 
too sticky to adjust adequately to economic shocks, under-performing countries like Italy and 
Portugal need ‘further structural reforms (…) to increase the responsiveness of domestic prices 
to shocks’, with action ‘required in labour markets’ (European Commission, 2006, p. 7). 
At the time of the outbreak of the US financial crisis in 2007, the political momentum 
in EU labour governance was strongly in favour of the agenda of liberalization (Zeitlin, 2008). 
This momentum in turn reflected the long-term reconfiguration of European welfare states in 
the era of global economic liberalization (Jessop, 1993; van Apeldoorn & Hager, 2010). 
Despite the general streamlining and strengthening of neoliberal EU policies in the years 
preceding the crisis, EU labour governance was made up of mostly voluntary policy 
instruments aiming to speed up domestic processes of liberalization (Bruff, 2017; Erne, 2008). 
There was, in short, no effective framework for governing wage developments and ensuring 
greater convergence among EMU member state economies.  
In economic terms, the divergence inside the Eurozone between the export-led growth 
models of the north and the debt-led growth models of the south had intensified. Since 2003, 
German nominal unit labour costs had contracted, pushing Germany’s already competitive 
labour market further away from its southern European counterparts. As the macroeconomic 
imbalances of the Eurozone accelerated in the run-up to the financial crisis, the pressure was 
building on EU leaders to act. Benign neglect, happily taken up on the advice of Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2002) was no longer an option. Yet, as the 2006 European Commission report on 
adjustment capacities reflects, there was considerable resistance to reinforcing EU labour 
governance. A sentiment prevalent in Europe’s business community and among many policy-
makers on the right, there was a strong faith in the ability of market forces to enact the necessary 
pressure on domestic workers and policy-makers. Firmer European-level labour market 
governance, it was feared, would become a vehicle not for liberalisation but for regulation and 
red tape at the supranational level (Erne, 2008).  
The policy recommendations in the 2006 European Commission report reflected the 
neoliberal resistance to firmer governance of labour and wages at the EU level. The 
recommendations for EU-level policy action focused on financial integration and the 
‘development of a shared understanding of wage, price and competitiveness trends’ among 
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Eurozone governments (European Commission, 2006, p. 9). While the latter was already part 
of the Lisbon strategy, the report urges policy-makers to continue the work to improve financial 
integration (European Commission, 2006, p. 10). At the domestic level, the report advocates a 
now familiar combination of fiscal consolidation and structural labour market reforms to foster 
economic convergence within the Eurozone. Yet, the lacking ambition for EU-level 
governance reform reflected neoliberal policy-makers’ firm believe in market-based 
adjustment. With the 2006 report’s strong emphasis on deepening financial integration as a 
means of macroeconomic stabilisation, the EU approach to wage and labour governance was 
strongly in line with classic neoliberal preferences for market-based and -enhancing policies. 
Comparatively, the Commission paid little attention to demand management and the important 
role of labour market institutions in providing stability.  
Given EU institutions’ reluctance to contemplate a non-market-based framework for 
governing Eurozone wages, imbalances, and divergence, expressed by the Commission as late 
as 2006, a remarkable shift in preferences took place in the years around the financial crisis of 
2008. By 2010, there was broad support among EU leaders and institutions for a 
macroeconomic governance framework to include labour governance in the EMU. The 
intermediate period marked an end to the neoliberal hegemonic project’s laissez-faires 
approach to EU labour governance. The rest of this chapter analyses the formation of this new 
interventionist urge.  
 
4.6. The changing role of wages from crisis to governance reform  
The financial crisis allowed for reforms to EU labour governance that had hitherto not 
been possible. By 2010, macroeconomic imbalances, and their relationship to Eurozone wages 
and competitiveness, stood at the centre of negotiations on a new framework for economic 
governance in the EMU. The analytical work that would place macroeconomic imbalances at 
the heart of the Eurozone crisis management negotiations took place under the anniversary 
evaluation of the EMU for the ‘EMU@10’ report published in May 2008. In an otherwise 
mostly celebratory evaluation of the first decade of the Euro, the Commission warned that the 
Eurozone’s productivity growth was falling behind that of other developing countries 
(European Commission, 2008a). Analysing this report in detail, the following section shows 
the efforts of the Commission to promote a response to the accelerating macroeconomic 
imbalances inside the Eurozone. The Commission had several tasks. First, it needed to 
convince European leaders of the severity of macroeconomic imbalances. Second, it should 
align the project of macroeconomic imbalance governance with the EU’s existing 
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macroeconomic governance agenda to avoid unnecessary political disruption. Third, it should 
propose a new framework for governing imbalances that could fit within the existing EMU 
institutional structure to avoid any need for Treaty change – at the time, European leaders were 
still in the process of finalising the revised Lisbon Treaty after the traumatising experiences of 
introducing a European constitution. The solution that the Commission found to these three 
problems was to align the governance of imbalances with the agenda on competitiveness and 
propose a revised EMU framework that would extend to macroeconomic imbalances. 
As the ‘unwinding’ of global imbalances spilled over into the Eurozone in 2007 
(European Commission, 2008a, p. 3), the Commission noted how the ‘substantial and lasting 
differences across countries in terms of inflation and unit labour costs’ would require ‘long 
periods of adjustment’ to restore competitiveness (European Commission, 2008a, p. 6). The 
Commission identified some member states’ deteriorating competitiveness as the result of 
‘comparative productivity decline along with an increase in relative wage’ (European 
Commission, 2008a, p. 60). Further, the Commission found that member states’ labour market 
flexibility was too weak to ‘offset the loss of adjustment capacity through the more flexible 
nominal exchange rates’ and that market-driven adjustment in price and wage levels to correct 
imbalances was too slow (European Commission, 2008a, p. 60).  
In response to growing divergence between member states in terms of competitiveness, 
the Commission started advocating ‘enhanced surveillance’ of macroeconomic imbalances, 
which ‘would help the affected countries to devise early responses before divergences become 
entrenched’ (European Commission, 2008a, p. 9). The Commission was increasingly 
concerned by the EMU’s lack of adequate governance instruments to coordinate member 
states’ necessary economic adjustments. The challenge of growing ‘cross-country externalities 
between policy actions’ requires stronger coordination of economic policies ‘also in the area 
of structural reforms.’ Yet, the existing framework was absent ‘of strong forms of policy co-
ordination in the area of structural reforms’ (European Commission, 2008a, p. 264).  
The report symbolised the beginning of the end to the neoliberal hegemonic project’s 
hesitant approach to the direct governance of imbalances and labour markets in the Eurozone. 
Linking macroeconomic imbalances to lacking structural labour market reforms, the 
Commission made the governance of imbalances a question of restoring competitiveness. The 
mounting evidence that ‘joining the euro area has not motivated Member States to accelerate 
the pace of structural reforms’ particularly worried the Commission (European Commission, 
2008a, p. 264). Comparing EMU member states to non-EU industrialised economies, the 
Commission found that ‘membership in the euro area has slowed down liberalization’, and 
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attributed the difference in the speed of labour market liberalization to the protection offered 
by a common currency (European Commission, 2008a, p. 52). Whereas fluctuating exchange 
rates were pushing states to pursue economic reform, ‘the disappearance of the exchange risk 
may have tended to weaken the incentives for reform, notably in labour markets’ (European 
Commission, 2008a, p. 88).  
Because the EMU effectively operates as a buffer between domestic labour markets and 
the world economy, the Commission advised the EU to strengthen EMU governance to ‘to 
extend surveillance to address macroeconomic divergences’ (European Commission, 2008a, p. 
252). The European Commission therefore proposed to put an end to the “benign neglect” with 
which imbalances had hitherto been treated: ‘The weight of the growth and adjustment 
challenge in the euro area contrasts with the absence of strong forms of policy co-ordination in 
the area of structural reforms’ (European Commission, 2008a, p. 263). The purpose of an 
extended surveillance system at the EU-level would be to incentivise a set of familiar domestic 
policy priorities, not least structural labour market reforms. The Commission envisioned a 
reform to European economic governance that could ‘reinforce the tool of peer review to 
encourage Member States undertaking adequate measures to address competitiveness 
problems’ (European Commission, 2008a, p. 258).  
Putting pressure on member states to address competitiveness, the Commission pushed 
for a solution that would make labour markets a much more central vehicle for adjustment in 
case of exogenous shocks. If a Eurozone member state is hit by a demand shock, ‘price and 
wage flexibility are key for efficient intra-area adjustment in the absence of internal exchange 
rates’ (European Commission, 2008a, p. 180). In other words, as long as wages are set by 
institutional agreements and legislation, and not by market forces, Eurozone member states in 
crisis will be unable to adjust.  
The Commission stressed that the objective of labour market liberalization was not 
intended to start a race to the bottom on wages. If member states started pursuing aggressive 
wage reductions, this would resemble ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies that could potentially 
destabilise the Eurozone economy (European Commission, 2008a, p. 238). Beggar-thy-
neighbour designates deliberate policies intended to stimulate exports through currency 
devaluation or wage reduction. Within a common currency union, beggar-thy-neighbour 
policies can logically only take place through wage reduction. As a result of the fixed exchange 
rate, and the relatively closed economy of the Euro area, they are also considerably more 
dangerous for other countries (Flassbeck & Lapavitsas, 2015). Economists and other observers 
 144 
have warned about dangers of beggar-thy-neighbour policies in the Eurozone since the launch 
of the Euro (The Economist, 2007; Tilford, 2010). 
The Commission expressed concerns about the use of wage reduction and internal 
devaluation as a crisis management tool. Concerted efforts to reduce costs could have 
significant negative spill-over effects in the case of a crisis: 
‘Countries that are adjusting to a negative shock may be tempted to resort to 
"competitive devaluation" policies. However, this would have a negative impact 
on the trade balance of partner countries, which may be induced to respond in a 
similar fashion. Coordination in this area serves to contain such beggar-thy-
neighbour behaviour’ (European Commission, 2008a, p. 238). 
Despite the identification of the potential problems with ‘competitive devaluation’, the 
Commission reiterated long-standing EU agenda of competitiveness, using the acceleration of 
imbalances to highlight the dangers involved in slowing down labour market liberalisation. 
Beyond general liberalization, including the decentralization of wage bargaining, the 
Commission stressed that addressing productivity was not enough to tackle imbalances. 
Instead, member states should directly address the problem of wages, which unlike 
productivity, ‘are potentially subject to policy influences… Public wage agreements, minimum 
wages, labour taxation, moral suasion and, in countries where they exist, tripartite agreements 
are possible channels through which governments can have an impact’ (European Commission, 
2008a, p. 262). 
To sum up, the report called for an enhanced EU framework for the governance of the 
Eurozone’s labour markets and wages. The enhanced framework should help government 
strike a balance between the necessary devaluation of wage levels and ‘competitive 
devaluation’, which was to be avoided. The rise of political attention to macroeconomic 
imbalances did not precede a straightforward neoliberal trajectory in EU labour governance. 
Rather, it altered the way the terrain of EU labour governance took part in hegemonic 
competition. Over the following decade, substantial political contestation would take place 
over the exact meaning of macroeconomic imbalances, and especially their relationship to 
labour markets and wages. Chapter 5 discusses hegemonic competition in the post-crisis EU 
framework. 
Intra-Eurozone macroeconomic imbalances - previously thought of as insignificant – 
thus began to dominate EU policy-making discourse around 2008. Having identified 
imbalances as a major threat to Eurozone stability, EU institutions found it pertinent to ensure 
that the EMU regulatory and institutional framework was capable of effectively dealing with 
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the relevant imbalances. The unfolding of the financial crisis in 2007-08 coincided with efforts 
at strengthening EMU and EU economic governance based on the Commission’s identification 
of persistent ‘inadequacies in the prudential framework and crisis management procedures at 
the EU level’ in the case of currency or financial crises (Commission 2008, p. 100).  
In the face of the crisis, the EU maintained the strategy of macroeconomic 
liberalisation, such as labour market and wage deregulation, for improving competitiveness. 
At the same time, reaching agreement on the importance of macroeconomic stabilisation, the 
EU launched a strategy with the purpose of a stronger coordination of Eurozone wages. The 
integration of these two objectives into a single strategy, took place in the context of a 
strengthened centre-right majority in Europe. This majority represented the neoliberal 
preference for minimalist EU level governance, which sought to achieve stabilisation through 
disciplinarian policies and avoid more costly stabilisation measures. 
However, the EU’s immediate response to the financial crisis, once the latter started to 
show its severe and detrimental effects on the real economy in Europe, was to coordinate a 
recovery framework between the EU institutions and member states. The efforts to coordinate 
economic recovery are reflected in the Commission Communications of 29 October and 26 
November 2008 (European Commission, 2008c, 2008d). 
The economic crisis recovery plan sought to add additional layers of fiscal stimulus and 
crisis management on to the existing macroeconomic and fiscal policy coordination 
frameworks, including the Lisbon Strategy and the SGP. In early 2008, the unfolding financial 
crisis was mostly perceived and referenced to as the US ‘subprime crisis’ and the spilling-over 
of ‘financial turbulence’ (European Commission, 2008a). While EU institutions maintained 
the exogenous nature of the crisis, events over the summer and early autumn of 2008 revealed 
how ‘the shocks hitting the European economy’ reduced the expected ‘potential growth rate in 
the medium term and [expected] actual growth significantly in 2009 and 2010 (European 
Commission, 2008c, p. 2). In response, the Commission outlined a recovery plan ‘proposing 
major injection of purchasing power into the economy, to boost demand and stimulate 
confidence,’ combined with ‘direct short-term action to reinforce Europe's competitiveness in 
the long term’ (European Commission, 2008d, p. 2).  
The Commission stressed that those member states ‘that took advantage of the good 
times to achieve more sustainable public finance positions and improve their competitive 
positions have more room for manoeuvre now’ (European Commission, 2008d, p. 7). For 
member states with manoeuvre to act, the Commission proposed measures that would directly 
stimulate private consumption, such as temporarily increased ‘transfers to the unemployed or 
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low-income households, or a temporary lengthening of the duration of unemployment benefit’ 
(European Commission, 2008d, p. 9). Conversely, financial pressures had pushed member 
states with less fiscal space, relatively higher inflation rates, or continued competitiveness 
problems, to ‘reinforce the link between the wage setting mechanism and productivity 
developments’ (European Commission, 2008d, p. 10). The EU supported that ‘complacent’ 
member states embarked on such a process of internal devaluation.  
In the recovery phase of 2008-09, the concern for macroeconomic imbalances as a 
major threat to the Eurozone’s economic stability was a prominent feature in the Commission’s 
economic policy-making, as reflected in the Communications in Table 4.2 (Appendix). As for 
wages, the Commission’s concern for inflation was manifest in the repeated emphasis on the 
urgent need to 'reinforce the link between the wage setting mechanism and productivity 
developments’ (European Commission, 2008a, p. 10) and reverse ‘accumulated wage and cost 
divergences' (European Commission, 2009a, p. 7).  
As such, the general emphasis through the crisis phase remained on wage moderation. 
Yet, in a number of Communications, the Commission also addressed the role of wages in 
maintaining wages and alleviating poverty (see Table 4.2 in Appendix). The crisis-induced 
slump in income and demand made efforts to support income ‘at the lower end of the labour 
market’ (European Commission, 2008c, p. 7) and increase ‘transfers to the unemployed’ 
(European Commission, 2008a, p. 8) a high priority. However, this priority should be 
compared to the Commission’s expressed concern for the ‘significant disincentives against 
entering the labour market’ that ran the risk of making welfare more attractive than work 
(European Commission, 2008d, p. 4). Therefore, fiscal stimulus and increased direct transfers 
to low-income groups should be ‘accompanied by structural reform measures’ to promote 
active labour market policies and tax and benefit reforms (European Commission, 2008c, p. 
5). 
Having identified the potentially devastating effects of intra-Eurozone imbalances, EU 
policy-making turned focus on identifying and acting upon macroeconomic imbalances, both 
as a mean to manage the escalating crisis stemming from the financial crash of 2007-08, and 
as a mean to establish the institutional foundation for withstanding future financial and 
economic crises. This would also involve a change in the mode of governance of Eurozone 
member states’ wage policies, with the new framework for economic governance enabling EU 
institutions to target potentially inflationary wage developments in case of macroeconomic 
imbalances.  
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The proposed changes to the governance framework effectively sought to carve out a 
single strategy for addressing the Eurozone’s macroeconomic imbalances and competitiveness 
losses. The Commission carefully presented the proposed changes as enhancing the Eurozone’s 
economic stability and improving its economic performance. This integration of the 
governance of competitiveness and imbalances took place in a midst of major macro-structural 
changes. Significantly, the single-most pertinent issue in monetary policy-making before the 
crisis was that of ensuring price stability against inflationary pressure. Since the financial crisis, 
upwards inflation has ceased as a policy concern all together, as Europe has instead struggled 
with severe deflationary pressure. The new EU economic governance framework did much to 
target the problem of pre-crisis inflationary pressures, but has been less relevant for addressing 
the post-crisis European economic conditions of stagnation and deflation (Green, 2018).  
After a brief period of coordinated economic stimulus in response to the global financial 
crisis, European leaders became increasingly worried about the levels of fiscal deficits, public 
debt, and current account deficits during late 2009 and early 2010. The Commission 
increasingly emphasised member states’ need for adjustment and structural reform as part of 
the wider process of fiscal consolidation in response to the stimulus packages of 2008-2009 
(e.g. European Commission, 2010k; table 4.3 in Appendix). The call for fiscal retrenchment 
was accompanied by the identification of ‘a broad range of policy issues covering 
macroeconomic policies, wages and labour markets’ in need of immediate and sustained 
political action (European Commission, 2010g, p. 4). Specifically, the Commission stated, 
‘(m)ajor policy reorientation is needed to bring about the necessary adjustment in terms of 
costs and wages’ (European Commission, 2010k, p. 4). 
When the financial crisis took a more forceful toll at Europe starting in late 2009, many 
political leaders drew the lesson that EU economic governance had proved too ‘soft’ and 
required substantial transformation (e.g. Barroso, 2014). The crisis of the common currency 
reignited the debate over the appropriate role of the EU economic governance: should it be 
confined to regulatory activities or resemble a proper government with greater redistributive 
power (European Trade Union Confederation, 2011; Sinn, 2010)? At this point of the crisis, 
European leaders struggled to reach conclusive agreements on solving the crisis, and German 
domestic politics would again influence European-level reforms. German politics delineated 
the strategic options for Merkel’s government, often reinforcing the Chancellor’s own 
reservations against decisive interventions and sweeping reforms. Significantly, the 2009 
federal election made the Euro-sceptic, libertarian Free Democratic Party (FDP) Merkel’s 
coalition partner. A result of the Christian Democratic Union’s (CDU) enhanced role in the 
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new government, the strict fiscal conservativism of Wolfgang Schäuble shaped the 
government’s fiscal policy stance. In addition, a 2009 ruling in the German Federal 
Constitutional Court ‘circumscribed the future autonomy of the Federal Government in 
European policy’ (Paterson, 2011, p. 66). Together, these events in German politics highlighted 
the dominance of the neoliberal hegemonic project.  
 
4.6.1. Greece’s crisis and the quest for European reform 
The unfolding of the Greek crisis in 2009-10 played a decisive role in strengthening the 
case for the programme of crisis management pushed by the neoliberal hegemonic project: 
combining fiscal consolidation and structural reform. The timing and character of the Greek 
crisis was, in words of an EU civil servant interviewed for this research project, ‘a bit of a bad 
luck in political terms’ (Interviewee #14). Given Greece’s multiple crises of debt and 
competitiveness, it shaped the crisis response around the central mantras of austerity and 
structural reform. In the words of the civil servant, the lessons were: ‘you have to bring your 
fiscal house in order, and you have to restore your competitiveness’ (Interviewee #14).  
After 4 years in opposition, PASOK regained power in October 2009. At this point, 
what initially appeared a North-Atlantic and liberal-Anglo financial crisis was quickly driving 
the Eurozone economy into ever-deeper recession. While in 2007 and early 2008, the epicentre 
of the financial crisis was firmly on American ground, its entry into Europe was marked by the 
nationalisation of UK bank Northern Rock in February 2008 and the bank bailouts of three 
major UK banks in October 2008. The nationalisation of Ireland’s Anglo Irish in January 2009 
bank helped turn the Eurozone crisis ‘into its full-blown phase characterized by highly 
intertwined financial and sovereign shocks’ (Mody & Sandri, 2012, p. 203). The Eurozone 
financial crisis was in other words already in ‘its full-blown phase’ when Greek PM George 
Papandreou and Finance Minister Papakonstantinou made public the severity of the Greek 
public deficit. 
While the Greek sovereign debt crisis was not the beginning of the Eurozone crisis, the 
state of the Greek public finances led Greece to make austerity a central crisis management 
strategy – at a time when Keynesian stimulus programmes still dominated the policy agenda 
across Europe (Seccareccia, 2011). Within months of the PASOK government gaining power, 
the Greek parliament had approved three austerity packages to curb government deficits, with 
the government further pledging to enact comprehensive structural reform of labour and 
product markets. The hope of the Greek government was that fiscal contraction could guarantee 
Greece’s access to credit in global financial markets. The inability or unwillingness of previous 
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Greek governments to maintain proper accounting systems and report correct fiscal statistics 
undermined the PASOK government’s efforts to regain investor confidence.   
At the European level, there was insufficient political unity to make interventions into 
the Greek crisis in a swift and forceful way. While European leaders mostly realised the 
importance of the Greek debt crisis, they were reluctant to intervene in a manner capable of 
avoiding the prolonged Greek and economic recession to follow. In effect, the ECB initially 
restrained itself from expansionary monetary policy in the style of the US Federal Reserve, 
political leaders rejected calls for early financial assistance with IMF involvement, and few 
were willing entertain the idea of significant debt restructuring (Tooze, 2018). The French 
government and the ECB expressed particularly strong reservations against IMF involvement 
and debt restructuring (Tooze, 2018).  
Rather than an early and timely intervention involving substantial debt restructuring, 
EU member states entered into a prolonged period of stalemate over the conditions for 
European financial aid to Greece. After the German government turned to support IMF 
involvement, and used this as a precondition for a Greek bailout, the European leaders could 
finally reach an agreement in March 2010. The agreement reached suggested that Greece was 
loaned money to keep the country solvent, but under harsh conditions of austerity and structural 
reform. In chapter 5, I discuss the consequences of these conditions for Greece’s political 
economy. 
Shortly before the agreement to bail out Greece in March 2010, the European 
Commission had proposed the Europe2020 strategy to replace the Lisbon strategy as the EU’s 
10 year agenda for social and economic policy priorities (European Commission, 2010e). As 
Kenneth Armstrong notes, the agenda for Europe2020 ‘was being pulled in different directions’ 
(Armstrong, 2012). Europe 2020 placed the objective of social inclusion on equal footing with 
growth, innovation, and business opportunities. Yet, from the point of view of many trade 
unions, Europe 2020 did not provide a roadmap for exiting economic recession (European 
Trade Union Confederation, 2013).  
Following the Europe2020 agenda, the EU’s governance framework for wages and 
labour was substantially reformed in the period 2010-2011, with the introduction of the 
European Semester of economic governance and the MIP. This formed part of a larger reform 
of the EU economic governance framework which also included a revision of the SGP and a 
clear procedure for financial support to Eurozone member states in crisis (European 
Commission, 2010k). The European Commission and the European Council reached similar 
conclusions on Europe’s needs: strengthen the governance of fiscal discipline, broaden 
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economic governance to include macroeconomic imbalances, and create a ‘(r)obust framework 
for crisis management’ (Task Force on Economic Governance, 2010, p. 2). Later, in 2011, the 
European Council adopted the Euro-Plus Pact to moderate wages, improve competitiveness, 
and align taxation (European Council, 2011a, pp. 13–20).  
On the negotiations over new EU economic governance, consensus had formed around 
the need to broaden EMU governance from fiscal to macroeconomic policy. A revised 
governance framework should aim at preventing and correcting “macroeconomic imbalances, 
including deteriorating competitiveness trends” by addressing, among other things, domestic 
wage policies (European Commission, 2010h, pp. 4, 9). Engineered by the European 
Commission, EU emphasis would turn increasingly towards the importance of fiscal 
consolidation, structural reform, and wage moderation, and away from stimulus and social 
protection. Therefore, the inherent tension between the competing objectives of wage 
moderation and income protection became increasingly pronounced over the period of 2010-
2011.  
Facilitating the strategy of wage moderation, as it had developed in the pre-crisis era, 
the European social-democratic hegemonic project had accepted wage moderation in return for 
growth and employment. When the crisis hit, and growth and employment plummeted, the 
compromise on wage moderation proved fragile. The main competing view came from agents 
with more neoliberal preferences. From the perspective of neoliberals, linking wage 
developments to productivity growth was not enough. For them, the crisis had revealed the 
unsustainability of Europe’s models of regulated labour markets and social protection. This 
view was outlined in no uncertain terms by ECB President Draghi, when he declared that the 
European social model was ‘gone’ (Blackstone, et al., 2012).  
 The negotiations over the design of the MIP proved difficult; while agreement had 
consolidated on the need for reinforced governance, disagreement persisted on the design of 
the reinforced framework. Former EU President Van Rompuy’s Task Force on Economic 
Governance initially endorsed the Commission’s plan for the MIP in October 2010 – but the 
European Parliament and the Council did not adopt the revised legal regulations until 
November 2011 (European Union, 2011).  
The political and institutional context, with centre-right majorities in the Councils, 
influenced the disciplinarian design of the European Semester and the MIP. More expansive 
tools of macroeconomic stabilisation, such as the proposed introduction of Eurobonds, were 
non-starters in this climate (Matthijs & McNamara, 2015). The MIP involved an asymmetric 
approach to macroeconomic imbalances. An imbalanced, export-led growth strategy with 
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current account surpluses and stagnant wages is more permissible than a debt-led strategy with 
current account deficits and rising labour costs. This reflects in the asymmetric thresholds for 
current accounts in the MIP scoreboard.  
The MIP also involved potentially great concentration of power in the Commission, 
who could determine the severity of imbalances, detailing policy recommendations, and 
propose financial sanctions in case of non-compliance – and the introduction of reverse 
qualified majority voting (RQMV) would complicate efforts by the Council to overturn the 
proposals. Through a new alert mechanism, the Commission should be able to detect 
potentially harmful imbalances and conduct in-depth reviews to determine their severity. If the 
in-depth review determines imbalances to be harmful, the member state in question is subject 
to a procedure involving national action plans and country-specific policy recommendations. 
In case of excessive imbalances, the EU can introduce an ‘excessive imbalance procedure’ in 
which member states are legally required to undertake policy action to address the problems, 
or ultimately face fines. 
The MIP was a controversial piece of legislation as it mirrored the framework for EMU 
fiscal governance, and expanded the realm of legally binding policy recommendations to 
include social and employment policy and possibly wage questions (Scharpf, 2014). The 
prolonged negotiations on the MIP involved political contestation over the rules and the 
automaticity of the MIP. At the inter-institutional negotiations, there was ample disagreement 
on concrete elements of a new macroeconomic governance framework, but broad support for 
such a framework in general.  
The Commission received support for the imbalance procedure from the ECB, the 
European Council’s van Rompuy task force, and in the European Parliament. The main 
controversies in the ensuing EU negotiations concerned the indicators on which member states’ 
macroeconomic performance would be evaluated, and the level of discretion offered to the 
Commission in assessing member state performance and compliance. The ECB preferred a 
very short list of indicators focusing exclusively on competitiveness (European Central Bank, 
2010). The Commission and the European Parliament preferred a longer list of imbalances for 
a more encompassing approach to imbalances. The Parliament even wanted to address 
economic and social imbalances ‘on an equal basis’ through indicators such as environmental 
externalities and income inequality (European Parliament, 2011a). The compromise was a 
scoreboard of 10 indicators, with one ‘social’ indicator on unemployment. 
Part of the controversy around the indicators also concerned the asymmetry of 
thresholds: while the Commission had proposed a current account imbalance threshold of 4% 
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of GDP for surplus and deficit countries, the final scoreboard had a 6% threshold for surplus 
countries. As for the Commission’s discretion, the ECB and the Parliament both wanted a high 
degree of automaticity in the procedure. For the ECB, the preference was for a competitiveness 
procedure with bite, to ensure swift compliance for deficit countries. For the Parliament, the 
fear was that the most powerful member states would be de-facto exempt from the procedure. 
In the end, the Commission successfully argued that the procedure’s legitimacy would stem 
from in-depth reviews in addition to broad surveillance, and that greater discretion was needed 
to assess member states’ economic performance in depth. Therefore, the Commission should 
have discretionary powers to determine when member states were experiencing ‘excessive 
imbalances’, and when to escalate the procedure and enter the ‘corrective imbalance 
procedure’.  The MIP was set up as an in-complete contract, which has given the Commission 
significant room to adjust the scoreboard and selectively apply the procedure on member states 
(Karagiannis & Héritier, 2013).  
Within the EU institutional negotiations to establish the MIP, the DG ECFIN had 
initially proposed a scoreboard of ‘hard’ macroeconomic indicators focusing on current 
accounts, real effective exchange rates, and investment positions (European Commission, 
2010j). The Commission initially preferred a clear distinction between the MIP’s task of 
governing imbalances, and the Europe 2020 strategy for economic growth. Hence, the MIP 
should target imbalances that reflect market or public policy failures that distort market 
equilibria. Conversely, Europe 2020 was the proper forum for addressing employment, growth, 
and social inclusion (European Commission, 2010i). In response to this narrow focus 
privileging economic concerns, the European Parliament proposed indicators on a range of 
social imbalances like unemployment and income inequality (European Parliament, 2011a). 
Reluctantly, the Commission included unemployment on the scoreboard of indicators of 
macroeconomic imbalances in the final proposal approved by the European Council in late 
2011 (European Commission, 2011d; European Council, 2011b). 
Ultimately, and on the insistence of the European Parliament, the institutional 
negotiations resulted in a greatly empowered Commission, which retained the power to 
determine and subsequently amend the scoreboard of indicators (European Union, 2011). 
Further, the European Parliament stressed the importance of limiting the Council’s role in the 
application of recommendations and sanctions for member states (European Parliament, 
2011b). Therefore, under the Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP), the Commission may 
propose financial sanctions under the provision of RQMV. In this case, the proposed sanction 
applies unless a qualified majority in the Council blocks the sanction. 
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4.7. Conclusion 
The period from the introduction of the single currency in 1999, over the outbreak of 
financial crisis in Europe, to the process of reforming the EMU institutional framework in 
2010-11 had brought with it a growing economic divergence between the Eurozone core and 
periphery. As this chapter has argued, the Eurozone’s divergence arose from the diverse 
domestic responses to a set of interacting global and European structural processes. In 
particular, stakeholders in Europe’s labour markets – trade unions, employers, governments – 
responded to the EMU’s deflationary institutional framework and the forces unleashed by 
economic globalization. As highlighted in chapter 3, European labour markets had already 
transformed in the 1980s and 1990s through social pacts and government interventions putting 
Europe’s economy on the path of wage moderation, income redistribution towards capital, and 
lower growth rates. In return, Europe’s leaders hoped, Europe would achieve higher stability, 
greater convergence between different economic regions, and greater long-term growth 
prospects.  
This chapter has argued that the result of wage moderation was not macroeconomic 
stability and real economic convergence, but the growth of finance and debt-led growth, 
increased financial and economic instability, and economic divergence. In the years after the 
introduction of single currency, macroeconomic imbalances started to build up in the Eurozone 
as the result of Europe’s crisis of productivity, the redistribution of income from labour and 
capital, and the ensuing financialisation of the European economy. These macro-structural 
transformations posed a radical challenge for EU labour governance: it was simply unfeasible 
for EU labour governance to ignore the perverse effects of the EMU. Eventually, EMU 
divergence ended in the deep and prolonged Eurozone crisis.  
Why was the EU unable to anticipate and act upon the worrying economic trends in the 
EMU? Based on critical integration theory, I have argued that competing hegemonic projects 
struggled to develop a comprehensive project of labour governance. In particular, an effective 
programme for tackling the EMU’s tendency towards divergence would counteract the 
proliferation of coordinated wage moderation and pro-capital redistribution at the domestic 
level. The neoliberal hegemonic project, which shaped European integration in the years 
leading up to the crisis, aligned the emergent project of labour governance with the project of 
competitiveness, and sought to target the EMU’s macroeconomic imbalances as a problem of 
competitiveness losses. Once the Eurozone crisis accelerated during 2009, wage adjustment 
surged to the top of the EU policy agenda together with fiscal discipline. As the Greek crisis 
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evolved, there was quickly developing the idea that neoliberal adjustment of labour markets 
was a cure not only for the troubled Hellenic Republic, but also across the Eurozone.   
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5. Reform in the absence of hegemony 
The preceding chapters 3 and 4 have deployed critical integration theory to analyse the 
evolution of labour governance in the EU since the Maastricht agreement on a single currency 
in December 1991. In particular, I have used the concept of competing hegemonic projects to 
highlight the recurring contestation around the kind of labour governance needed for a 
functioning monetary union. In chapter 3, I analysed how monetary integration was secured 
in the absence of a framework for governing Europe’s diverse labour markets, and the 
emergence of a project for EU labour governance in the late 1990s. In chapter 4, I analysed 
the decade from the introduction of the euro to the most acute phase in the Eurozone in 2010, 
when debt crises were escalating across the Eurozone periphery and the work to reform EU 
labour governance had started. In this chapter, I analyse EU labour governance since 2010, 
where it has organised around the project of managing Eurozone imbalances by improving 
member states’ competitiveness. The chapter approaches EU labour governance since the 
crisis from critical integration theory perspective by focusing on the relationship between 
competing hegemonic projects and practices of labour governance. The chapter argues that 
after the crisis, EU labour governance has reformed in the absence of hegemony, which 
prevents lasting, institutional transformations. In terms of implications, this means that post-
crisis labour governance combines pre-crisis disciplinarian and managerial governance 
practices 
 
5.1. Introduction 
After the financial crisis, EU economic governance was shored up in an effort to restore 
fiscal discipline and accelerate labour market structural reforms among member states to ensure 
market confidence in the European project. Former President of the European Commission 
José Manuel Barroso warned that ‘without public finances in order there will be no confidence’ 
(Barroso, 2010). In line with the long-running EU discourse on competitiveness, Barroso 
condemned those European leaders who ‘turned a blind eye to an underlying reality: that 
Europe's global competitiveness is slowly eroding.’ Barroso therefore stressed the need for 
strengthening EU governance of structural reform. European leaders initiated a number of 
reforms to the Eurozone’s governance framework. Some reforms addressed the governance of 
wages and labour markets, such as the procedure for rebalancing the economies of member 
state facing large macroeconomic imbalances - the MIP.  
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The purpose of this thesis is to analyse how and why EU labour governance has 
developed in the context of monetary integration and the Eurozone crisis. The contribution of 
this chapter is the analysis of EU labour governance in the wake of the Eurozone crisis. The 
thesis has progressed via a theoretical and conceptual discussion of the relationship between 
EU labour governance, European integration, and the EMU (Chapter 1 and 2), and an empirical 
analysis of the evolution of EU labour governance in relation to progress in European monetary 
integration since the 1980s (Chapter 3 and 4). The analysis in Chapter 4 ended with the 
reorganisation of EU labour and economic governance in response to the accelerating Eurozone 
crisis, which threatened the functioning of the EMU at large.    
Turning to the analysis of the evolution in EU labour governance since the financial 
crisis, in this chapter I focus on the politics of governing wages and labour markets continent-
wide, in key EMU member states, and in the peripheral member state Greece. Drawing on 
critical integration theory, I argue that an absence of deeper hegemony has shaped the recent 
evolution of EU labour governance. The effect of the Eurozone crisis has been to put creditor 
country governments more firmly behind the neoliberal project. This is because the EMU and 
the crisis have increasingly shaped the identity of EMU member state governments as 
representatives of either creditors or debtors. The new framework for economic governance 
established after the crisis expanded the realm of EMU governance from fiscal to 
macroeconomic policy. It represented an acknowledgement that fiscal prudence was not 
enough to stabilise the currency union. Yet, in its institutionalisation, it reproduced the 
disciplinarian framework of the SGP within the context of macroeconomic governance and 
combined this framework with the existing managerial framework of EU labour governance. 
The distributional effect has been that the EU’s disciplinarian economic governance framework 
has put the main burden of adjustment on workers in southern Europe.  
To substantiate this overall argument, I analyse the European Semester and the MIP as 
a new terrain for political contestation that offers the basis for political compromise in the 
absence of hegemony. Examining the durability of this compromise in light of its structural 
conditions, I argue that EU labour governance is unable to develop deeper hegemonic stability 
because it leaves fundamental questions of political responsibility unresolved. In particular, the 
new framework for EU labour governance maintains the EMU’s institutional reliance on 
centralised monetary policy and decentralised macroeconomic responsibility. In effect, EU 
labour governance is unable to address the structural causes of the crisis in the first place, 
particularly the long-term contraction in wage shares and domestic demand, and the divergence 
of competitiveness within the EMU (Chapter 4).  
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Despite the instalment of a disciplinarian framework for labour governance, the power 
and coherence of the neoliberal hegemonic project has eroded. Yet, social democracy as a 
coherent alternative has not delivered. In response to the lack of (neoliberal) political 
hegemony for EU labour governance, the Commission has used its institutional prominence at 
the supranational level to emphasise the EU’s social dimension. In particular, the Commission 
has mobilised performance management practices to the purpose of balancing competitive 
structural reforms for internal devaluation with uncontroversial structural reforms for training 
and social inclusion. The turn to consensual policy guidance under the EMU depends on 
political contingencies and economic cycles and allows for only superficial political 
compromises on relatively uncontroversial structural reforms and selective wage stimulation. 
In the absence of deeper political hegemony and transformations to the institutional structure 
of the EMU, current compromises are contingent on the 2016-2018 economic boom cycle, and 
therefore remain fragile.  
The chapter is organised as follows. First, I outline a critical integration theory of the 
labour governance in the Eurozone crisis. Second, I analyse EU labour governance under the 
new economic governance (NEG) framework established in 2010-11 and discuss the strategies 
of actors located at the supranational level. Third, I discuss two futile efforts to transform EU 
labour governance more radically. Fourth, I compare EU labour governance in Germany, 
France and Italy, with labour governance in Greece. I end the chapter by concluding. 
 
5.2. Critical integration theory, labour governance, and the EMU in crisis 
EU labour governance has changed since the financial crisis, as reforms to EU 
economic governance have led to further EU surveillance of labour costs, unemployment, and 
more. The nature and consequences of the changes to EU labour governance divide observers. 
For Fritz Scharpf, the MIP was a particularly concerning development for European 
democracy, as it extended ‘the Commission’s supervision and control to an undefined range of 
national policy areas where the EU lacks hard-law competences’ (Scharpf, 2014, p. 27). For 
Scharpf, post-crisis changes to EU governance solidified the ‘priority of negative over positive 
integration, and the priority of saving the euro’ over democracy (Scharpf, 2015, p. 385). 
Strengthening this line of reasoning, others have presented the EU’s NEG framework as the 
culmination of a long process towards authoritarian constitutionalism, (neo)liberalism, or 
‘statism’ (Bruff, 2017; Oberndorfer, 2015; Sandbeck & Schneider, 2014; Wilkinson, 2015). 
Europe’s trade unions have also expressed concern (European Trade Union Confederation, 
2011).  
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Yet, a number of policy-focused studies of the MIP and the European Semester have 
challenged the harsher assessments of the reinforced framework for governing wages and 
labour in the Eurozone (Bekker, 2015, 2018; Zeitlin & Vanhercke, 2018). They study the 
practice of EU governance through these institutions, and point to the non-hierarchical 
mechanisms involved. Zeitlin and Vanhercke emphasize how a process of ‘progressive 
socialization of the European Semester’ has involved a ‘set of procedural developments, which 
have reinforced the role of social and employment policy actors in its governance’ (2018, pp. 
153, 158).  
Sonja Bekker studies the issuance of country-specific recommendations (CSRs) to find 
that more than half of all recommendations ‘address social and employment policy issues’ 
(2015, p. 16). Bekker notes a procedural infusion of social and employment policy with 
economic governance, as the relatively ‘hard’ legal instrument of the MIP frequently addresses 
social and employment policies. While this may seem to support Scharpf’s suspicion that the 
Commission ‘controls’ social policy, Bekker concludes that the MIP does not ‘neglect the 
social dimension, and suggests a potentially constructive role for various social actors in the 
future development of the procedure (2015, p. 17). David Bokhorst, in his thesis on the MIP, 
emphasises the non-hierarchical mechanisms in the relationship between the Commission and 
member states. Commenting on the divergent opinions mode of governance and the content of 
the MIP, Bokhorst asserts the importance of judging the MIP on its practical implementation 
rather than its legal basis (Bokhorst, 2019). 
At the level of institutional analysis, this chapter assesses the evolution of the EU’s 
NEG framework of the European Semester and the MIP. The existing studies of the European 
Semester and the MIP suggest a two-dimensional institution. One dimension is the MIP’s legal 
basis, which implies that member states defying the Commission’s MIP recommendations, 
once the Council approves them, may receive financial sanctions. Given the MIP scoreboard’s 
strong focus on cost competitiveness, this could also occur in policy areas such as wages in 
which EU has limited competence. Scharpf and other political economists have emphasised 
this dimension. The other dimension concerns the practice of MIP governance, in which the 
governance of wages and labour operates in a less hierarchical fashion and involves a wide 
range of actors, including experts, civil servants, and social actors.  
Here, I stress the importance of a third dimension. In addition to the disciplinary legal 
basis and the non-hierarchical policy mechanisms, the post-crisis EU labour governance also 
builds on managerial policy practices, particularly benchmarking. In particular, the MIP centres 
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on a scoreboard of macroeconomic indicators on which member state performance is 
measured.  
Building on managerial ideas, non-hierarchical mechanisms, and a regime of legally 
binding recommendations and sanctions, post-crisis EU labour governance has brought 
together existing modes of EU governance in a new and unprecedented constellation. To 
appreciate how post-crisis labour governance works requires moving beyond the assumptions 
that underpin the policy-focused literature. Bokhorst, Bekker, and Zeitlin, all assert the 
importance of studying economic governance in practice and highlight how the European 
Semester and the MIP rest on negotiations and pragmatism, rather than coercive measures. Yet, 
in this literature we find little discussion of the significance of managerial practices or the 
continued potentiality of stricter application of sanctions, e.g. in times of crisis. The managerial 
practice of benchmarking helps set the agenda for structural reforms, by highlighting problems 
with e.g. productivity, unemployment, or labour costs. Together with the potentiality of 
sanctions, benchmarking, and non-hierarchical mechanisms, the MIP is an institutional 
framework with little ‘input responsiveness (…) to peoples’ preferences, as shaped through 
political debate in a common public space and political competition in political institutions that 
ensure officials’ accountability via general elections’ (Schmidt, 2015, pp. 91–92). 
Beyond the institutional analysis, in this chapter I use critical integration theory to posit 
the Eurozone crisis as structural crisis of European integration: the inability to bolster the 
European project of monetary integration, arguably Europe’s prestige project in the post-
Maastricht era. The financial and Eurozone crises signalled a dramatic structural change at the 
intersection of European institutions and global capitalism. Over the short course of 2008-2009, 
the interaction between the EMU and global financial markets had quickly deteriorated, from 
one of mutual benefit to a potential doom-loop. In the pre-crisis era, the EMU and international 
finance had enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship. For international finance, EMU 
sovereign bonds offered a safe asset, not least given Germany’s anchor of price and financial 
stability (Hall, 2012). Thus, by entering the EMU, most member states enjoyed a significant 
lowering of sovereign interest rates. Yet, in the months and years after the Irish banking crisis 
and the Greek sovereign debt crisis, the premium governments in the Eurozone periphery 
would pay on sovereign debt dramatically rose (Mody & Sandri, 2012, p. 205).  
The EMU no longer provided a corridor for its member state governments to access 
global financial markets. Rather, the EMU institutional structure and the no-bail out clause 
now permeated the structural power of global finance, as the latter withdrew lending from 
countries unable to declare bankruptcy as EMU member states (Roos, 2019). For the 
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Eurozone’s hegemonic projects, these structural shifts would embolden hard-liners within the 
neoliberal project willing to dispose of poor-performing EMU member states like Greece. For 
example, in 2011, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble prepared for a Greek default 
and possible subsequent exit from the EMU (Spiegel Online, 2011). 
 The EU’s structural crisis consisted of institutional and macro-structural components, 
following critical integration theory: the institutional crisis arrived as the EMU reproduced the 
existing economic divergence between core and periphery member states, while the macro-
structural crisis reflected the vulnerability of the EU and its single currency under the condition 
of global financial turmoil in 2008-2009. Yet, political contingencies and economic 
conjunctures, and not only the more fundamental, structural deficiencies of the EMU, shaped 
the Eurozone crisis. The delayed and half-measured nature of Europe’s political leaders’ 
response to the crisis perpetuated the economic recession (Mody, 2018; Sandbu, 2015; Tooze, 
2018).  
Perhaps most influential in shaping the Europe’s economic trajectory was the decisions 
made in the ECB governing council. The ECB’s commitment to price stability led to a near-
disastrous set of decisions to tighten monetary policy in 2011. In April and July 2011, the ECB 
twice decided to raise interests to keep inflation in line with target of ‘below, but close to 2%’.  
Conversely, the ECB’s decision to roll out extensive quantitative easing and do ‘whatever it 
takes’ to save the euro in 2012, eased pressures. Before President Draghi’s major intervention 
in July 2012, the ECB had interpreted its mandate in conservative fashion. For example, former 
President Trichet stressed the limited nature of the ECB’s first adventures in unconventional 
policy: ‘we have decided to engage in the purchase of covered bonds (…) as a segment of the 
private securities markets that in general has been particularly affected [by the financial crisis] 
(…) to help to revive this particular segment of the market’ (Trichet & Papademos, 2009).  
Under Trichet, the ECB was not seeking to stabilise financial markets in general, but 
only particular segments. Under Draghi, the ECB changed its rhetoric from “credibility” to 
“stability” and developed a diverse toolbox of unconventional monetary policy (Schmidt, 
2016). Draghi, in his own words, wanted to bring ‘certainty to markets that the ECB was 
unwavering’ in its support for the Euro (Barber & Jones, 2019). At the same time, this specific 
decision provided Europe with an unprecedented economic phenomenon: the unconventional 
policy enacted since 2012 has installed what appears to be permanently low interest rates in 
the European economy. The ECB’s interventions have sparked new forms of political contestation: for 
instance, the legality of the ECB’s bond buying programme has been tested at the German 
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Constitutional Court, and the controversial nature of the ECB’s programmes helped the 
formation of the nationalist-neoliberal Alternative für Deutschland.  
Once the most acute phase of crisis had passed in 2012, political work began to restore 
some consensus around the appropriate direction of the EMU and Europe more broadly. 
Critical integration theory focuses on the domestic sources that may facilitate a new consensus. 
Here, I argue, the relationship between structural conditions (e.g. EMU deficiency), political 
contingencies (e.g. half-measured responses) and economic variables (e.g. negative interest 
rates) is crucial. At the current conjuncture of low interest rates and low growth, there is much 
less pressure on the EMU and its member states, even if there is still a great deal of real 
economic divergence between member states. The conditions of low inflation and growth rates 
has slowly nurtured political decisions more conducive to demand management. As such, EU 
institutions have promoted wage rises in some countries, while increasingly emphasizing more 
consensual structural labour market reforms, focusing on elements like training and active 
labour market policies. As such, the current economic conjuncture of zero interest rate policy, 
low inflation, and low growth has been conducive to the privileging of consensual reform 
guidance. However, I argue, this contingent political situation cannot overcome the structural 
antagonisms and weak forms of political hegemony that permeates European integration and 
the governance of Eurozone labour markets. 
 
5.3. The New Economic Governance framework for wages and labour 
At the height of the Eurozone crisis, the Commission framed their approach to 
governing macroeconomic imbalances as ‘holistic’. For the ECB and the Commission, tackling 
macroeconomic imbalances was also about improving competitiveness. The 2008 report on the 
EMU anniversary, which had helped bring the issue of macroeconomic imbalances to the 
forefront of European politics, had suggested a combined framework for monitoring and 
governing competitiveness and imbalances (European Commission, 2008a). In order to 
strengthen Europe’s competitiveness, the governance of imbalances should target labour costs 
and structural impediments to productivity and growth, such as centralised labour bargaining.  
The Commission and European Council’s response to the growing concern for the 
dangers of imbalances was not institutional reform to address the sources of divergence, but a 
reinforced disciplinarian macroeconomic governance framework. The Commission, under the 
presidency of José Manuel Barroso was responsible for initiating the set of reforms to install   
the NEG framework. Barroso outlined in a speech at OECD in 2010 that the proposed 
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governance framework represented a ‘holistic approach’ to crisis management based on ‘ex-
ante coordination’ of macroeconomic policy (Barroso, 2010, p. 3.5). 
The MIP scoreboard lists current account imbalances, unit labour costs, and exports as 
indicators of potential macroeconomic imbalances. The first step in the annual cycle of the MIP 
is the Commission’s surveillance of member state performance on these indicators. For 
instance, as France’s export performance deteriorated during the financial crisis, France 
crossed the indicator threshold for export market shares within the MIP procedure in 2012.  
While the MIP scoreboard of indicators constitute one such set of benchmarks, member 
states performance vis-à-vis these indicators does not automatically determine whether a 
member state is experiencing excessive imbalances that require correction. At the insistence of 
the Commission, only in-depth country reviews conducted by country specialists within the 
Commission (‘s economic and employment departments) can determine the significance of a 
country’s macroeconomic imbalances and the urgency of the corrective action required. In this 
aspect, I argue, the MIP is a managerial practice in which EU officials cooperate with domestic 
policy actors to improve domestic economic performance on a clearly defined set of criteria. 
Outside the EU institutions and member state governments, trade unions and employers 
were adjusting their approach to EU labour governance. Up until the financial crisis, 
employers, financial elites and neoliberal leaders were resisting what they saw as the building 
blocks to a political union, preferring instead non-intervention into European wage and 
employment conditions (Erne, 2015).  
This changed when Europe was plunged into deep existential crisis. For the neoliberal 
hegemonic project, the crisis confirmed that the time of Europe’s expensive social models was 
gone. In the absence of decisive policy action at the domestic level, the remnants of the social 
model were lingering on, but markets had lost faith and it was time for fundamental change. 
At least so was the thinking among many EU leaders. The context for what Barroso called ‘a 
silent revolution in terms of stronger economic governance by small steps’ (Phillips, 2011) was 
the acute risk of ‘government bankruptcy’ due to the reluctance of European leaders and the 
ECB to guarantee the solvency of crisis countries (Barroso, 2010, p. 4). This was undoubtedly 
the direst phase of the crisis, before the ECB initiated the controversial programme of Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT) and relieved Eurozone governments from the most severe 
market pressure. In this phase, Commission vice-president Olli Rehn stressed that the solution 
for ‘vulnerable Member States under close market scrutiny’ was to ‘convince both the market 
forces and policy-makers over the capability to tackle the fiscal challenges and create 
confidence’ (Rehn, 2012).  
 163 
ETUC warned that workers were ‘being presented with all of the huge costs of the 
crisis’ (ETUC, 2010b, para. 2). ETUC expressed concern that the MIP would give EU 
institutions ‘yet another possibility to intervene in areas where they have no competence’ under 
the TFEU, make workers ‘pay for the entire cost of the crisis’, and enforce prolonged economic 
recession upon its member states (ETUC, 2010a, pt. 2). However, ETUC never resisted 
European economic coordination per se, but only concrete deflationary proposals targeting 
workers unfairly (ETUC, 2010a). The representative of European organized labour thus 
denounced the NEG at its conception but accepted the need for a framework that more 
effectively could mediate the various wage and labour demands at the national, European, and 
global level, and safeguard the Eurozone against financial speculation and macroeconomic 
imbalances. A strategy of pushing for better economic governance trumped that of resisting 
economic integration.  
From a critical integration theory perspective, ETUC’s strategic positioning reflects EU 
institutional and macro-structural conditions. Pre-crisis EMU would provide governments and 
social partners with a stability-oriented framework. The EMU framework in place since 1992 
had allowed governments and social partners in several countries to successfully negotiate 
social pacts, but the result had generally been towards ever-lower wages relative to productivity 
(Chapter 3 and 4). The crisis hit hardest the countries that had managed to reverse the trend of 
falling wage shares, such as Greece. While the interaction between EMU institutions and 
macro-structural pressure was not conducive to trade unions’ redistributive demands, a 
potential monetary disintegration was not an attractive proposition either. The power of trade 
unions had eroded over decades, and disintegration was unlikely to reverse that trend. Further, 
given the context of severe economic crisis, monetary disintegration was likely to release an 
enormous pressure on member states from decisions in global financial markets, likely to inflict 
capital flight, interest rate hikes, and more.  
In this period, what was at stake was arguably the survival of Europe’s currency union. 
Domestic politics, particularly in Germany, hindered a decisive intervention to stabilise the 
Eurozone, whether fiscal transfers, risk sharing, or other measures. The dominant narrative that 
it was in the interest of taxpayers in EMU creditor member states to avoid transfers and bailouts 
allowed creditor member state governments to unite behind the neoliberal hegemonic project. 
The ideas and values underpinning this project opposed the moral hazard that would allegedly 
follow fiscal transfers or risk sharing. At the same time, the ECB’s institutional interpretation 
of its mandate translated into its initial reluctance to pursue large-scale asset purchases. 
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The dominance of neoliberal ideas on crisis management at the EU level helped the 
mostly disciplinarian spirit of EU governance after the crisis. At this point, the major point of 
contention was the extent to which the neoliberal project could muster institutional support 
from the Councils, the European Council, and the European Parliament. To this end, the 
protests from Europe’s trade unions were less of a concern. 
   
5.3.1. Building consensus around labour governance 
The adoption of the reinforced governance framework for fiscal and macroeconomic 
policy in 2011 did little to calm the still accelerating Eurozone crisis. Only after ECB President 
Mario Draghi’s announcement ‘to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro’ (Draghi, 2012), 
Europe’s political and economic conditions shifted - even if the ECB intervention did not 
address the EMU’s structural inability to govern its own crisis of competitiveness (Talani, 
2015). In terms of political-economic conjunctures, the ECB’s new interventionist approach to 
the Eurozone crisis brought with it a severe decline in Eurozone government bond yields. The 
acute pressure on crisis government finances had faded. For instance, between 2012 and 2014, 
Greece’s 10-year government bond yields slipped from above 30% to below 10% 
(Wigglesworth, 2019).  
As the immediate existential threat to the Eurozone vanished, the political work of 
restoring and broadening elite consensus over the long-term direction of EU economic 
governance regained prominence. In two speeches in spring 2013, Barroso and Rehn outlined 
the reform priorities that would take the Eurozone out of crisis mode and restore growth. For 
Rehn and Barroso, structural reforms for competitiveness remained key to secure the stability 
and resilience of Europe (Barroso, 2013; Rehn, 2013). Under the conditions of continued 
consolidation and structural reform, Barroso noted ‘the space to slow down the pace of 
consolidation’ and take ‘specific focused action’ on Europe’s ‘social emergency’ of 
unemployment and inequality (Barroso, 2013, p. 4). Thus, the crucial thing for Europe was to 
move beyond the ‘futile’ debate ‘about austerity versus growth’ that had shaped European 
political conflict since the crisis and install among policy-makers the ‘consensus (…) vital for 
confidence’ and growth (Barroso, 2013, p. 5)  
Across the EU institutions, European leaders committed to strengthening the social 
dimension to the EMU. The president of the European Council, after consulting the 
Commission, the Eurogroup of Eurozone finance ministers, and the ECB, identified the 
‘building blocks’ ‘towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ that could promote social 
fairness (Van Rompuy, 2012, p. 1). Despite the renewed focus on social issues such as 
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unemployment and inequality, trade unions were mostly unimpressed. ETUC maintained that 
the rhetoric on social issues could not hide how EU economic governance ‘institutionalizes a 
structural bias towards the domination of economic over social governance’ (ETUC, 2013a, pt. 
3).  
Thus, the Commission rhetoric changed after the ECB’s decisive intervention in 2012. 
As the immediate existential threat to the Eurozone vanished, the political work of restoring 
and broadening elite consensus over the long-term direction of EU economic governance 
regained prominence. The Commission has attempted to build consensus among actors with 
different interests and preferences from within the NEG framework, thereby increase the 
political hegemony of the Commission’s labour market structural reform agenda. This 
argument is in line with critical integration theory and its emphasis on the importance of 
hegemonic projects, contestation, and compromises for the direction and speed of European 
integration. 
Lead by the Presidency and the College of Commissioners, the Commission developed 
a strategy for balancing the project of correcting macroeconomic imbalances with a better 
surveillance of the EMU’s social development. In June 2013, the European Council announced 
its intention to take ‘urgent action’ against youth unemployment through a Youth Guarantee, 
and improve the surveillance of ‘the social and labour market situation within EMU’ (European 
Council, 2013, pp. 1, 11). The Commission followed up by adding five auxiliary indicators on 
unemployment, social exclusion, and poverty, to the MIP scoreboard. The Commission 
Presidency was also vocal about the importance of monitoring the Eurozone’s ‘social 
dimension’ within the procedure of the MIP. Outlining the strategy for strengthening the social 
dimension of the EMU, the Commission had made clear the purpose of ‘incorporating the 
social dimension in surveillance of the macroeconomic imbalances’, as ‘stronger coordination 
of employment and social policies within the European Semester’ would ‘focus the efforts of 
governments’ (European Commission, 2013b, pp. 5–7).  
Running for the post of Commission President in the first-ever Spitzenkandidat process 
in 2014, former Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker, outlined his ambition of 
targeting Europe’s record-high unemployment rates (Fontanella-Khan, 2014). Upon election, 
Juncker championed the idea of socialising the NEG framework by further strengthening the 
social indicators within the MIP, and in September 2015, the Commission elevated three 
employment indicators on activity rate, long-term unemployment, and youth unemployment, 
to the main scoreboard. The Commission would use these indicators to strengthen the accuracy 
of its surveillance of imbalances, but transgression of the indicator thresholds would not trigger 
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any additional steps in the procedure. Including and elevating social indicators on the MIP 
scoreboard, the Commission did not intend on treating social deterioration as an economic 
imbalance. Instead, monitoring unemployment should minimise the social consequences of 
correcting imbalances (European Commission, 2015b). The inclusion of social indicators in 
the MIP did not resolve the tensions inherent to the project of governing labour through the 
governance of imbalances: rather, the Commission’s explanation for including social indicators 
highlighted the expectation that the governance of imbalances would come with negative social 
consequences.  
Despite the intention of gathering broader support for the EU governance framework, 
this new, more socially oriented scoreboard did not gain universal approval. Rather, the 
inclusion of social indicators in the MIP scoreboard effectively disenfranchised both member 
state ministers of finance as well as of employment and social policy. For many member state 
ministers, the inclusion of employment indicators in the MIP scoreboard would cause a blurring 
of the purpose of the MIP, which should be responsible for preventing potentially harmful 
imbalances, particularly in the Eurozone.  Social consequences were the natural remit of the 
European Semester, which had responsibility for carrying out the Europe 2020 strategy for a 
competitive, inclusive, and sustainable economy. Ministers in the Employment and Social 
Policy Council (EPSCO), following this line of reasoning, argued in favour of a clear 
distinction between social and employment policy recommendations, issued through the 
European Semester, and the macroeconomic recommendations of the MIP. Social and 
employment ministers were reluctant to let social policy be guided by the predominantly 
economic concerns of the ECOFIN Council of Finance ministers in change of the MIP. They 
therefore wanted to maintain social policy issues ‘within the EPSCO remit’ rather than 
subsuming them to the MIP process (EPSCO Council, 2015; Hansen & Lovering, 2019b) 
The ECOFIN Council of finance ministers also questioned the Commission altering the 
MIP to take into account social imbalances (ECOFIN Council, 2014), and later, in 2016, they 
expressed their ‘concern about the inclusion by the Commission of three additional 
employment indicators given the need to preserve the effectiveness of the scoreboard’ 
(ECOFIN Council, 2016, p. 4). On the side of Europe’s trade unions, ETUC ‘deplore(d)’ that 
the social indicators, unlike the original indicators, could ‘not result in a binding sanction 
mechanism’ (ETUC, 2013b). Even when the social and employment indicators were elevated 
to the main scoreboard in 2015, they could not trigger further steps in the MIP. In response to 
the lacking procedural power of social indicators, ETUC announced it would try ‘enhancing 
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the trade union position’ in EU economic governance by launching a new ‘ETUC semester’ of 
European-level trade union coordination (ETUC, 2013c, n.p.).  
In the context of EU labour governance, the focus on the social dimension to economic 
imbalances forms part of the Commission’s strategy to use the MIP to promote and accelerate 
structural labour market strategy and monitor their likely negative social consequences. One 
way the Commission has sought to build consensus has been through the annual CSRs, in 
which the Commission has increasingly emphasised the importance of (sustainable) public 
spending, wage rises, and social challenges (European Commission, 2017a, 2018b). In 
addition, focusing increasingly on the likely social costs to economic adjustment and internal 
devaluation, the Commission also took a lead on the alteration of the content of the structural 
reforms promoted through the NEG framework. Within the College of Commissioners, Laszlo 
Andor, the social-democratic Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs, actively 
championed the project of socialising economic governance in order to broaden political 
consensus. During the critical phase of the crisis, Andor had repeatedly stressed the importance 
of making Europe’s recovery ‘job-rich’ to avoid a persistent structural unemployment crisis 
(Andor, 2011a, 2011b). 
As highlighted by a former advisor to the Commission, Barroso, Rehn, and Andor all 
contributed to ‘a redefinition of what structural reforms mean’ from ‘the kind of notion known 
from the paradigm of the Washington Consensus’ to ‘a second generation of structural reforms’ 
(Interviewee #4). In short, second generation structural reforms aim at facilitating adjustment 
by improving productivity rather than cutting costs and dismantling labour organisation. 
Policies supporting productivity may include education and training, active labour market 
policies, and adequate social protection.  
 
5.4. Two (futile) efforts at more fundamental transformation 
As highlighted above, the NEG framework left EU labour governance sufficiently 
unspecified to allow for a range of interpretations by different political leaders and 
Commissioners. In the language of critical integration theory, EU labour governance remained 
a project of European integration open for hegemonic competition and political contestation. 
In short, EU labour governance rests on weak political compromise in the absence of deeper 
hegemony. To compare post-crisis labour governance with the counterfactual – governance 
underpinned by hegemony – I use this section to analyse two hitherto futile efforts at 
fundamental transformation in EU labour governance: the introduction of an intergovernmental 
competitiveness pact (Euro-Plus Pact), and a Eurozone budget with fiscal transfers.  
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The futile introduction of an intergovernmental competitiveness pact symbolised the 
simultaneous dominance and weakness of the neoliberal hegemonic project. At the time of the 
launch of the NEG framework in 2011, Europe’s most powerful leaders, Merkel and Sarkozy 
embarked on an effort to align EU labour governance on a programme of neoliberal adjustment. 
Their proposal was to strengthen EU economic governance to ensure firm coordination of 
member states’ competitiveness. The objective was to install an instrument that at once 
improved Europe’s long-term growth prospects and provided insurance against the dangerous 
divergence experienced in the lead-up to the financial crisis. In effect, Europe’s leaders would 
have to push EU labour governance considerably further than what was achieved with the 
European Semester and the MIP. The following year, European Commission President van 
Rompuy proposed to create a Eurozone budget to combine macro-economic stabilization with 
a tool for structural reforms, effectively proposing a fiscal union. Both proposals would have 
significantly transformed EU labour governance and its relationship to the EMU, but for 
reasons of hegemonic competition and political contestation, they never materialised.   
As we have seen, the European Semester and the MIP streamlined the (preventive) 
procedure for intergovernmental policy coordination and installed a new corrective procedure 
for member states unable to achieve wage moderation and macroeconomic stability. The 
proposed Euro-Plus Pact, conversely, would directly govern member states’ competitiveness 
by installing a rules-based procedure for the reform of key wage setting mechanisms at the 
domestic level. The German and French governments announced their intentions to shore up 
the governance of competitiveness in three letters to the Eurozone governments during 2011 
(Brand, 2011; Reuters, 2011; Sarkozy & Merkel, 2011).  
Like the MIP, the rationale for the Pact lies in the (causal) relationship between cost 
competitiveness and the macroeconomic imbalances believed to constitute the core of the 
Eurozone crisis. Targeting and containing unit labour costs, through wage restraint, labour 
market reforms, and pension and benefit reforms, the Pact was supposed to help member states 
running large current account deficits to restore external balance and avoid further losses in 
cost competitiveness. The scientific support for the supposed causal relationship running from 
cost competitiveness to current account imbalances is, at best, modest. Some studies do find 
such a relationship to exist. Belke & Dreger find that ‘a lack in competitiveness is the main 
explanation for the external deficits’ of the crisis-ridden Eurozone countries, and advocate a 
‘depreciation of the real exchange rate in the deficit countries via a cut in their unit labour 
costs’ (2013, pp. 6, 14). Gros (2012), Marzinotto (2011), and Gabrisch & Staehr (2015) 
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however, have all repudiated this finding, and implicitly questioned the basic rationale for the 
Euro-Plus Pact.  
Of the two instruments to restore competitiveness and reduce imbalances, the Euro-
Plus Pact had the most concrete policy implications. As such, it would be a responsibility of 
every participating member state to bring wage developments in line with productivity. The 
preferred method of the original German-Franco Competitiveness Pact, proposed in February 
2011 was the abolition of indexing of wages to inflation combined with a generalised 
decentralisation of wage bargaining (Barnard, 2012). The Pact that Europe’s leaders agreed at 
the European Council meeting of 24/25 March 2011, slightly opened up the policy space for 
member states, but still commits member states to pursue strategies that lower labour costs and 
improve competitiveness.  
While clear on the overall objective (rebalancing through competitiveness) as well as 
the domestic policies it implied, member states were unable to agree on a procedure and a set 
of enforcement mechanisms that would move the Pact beyond the governance framework of 
the OMC. In contrast, the MIP sets up transparent criteria for enforcement and sanctions and 
uses the RQMV procedure to limit the ability of member states blocking sanctions in the 
Council. Compared to the eventual manifestation of the Pact, the MIP had the greater potential 
to shift the authority to govern imbalances in favour of EU-level governance.  
The Euro-Plus Pact eventually came to symbolise the futile efforts of key European 
leaders to transform EU labour governance into a powerful vehicle for neoliberal adjustment. 
There were several factors behind the failure of the Pact in causing fundamental change in EU 
labour governance. Prominently, the role of the European Commission was very vague, and 
the kind of ‘governance-at-a-distance’ characteristic of the Commission was missing - in terms 
of economic surveillance, the Pact merely replicated the European Semester and the MIP. 
Furthermore, Commission actors were sceptical about anchoring enforcement and sanctions in 
the Commission (Smeets & Beach, 2019). Alternatively, Europe’s leaders could have anchored 
the new Pact in EU law through treaty change. However, reluctant to engage in treaty changes, 
this was never viable route in the reform of EU labour and economic governance after the 
crisis. In effect, while member states in principle could sign up to the neoliberal purpose of the 
Pact, the available institutional routes for anchoring the pact were unattainable. The problem 
for the Euro-Plus Pact was not its neoliberal ideational foundation but its uneasy fit with the 
existing EU institutional structure.  
While many European leaders are very keen to provide financial incentives for 
structural reform, they have hitherto been unable to muster support for the necessary 
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institutional reform. In the wake of the Eurozone crisis, the Commission has also proposed a 
Eurozone budget to combine macroeconomic stabilisation mechanisms with incentives for 
structural reforms. If realised, a Eurozone budget intended to promote structural reform would 
combine Keynesian principles of counter-cyclical stabilisation with supply-side economics 
focusing on structural labour and product market reforms. Therefore, a Eurozone budget 
directly linked to structural reform should attract neoliberal and social democratic actors and 
could form the basis for hegemonic compromise. If fully implemented, such a budget would 
constitute a more fundamental reorientation in EU labour governance than what has been 
achieved since the crisis. This is because the proposed budget could add a macroeconomic 
framework to the long-standing structural reform agenda.  
However, this has hitherto been a futile effort. After years of extensive analysis and 
political negotiations, in June 2019 Eurozone leaders reached an agreement on a Budgetary 
Instrument for Convergence and Competitiveness (BICC) that links financial support to 
structural reform (Euro Summit, 2019). Yet, it was ‘designed explicitly without a 
countercyclical stabilization function and without its own sources of funding’ (Kirkegaard, 
2019). After agreeing on the budgetary instrument, political contestation among Europe’s 
leaders continued, with Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte declaring the idea of a Eurozone 
budget ‘gone’ (Smith-Meyer, 2019).  
The opposition of the Dutch government and other Northern member states to a fiscal 
stabilisation mechanism in the EMU reflects the long-term stance of the neoliberal hegemonic 
project to support only disciplinarian modes of EU labour governance and oppose any steps 
towards a union of fiscal transfers between member states. The compromise outcome provides 
modest financial incentives to labour market and other structural reforms and continues the 
EU’s institutional legacy of pursuing macroeconomic stabilisation via domestic structural 
reforms rather than counter-cyclical demand management.  
 
5.5. Labour governance in key Eurozone members: Germany, France, and Italy 
In the absence of political hegemony to enable structural transformation in EU labour 
governance, hegemonic competition and political contestation has shaped EU labour 
governance since the introduction of the NEG framework in 2011. The European Commission 
has sought to continue a practice of governing European workers at a distance by using 
performance management techniques. At the same time, the Commission has sought to build 
more compromises among EU institutional actors by simultaneously promoting neoliberal 
adjustment and expansionary demand stimulation. In effect, the Commission has pursued a 
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differentiated strategy of neoliberal adjustment in Southern Europe and demand stimulation in 
the North. While starting to target Germany’s suppressed demand after 2013, the Commission 
also continued recommending structural reform to improve competitiveness across Southern 
Europe and in France. 
Seeking to broaden the political support for economic governance, both inside the 
European institutions as well as among European policymakers, the Commission increasingly 
targeted countries running current account surpluses and potentially supressing demand. The 
structural context as well changes in Europe’s economic conjunctures also explain the EU’s 
gradual change. The prolonged period of low growth and high unemployment has limited the 
Eurozone’s economic divergence, through discouraging credit flows to southern Europe, and 
limiting wage inflation. In recent years, Germany has been only member state to transgress the 
key MIP indicator of current account imbalances. In November 2013, the Commission targeted 
Germany’s surplus for the first time (European Commission, 2013c). Assessing the factors 
leading to this (perhaps tangential) reorientation, the former employment Commissioner 
adviser emphasises the EMU institutional structure and the shift in economic conjunctures after 
2012:  
‘Barroso and Rehn also understood the reality and the downside of the internal 
devaluation strategy, so they were kind of pursuing it as long as they had to 
because there was financial market instability. But as soon as the ECB stepped 
in and helped with the OMT in 2012 … Andor and Rehn started to criticise the 
German surplus position (…) and suggested that Germany could increase 
internal investment (Interviewee #4). 
Thus, a rhetorical and practical reorientation took place in the final two years of the 
second Barroso Commission (2012-2014). Increasingly, the Commission promoted what they 
perceived as consensual structural reforms and stressed the importance of implementing the 
necessary structural reforms for competitiveness with an eye for the ‘care of the most 
vulnerable’ (Barroso, 2013, p. 4) 
 This programme of consensual reforms supplements rather than replaces the 
programme of austerity and internal devaluation. For instance, the EU’s policy 
recommendations for Italy and France in the area of wages and labour markets bear clear signs 
of the continued strategy of neoliberal adjustment. In recent times, France and Italy have both 
mirrored the long-term European problem with unemployment. Since the early-1990s, 
unemployment rates in Italy and France have mostly followed the trend in Eurozone 
unemployment, typically ranging at 8-11%, with a few cyclical exceptions (see figure 5.1).  
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Figure 5.1. Unemployment in Italy, France, Eurozone 12 
Source: AMECO 
 
For the EU institutions involved in wage and labour governance in France and Italy, the 
main problem is structural unemployment, not cyclical unemployment. This means that, in the 
eyes of EU institutions, the solution to the problem of unemployment becomes structural 
reforms, and not stimulating economic demand. In effect, the high structural unemployment 
rates suggest that France and Italy’s labour markets are marred by rigidities and poor 
competitiveness, and not by the (demand) effects of economic recession. In France, structural 
unemployment slowly increased from below 8% in the early 1990s to around 9.5% following 
the financial crisis. In Italy, structural unemployment decreased in advance of the financial 
crisis, reaching a low of 8.1% in 2007, only to increase to above 10% by 2015. Here, structural 
unemployment refers to the non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU), which 
the Commission’s DG ECFIN estimates for all member states.9 For France and Italy, actual 
and structural unemployment remained in relatively close proximity throughout the period, 
with a few exceptions around the boom years of 2006-07, and the crisis period of peak 
unemployment in 2013-15. As of 2018, France’s unemployment rate of 9.1 closely mirrored 
 
9 AMECO online: https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm 
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its structural level of 9.4%, while Italy’s unemployment rate of 10.6% was slightly higher than 
its structural level (10%).  
The significance of this is that the EU has deemed Italy and France’s actual 
unemployment levels to be at or near the lowest possible level that allows for price stability. If 
the two countries’ unemployment rates fall further below the structural level, and the NAWRU 
estimates are correct, the effect will be accelerating inflation and a violation of the EMU 
commitment to price stability. Therefore, one of the major objectives of the EU’s governance 
of wages and labour markets in Italy and France has been to lower structural unemployment 
through a range of structural labour market reforms. For a period after the financial crisis, this 
involved explicit recommendations to undertake reforms aimed at internal devaluation. The 
NAWRU figures highlight the advanced economic modelling that the Commission produces 
to improve policy recommendations. As the NAWRU consistently increases in the wake of 
economic recessions, the figures provide justification to the EMU’s structural, deflationary 
bias: in France, for instance, the NAWRU suggests that demand stimulation to fight 
unemployment would risk spiralling inflation out of control. All this suggests that the 
Commission’s production of economic knowledge is important for construing political 
contestation over EU labour governance. 
  Italy has been under close macroeconomic inspection since the MIP’s initial 
surveillance in 2012. Here, Italy transgressed the indicator thresholds for export market shares 
and public debt, which they repeated in 2013. Both years, the Commission followed up with 
closer, in-depth reviews based on the country’s ‘significant deterioration in competitiveness’, 
and found Italy to be ‘experiencing macroeconomic imbalances’ but not excessive ones  
(Council of the European Union, 2012b, 2013b; European Commission, 2012b, para. Italy). 
From 2014 onwards, the EU has identified excessive imbalances in Italy, based on ‘very high 
level of public debt and weak external competitiveness, both ultimately rooted in the protracted 
sluggish productivity growth’ (Council of the European Union, 2014b, para. 7).   
In the first three years of the European Semester, 2011-2013, among more controversial 
recommendations, the EU urged Italy to review its employment protection legislation on 
dismissals, to reform the wage-setting framework to restrain wage growth to the country’s 
productivity growth, and to tackle labour market segmentation. In 2012 and in 2014-15, the 
Italian government adopted two labour market reforms. In 2012, the technocratic government 
under Prime Minister Mario Monti adopted the Fornero Reform, while Matteo Renzi 
government adopted the ‘Jobs act’ reform bill in 2014. Both reforms reduced dismissal rules 
and procedures, increased coverage of unemployment benefits, and sought to strengthen active 
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labour market policies by improving training and guidance and make better use of penalties 
against inactive benefit claimants (Iudicone & Arca Sedda, 2015; Picot & Tassinari, 2017; 
Pinelli et al., 2017). 
Having detected excessive imbalances for the first time in 2014, the Commission 
continued to highlight the issues of competitiveness and productivity, and followed up with 
recommendations to implement the proposed labour market reform and improve cost 
competitiveness and job creation (European Commission, 2014a). From this point, the 
Commission also started publishing annual reviews of relevant policy measures. Following the 
explicit EU focus on wages and cost competitiveness from 2011 up until 2015, the 
Commission’s language slightly shifted thereafter. As overall wage moderation started to 
consolidate, the EU continued pushing for decentralised wage bargaining; but the purpose of 
this was now less about aligning current wages to productivity. Instead, reforms should induce 
flexibility into the system in anticipation of a coming crisis to avoid a repetition of the ‘wage 
rigidity during the crisis, with nominal wages rising above inflation even when unemployment 
rate was sharply increasing’ (European Commission, 2017b, p. 12). As of 2018, the 
Commission remained concerned by ‘the persistent and unintended changes in real wages’ 
likely to occur in case of a crisis (European Commission, 2018c, p. 14) 
Since 2015, Italy’s CSRs have focused on politically uncontroversial reforms, such as 
better childcare facilities and better-targeted investment in research and education, in addition 
to the more contentious issue of wage bargaining. In particular, the 2018 recommendations 
emphasise social issues and investment, and has even avoided recommending a 
decentralisation of wage bargaining, despite the Commission’s in-depth country report on Italy 
suggesting that bargaining remained an unsolved issue (Council of the European Union, 2018b; 
European Commission, 2018a). The decision to avoid this contentious issue in a year of 
increased budgetary conflict between Italy and the EU suggests the active political role played 
by the Commission within the NEG framework, and its acceptance in the Council.  
For France, the Commission identified the combination of falling export market shares 
and high private and public debt as constituting excessive imbalances in 2015. Before 2015, 
these imbalances had not been excessive, but had required decisive policy action. The fall in 
export shares reflected France’s deep competitiveness problems in the eyes of EU institutions. 
In line with this view, the EU has recommended labour reforms ‘to ensure that wages evolve 
in line with productivity’ and ‘that minimum wage developments are consistent with the 
objectives of promoting employment and competitiveness (Council of the European Union, 
2015, recommendation 3). As with Italy, the Commission has consistently pushed a number of 
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politically appealing, if administratively difficult reforms, such as more effective, more 
strongly coordinated, and better-targeted active labour market policies (Council of the 
European Union, 2011, 2012a, 2013a).  
The politically more controversial recommendations concern the minimum wage, 
unemployment benefits, collective bargaining, and employment protection legislation. Out of 
the eight years of MIP governance 2011-2018, the EU has recommended France to make 
developments in the minimum wage more conducive to competitiveness and job creation seven 
times. In addition, the EU has recommended France bring the unemployment benefit system 
‘back to budgetary sustainability’ and increase ‘incentives to return to work’ four times; to 
deregulate employment protection two times, and more flexible wage bargaining once, in 2015 
(Council of the European Union, 2011, 2012a, 2013a, 2014a, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018a). The 
only year the EU has recommended action across three of the four policy areas (minimum 
wage, unemployment benefits, and collective bargaining) is 2015. Since 2015, the EU has 
focused increasingly on the minimum wage, the only of the four areas addressed in 2017 and 
2018.  
The Commission’s insistence on structural reform for cost competitiveness in France 
and Italy continued almost unbridled until 2016. Over time, the EU increasingly emphasised 
politically uncontroversial reforms such as training, and in the case of France, the EU issued 
increasingly detailed recommendations after 2016. In recent years, the focus on training and 
social inclusion has tended to replace, and not merely complement the structural reform 
recommendations aimed at internal devaluation (Council of the European Union, 2017, 2018).  
Asserting hegemonic competition as a fundamental feature of European integration, the 
framework deployed in this thesis suggests that institutional evolution, such as the European 
Semester and the MIP are likely to reproduce existing hegemonic competition. However, 
changes to the institutional context may change the more specific dynamics of political 
contestation. The use of sanctions in the MIP, one of the most controversial aspects of the new 
procedure, highlights the reproduction of hegemonic competition and the changes to political 
contestation. Under the MIP, the EU can impose financial sanctions of up to 0.1% of GDP if 
member states experiencing excessive imbalances repeatedly submit insufficient action plans 
or fail to take corrective action (European Commission, 2016a). Financial sanctions, therefore, 
do not apply to lacking implementation of policy recommendations (i.e. CSRs), but to 
insufficient (plans for) action on excessive imbalances. Only under the EIP may financial 
sanctions apply. Yet, the Commission has never taken the politically controversial move of 
launching an EIP. This decision reflects the continued relevance of hegemonic competition. 
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Various EU institutional actors, including the ECB, have criticised the Commission for not 
invoking the EIP (European Central Bank, 2017). Yet, the Commission has maintained that 
they would only invoke the EIP in cases where governments show ‘insufficient commitment 
to reforms’ to correct ‘severe macroeconomic imbalances that jeopardise the proper 
functioning of the economic and monetary union, like those that led to the crises’ (European 
Commission, 2015c, pp. 9–10). This stance suggests a reluctance to engage in overt conflict 
with domestic state actors over reform implementation. A Commission official interviewee 
outlined that while sanctions have been proposed for excessive deficits ‘with labour market 
and social policy, we are very much in the point and blame and discussing, trying to have, so 
to speak, an incitative (sic) approach, but we cannot impose any [sanctions]’ (Interviewee #15).    
We are yet to see what conditions could result in an EIP. Given the importance ascribed 
to Eurozone current account imbalances for the crisis in the first place, current accounts 
undoubtedly stand at the centre of the MIP. This suggests that the current economic conjuncture 
of low growth and depressed demand cycles is counter-conducive to the use of the EIP as 
current account deficits have evaporated in the post-crisis era. In other words, the political-
economic evolution in Europe after the financial crisis, particularly the application of austerity 
in the Eurozone periphery, brought about a situation in which a number of core MIP scoreboard 
indicators quickly rebalanced. In addition to the current account balance, under the impetus of 
economic recession and the rise in unemployment, wage developments were also very 
moderate in the Eurozone periphery after 2008, and unit labour costs mostly stagnated. 
Given the macroeconomic consequences of austerity, deficit member states in the 
Eurozone periphery have generally performed well on the MIP scoreboard, as it seeks to detect 
primarily inflationary trends of wage rises and ‘real effective exchange rate’ developments. 
Conversely, Germany’s persistently excessive current account surplus has been insufficient for 
an EIP. From the existing evidence, it looks clear that the Commission is unlikely to launch 
EIPs in the absence of grave current account deficits. That means that the current conjuncture 
in Europe’s political economy prevents EIPs and thereby the potentiality of sanctions. 
Rather than an instrument for enforcing cyclical convergence, the MIP has developed 
into a governance instrument of persuasion and performance management techniques. In 
particular, we have seen how the EU institutions have focused on the indicator for export 
market shares in order to mobilize the MIP procedure for the strategy of wage moderation and 
labour market structural reform. In the case of France, in the absence of recorded wage 
inflation, export market shares would play a significant role in the EU institutions’ efforts at 
moderating French wages. The indicator on export market shares suggests that member states 
 177 
experiencing 6% fall in export market shares over 5 years may be experiencing macroeconomic 
imbalances in need of correction. Eurozone member states have recurrently crossed the 
threshold on export market shares: 12 of the current Eurozone member states have crossed the 
threshold at some point since 2012. This is largely unsurprising, given the decline of the 
Eurozone’s export market shares, particularly in the early stages of the crisis (European 
Commission, 2012b) and the Commission has rarely concluded that export market shares 
constitute harmful macroeconomic imbalances.  
There are, however, important exceptions, including France and Italy. In France, in 
particular, decreasing export market shares have shaped the Commission’s In-Depth Reviews 
and CSRs on labour markets. During the crisis, French unit labour costs have remained well-
below the MIP threshold of 9% over three years, and mostly corresponded to ECB inflation 
targets – for instance, in 2009-2011, unit labour costs rose 6% over three years (European 
Commission, 2012d). Yet, in France’s In-Depth Reviews, the Commission repeatedly pointed 
out that the intersecting export and labour cost dynamics exposed serious competitiveness 
issues in the French economy (European Commission, 2012c, 2013a, 2014b). When nominal 
unit labour costs all but stagnated from 2012 onwards, the EU nonetheless strongly warned 
France against the longer-term futility of measures reducing labour costs that did not directly 
target ‘the wage-setting process and [contained] minimum wage development [reform 
measures]’ (European Commission, 2016b, p. 2). 
How would critical integration theory interpret EU labour governance in key member 
states in the post-crisis era? In efforts to overcome continued political contestation, the 
European Commission has used the broad scope of the indicator scoreboard to monitor and 
recommend action on labour market policy for member states. Yet, by deferring the question 
of increased use of EIPs and sanctions, the Commission has itself become subject to criticism 
from institutional actors keen to speed up structural labour market reforms in the EU. For 
instance, the ECB has repeatedly criticised the Commission for excessive reliance on 
surveillance, persuasion, and benchmarking, and its allegedly insufficient use of the full 
repertoire of instruments in the MIP (European Central Bank, 2012, 2013, 2015).  
 
5.6. Governing peripheral labour: the exceptional case of Greece  
Compared to EU governance of labour in Italy and France, the EU has engaged much 
more actively in the restructuring of labour markets in Greece. In order to analyse the 
development of EU labour governance in Greece since the crisis, we need to return to the 
beginning of the Greek crisis and contextualise this in light of the wider Eurozone crisis. For 
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many European leaders, the Eurozone crisis really started when Greece announced an expected 
government deficit of 12.5% of GDP, and within months, asked for the EU to circumvent the 
EMU ‘no-bailout’ clause and provide financial assistance to avoid a government collapse. Up 
until this point, European leaders had mostly treated Europe’s crisis as a purely financial crisis 
stemming from across the Atlantic. Now, with the Greek government effectively bankrupt, it 
was inevitably also a political crisis. For months, there was nonetheless a clear lack of the 
required political consensus among European leaders to intervene in an effective and timely 
manner. Merkel’s options were constrained by domestic German politics, with growing 
conservative opposition to any reform of the Eurozone to help Greece and other countries in 
trouble. The ECB under President Jean-Claude Trichet provided a strict interpretation of the 
constraints on their mandate. The French government refused to let IMF participate in any 
potential bailout. Yet, eventually Sarkozy would negate his government’s opposition to IMF 
participation, and Merkel’s government agreed to a Greek bailout before any conclusive 
agreements on private sector debt restructuring. In return came strict policy conditionalities, 
monitored by the Troika institutions of the ECB, the Commission, and the IMF, with the 
Eurogroup of Eurozone finance ministers the coordinating actor. With the installation of the 
Troika and the ensuing policy conditionalities, Greek workers and citizens became subject to 
fundamental reforms of employment protection, benefit systems, and wage institutions.  
The inability of any major European actor to determine the conditions of a bailout 
hindered a decisive intervention in late 2009 and early 2010. Critical integration theory 
interprets this inability to act as reflective of the competitive dynamics between Europe’s 
hegemonic projects. Europe’s leaders could justify their inaction by pointing to the institutional 
framework of the EMU, which included the no-bailout provision, the independence of the ECB, 
and the fiscal discipline of the SGP. The institutional structure was the basis for performing 
intergovernmental restraint. Without a bailout provision, what could the EU really do? The 
EMU institutional framework was itself the result of domestic and supranational conflicts over 
the purpose and structures of European integration (Chapter 3). As such, the legacies of the 
compromise reached in the early 1990s shaped the decision-making process as the Eurozone 
crisis accelerated.  
In early 2010, a solution to the stalemate depended heavily on the German government, 
which combined an institutionally dominant ordoliberal variant of the neoliberal project with 
the personal, Atlanticist preferences of Angela Merkel. For decades, the pro-European social 
democrats had offered the main rival project to the neoliberals, but the fall-out of the crisis 
suggested a significant weakening of their position. Besides newly elected Greek Prime 
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Minister Papandreou, only six social democrats headed the European member states in late 
2009. In German domestic politics, the economically liberal, but partly Eurosceptic, FDP party 
had replaced the Social Democratic Party (SPD) as the CDU’s coalition partner in autumn 
2009. Therefore, a great deal of domestic opposition came from conservative and libertarian 
forces, which vehemently criticised any EU-level policy innovation beyond that of supposedly 
restoring discipline and feared how a Greek bailout might endanger Europe’s commitment to 
stability.  In Germany, various newspapers described the eventual loan agreement as 
‘nightmare’ for German citizens now expected to ‘pay for Greece’s luxury pensions’ (cited in 
Peel, 2010) 
For the EU, Greece’s potential bankruptcy loomed large and various EU actors started 
questioning the country’s membership of the EMU. Once European leaders eventually agreed 
on providing financial assistance to Greece, policy conditionalities included severe wage 
moderation. The Commission’s concern for Greece’s macroeconomic performance focused on 
‘(t)he rapid rise of wage costs and mark-ups in excess of productivity growth’, while ‘(t)he 
disconnection between wages and labour-market conditions and productivity developments’ 
had contributed to the marked deterioration of Greece’s macroeconomic position (European 
Commission, 2010d, pp. 3–4). Consequently, ‘the high and persistent external imbalances’ 
highlighted the urgent need for competitive adjustment through ‘(s)tructural measures and 
wage moderation’ (European Commission, 2010d, p. 19). 
With the economic conditions quickly deteriorating between autumn 2009 and spring 
2010, the EU made clear that the successful restoration of the Greek economy would now rest 
on four contingencies. First, that the Greek government’s 2010 ‘fiscal consolidation measures 
were quantified in a prudent way’ so that expenditure cuts and revenue increases would at least 
meet the stipulated budget targets (European Commission, 2010f, p. 19). Second, that the 
bailout programme would set clearly defined budget objectives for 2011 and 2012 in addition 
to the existing 2010 budget commitments. Third, that austerity and fiscal contraction would 
cause economic expansion in the medium run through low fiscal multipliers and ‘release of 
resources for the private sector’ (European Commission, 2010f, p. 19). Fourth, that austerity 
and structural reform would transform Greece into an export-led growth model. Together, the 
four contingencies formed the basis for the agreed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
between Greece and the Troika institutions (European Commission, 2010f).  
In other words, having delayed the necessary intervention by approximately 6 months, 
the EU-IMF bailout now depended on Greece dramatically upscaling the severity of its 
austerity programme. At the same time, however, avoiding a deep and prolonged recession also 
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depended on the immediate materialisation of the doctrine of ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’ 
(Giavazzi & Pagano, 1990). The basis for the bailout was the (rather wishful) thinking that 
fiscal contraction would only have moderate effects on aggregate demand (so-called low fiscal 
multipliers); that private sector investment would pick up immediately in response to public 
sector contraction; and that exports would improve as soon as structural reforms were 
implemented.  
There was an element of ideological naivety behind the policy conditionalities attached 
to Greece. Combining fiscal contraction and internal devaluation was never going to get 
Greece’s economy going. Yet, the conditionalities did not only reflect ideological preferences 
for unrealistic restructuring. As critical integration theory suggests, they also reflected a 
number of structural conditions under which the Greek bailout took place. First, Greece was a 
special case of a country in a severe productivity and competitiveness crisis, which had used 
public as well as private debt to maintain output growth. Second, the EU institutional delay in 
agreeing to a bailout, and the ECB’s restrictive interpretation of its mandate to intervene, 
helped escalate the crisis between October 2009 and May 2010. Third, in a global context of 
financial crisis, measures that were more dramatic would likely dampen panic mode among 
financial market actors. Together, these institutional and structural conditions for the Greek 
bailout help explain why the EU was able to enforce severe labour market reforms in Greece. 
 
5.6.1. Targeting Greek workers 
The conditionalities of the first bailout package primarily targeted Greece’s fiscal 
conditions. The primary way Greece was to reduce its fiscal deficit was through public sector 
cuts, privatisation, and a more efficient tax collection practice. Already in February-March 
2010, paving the way for an agreement on the initial bailout programme, the Greek parliament 
passed legislation to reduce the government wage bill by enacting public sector wage freezes 
and reducing employee allowances and bonuses. With the launch of the bailout programme, 
the EU institutions reiterated the need for labour market reforms. In addition to budget changes, 
the conditionalities concerned structural policies, whereby Greek (private sector) wages where 
to be made more flexible by liberalising the wage bargaining system. Concretely, the MoU 
pointed out, the government should legislate to ‘pay rates for overtime work and [enhance] 
flexibility in the management of working time’ and introduce a new sub-minimum wage for 
‘groups at risk’ (European Commission, 2010f, p. 73). To this extent, a new, lower minimum 
wage would also be a strategy of social inclusion – only through substantially lower wages, 
could ‘groups at risk’ hope to retain employment. Presenting wage cuts for low-income groups 
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as a case of social inclusion was not new to the EU, but directly instructing minimum wage 
cuts under the auspice of social inclusion was a new role for the EU. The EU institutions were 
adamant about Greece’s need to reform labour markets. Employment protection legislation 
caused segmentation and hindered mobility, inclusion, and transition in the labour market, the 
universal wage bargaining system caused wage inflation and the minimum wage was hostile 
to employment (European Commission, 2010f, p. 28). 
In spring 2010, alongside the negotiations on the terms of the bail-out package, the 
Greek government shored up plans for minimum wage and other pay-related reforms. 15 July 
2010, the Greek Parliament approved a labour market reform (Law 3862/2010), which 
introduced a sub-minimum wage for under-25s and reduced overtime premium (European 
Commission, 2010c). As for the longer-term reforms to Greece’s labour markets, the 2010 
bailout conditionalities showed relative patience. The Greek government and the institutions 
agreed to ‘follow a two-step approach’ with social partner consultations preceding government 
enforcement of ‘the required changes in the wage-setting mechanisms and labour market 
institutions’ (European Commission, 2010f, p. 27) 
Structural labour market reforms outside the public sector played mostly a 
complementary role in the first bailout conditionality agreement. Yet, in recurring compliance 
reports, and in the updated MoUs agreed with the Greek government, the Troika institutions 
subsequently stressed the importance of wage and labour reforms. In particular, attention 
centred on the vested interests delaying ‘reforms of the remuneration system in the public 
sector and of the wage bargaining system’ (European Commission, 2010b, p. 2). In response, 
the Troika required a “new law [which] establishes that firm-level agreements prevail over 
those under sector and occupational agreements without undue restrictions” as well as 
legislation removing impediments to temporary, fixed-term, and part-time work (European 
Commission, 2010b, p. 89)  
In line with Troika requirements, the Greek parliament approved a new round of labour 
reforms in December 2010. However, the Troika strongly criticized the Greek government for 
limiting the range of the reform and for its inability to implement the law swiftly (European 
Commission, 2011c). The Troika specifically criticised that the new law had been applied ‘as 
a tool for only limited wage decentralisation’ and not promoted ‘as a powerful instrument to 
increase employment and improve competitiveness’(European Commission, 2011c, p. 33).  
The effects of Greece’s wage decentralisation have been substantial in international 
perspective. Together with Ireland and Romania, Greece was the only EU member state that 
radically changed the primary level of wage bargaining (Waddington, et al., 2019). Whereas 
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the sectoral level dominated in pre-crisis Greece, post-crisis legal and institutional reforms 
brought about a ‘significant extent of bargaining contraction and decentralisation’ to the 
company level (Koukiadaki & Grimshaw, 2016).  
Given the potentially significant distributional consequences of an upheaval of the 
Greek public sector and labour markets, the Commission also emphasized the programme’s 
‘socially-balanced approach’ protecting ‘the most vulnerable’ (European Commission, 2010f, 
p. 33). Nevertheless, the Commission noted, ‘the social costs (of the policies) are significant’, 
with ‘social unrest and acute political tensions’ constituting obvious risks to the programme’s 
implementation (European Commission, 2010f, p. 34) Therefore, the programme sought to 
protect low-income groups from the planned wage and entitlement cuts (point 8 in the 
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP), European Commission, 2010f).  
The extensive rhetorical commitment to a socially balanced adjustment approach 
reflects the competing hegemonic projects involved in designing the terms of the bailout. As 
such, these social commitments reflect political compromises in the Eurogroup and the Troika 
institutions. They also reflect the broader context of social upheaval in Greece and beyond. 
Beyond the acknowledgement – or fear – of the danger of social unrest, the social provisions 
of the agreements between Greece and the Troika delineate a specific and limited role for the 
Greek government. The EU expected the Greek government to liberalise labour markets and 
enforce wage cuts, while protection the most vulnerable groups better. This compromise 
severely limited the Greek governments’ ability to intervene in the allocation of resources in 
society. It left the government with the diminished task of alleviating the worst forms of social 
hardship brought about by the apparently necessary competitive adjustment. In the context of 
a dictated ‘realignment of incomes to sustainable levels’ to restore budget balances and 
competitiveness, the agreement’s assurances of social fairness would be difficult to uphold 
(point 7 in the MEFP, European Commission, 2010f). In addition, the public sector cuts 
involved a substantial reduction in social spending, meaning that the adjustment targeted the 
Greek working class twice: both as wage earners and as social welfare recipients (Roos, 2019). 
The effects of these changes were therefore not only industrial or economic, but also social and 
political. After 2010, the level of social unrest increased in Greece, begging the question of 
whether new political projects could emerge from the ground. 
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5.6.2. Intensifying reform efforts and growing social unrest in Greece 
As noted above, the EU had foreseen ‘social unrest and acute political tensions’ as a 
result of its bailout programme, and it did not take long before this started to materialise through 
occupations, demonstrations, and mass strikes in Athens and other major Greek cities. The first 
major strike took place on 5 May 2010, accompanied by a major demonstration and deadly 
riots in Athens (BBC, 2010). However, it was in spring 2011 that a coherent anti-austerity 
movement gathered pace in Greece. Inspired by the Spanish Indignados movement, 25 May 
2011 marked the first day of the prolonged occupation of the Syntagma Square in Athens 
(Vogiatzoglou, 2017). The anti-austerity movements marked the beginning of one of the most 
successful counter-hegemonic forces in European integration in recent decades. As this 
movement eventually had to consider how to change existing hegemonic competition and 
political compromises at the European level, critical integration theory helps illustrate the set 
of tensions and contradictions that faced Greece’s emergent, counter-hegemonic force.  
Greece’s social unrest gathered steam while its economic recession worsened. In 
response to the worsening economic situation, the EU and the IMF prepared for a completely 
new bailout package. At the same time, they were drawing up considerable stronger policy 
conditionality in an updated MoU for the first bailout. The July 2011 updated MoU effectively 
made it the responsibility of the government to ensure the alignment of ‘wage developments 
with productivity developments at firm level’ (European Commission, 2011b, p. 127). The July 
2011 updated MoU also contained provisions to bring public sector wages in line with the 
private sector norms and to ‘decompress the wage structure to better reward performance’ 
(European Commission, 2011b, p. 86). In addition, the updated agreement required ‘cuts in the 
public sector wage bill (…) achieved by eliminating most allowances in the context of a 
comprehensive wage grid reform and an increase in working hours’ (European Commission, 
2011b, p. 2). Simultaneously, a new medium-term fiscal strategy announced ‘the 
implementation [in the public sector] of the rule of 1 recruitment for 10 exits in 2011’ leading 
to an estimated 20% reduction in public sector workforce in four years (European Commission, 
2011b, p. 25). Further, the strategy announced an ‘increase in the weekly working hours for 
public sector employees’ and reduction in overtime payments and allowances (European 
Commission, 2011b, p. 142). 
Based on critical integration theory, I argue that the policy conditionalities of the bailout 
packages depend on the on-going hegemonic competition in the EU. The Greek policy 
conditionalities were an emergent outcome of the contingent combination of structurally 
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emboldened EMU creditor states and strong neoliberal economic views proliferating in those 
member states. The updated MoU of July 2011 included de-facto requirements imposed on the 
Greek government to test its willingness to commit to a more general reconfiguration of Greek 
labour markets than envisioned in the initial MoU. As such, the fundamental conditionality for 
continued financial assistance evolved from fiscal consolidation to a broader societal 
transformation. This reflected the compromise at the EU level to expand EMU governance 
from fiscal to macroeconomic policy with the introduction of the MIP, which included 
targeting labour costs and labour markets more directly. Greece was part of a broader European 
turn to labour as an instrument for achieving macroeconomic adjustment. 
The fixation on Greek labour as a central macroeconomic adjustment variable did not 
involve relaxation of the conditionality of fiscal consolidation. As the political focus turned 
increasingly on Greek labour, the effect was a more long-term adjustment channel. In short, it 
would take time to adjust wages and employment conditions in Greece, and even longer for 
this adjustment to help bring down Greek debt. Therefore, it was increasingly necessary to act 
on Greece’s debt sustainability. As such, debt restructuring became integral to EU institutions’ 
preparations for Greece’s second bailout package. In July 2011, Greece, the Troika institutions, 
and international private creditors, agreed on what the latter had calculated to be a 21% debt 
“haircut”. This level of debt restructuring was a condition of the German government, which 
required substantial private sector involvement, but it was a level of restructuring most likely 
insufficient to make Greece’s debt sustainable, and did in fact not involve any real debt relief 
(Tooze, 2018, pp. 384–389, 404–408; Zettelmeyer et al., 2013). Three months later, the 
European leaders, the IMF, and the private creditors agreed on a 50% haircut of privately held 
debt as the condition for a second bailout package. This way, creditor haircuts and bailout 
packages were now fully intertwined, with a 200bn euro debt restructuring agreed to bolster 
the sustainability of Greece’s debt before launching a new bailout package.  
Greece’s ability to pay back even its restructured debt obligations depended greatly on 
an immediate and sustained economic recovery. In the eyes of the EU institutions, this 
transformation required substantial cuts in wages and labour costs. Depressingly, therefore, the 
European Commission noted that “(d)espite a considerable reduction in per capita income, 
downward rigidities in wage-setting systems have prevented the necessary adjustment of 
private sector wages, thus contributing to a sharp increase in unemployment” (European 
Commission, 2011a, p. 35) and prolonged economic recession.  To promote fiscal and wage 
adjustment, the agreed adjustment of public sector wages was front-loaded for immediate 
implementation, with legislation planned to lower average wages by 17% (European 
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Commission, 2011a). Further, to reduce downward wage rigidity, the government agreed to 
suspend ‘the extension of occupational and sectoral collective agreements … to give flexibility 
to firms and their staff in order to agree wage setting at the firm-level’ (European Commission, 
2011a, p. 36). From the perspective of critical integration theory, these agreements show an 
increased fixation on labour and wage flexibility as a solution to the structural flaws in the 
EMU and their repercussions for Greece’s economy. The bailout conditions forced Greek 
labour to show the adaptability that the EMU institutional structures lack. 
Politically, these frontloaded requirements were putting Greek Prime Minister 
Papandreou under severe domestic pressure: The Syntagma square occupation, started on 25 
May, ended in two days of violent and costly clashes between protestors and the police in June 
2011. In October, a two-day general strike culminated in demonstrations involving up to 
500.000 protestors and violent clashes in Athens’ streets (Vogiatzoglou, 2017). Politically, 
PASOK MPs were splitting from the party in protest over the continued austerity measures. 
Ultimately, in November 2011 Papandreou proposed to hold a referendum on the second 
bailout package. After strong opposition from European leaders, Papandreou was not only 
forced to back down on his referendum promise, but to step down as prime minister in order to 
gather support for a left-right coalition government under a technocratic leader, former ECB 
vice-president Lucas Papademos.  
With a new bailout package agreed in October, and a technocratic, ECB-aligned prime 
minister installed in November 2011, everything suggested that the terms of the second bailout 
could be spelled out during winter 2012. Yet, in February 2012, reports emerged that Troika 
representatives had made an immediate 25% cut in both the minimum wage and public sector 
wages a central condition for finally agreeing on the second bailout. The Greek counter-offer, 
which included a 3-year wage freeze was firmly rejected by the Troika (Hope & Spiegel, 2012). 
Even under Papademos’ technocratic government, the relationship between Greece and the 
Troika institutions was characterised by conflict. However, edging closer to the prospect of 
bankruptcy, the Greek parliament approved an extensive round of austerity measures on 12 
February 2012, including a 22% minimum wage cut, clearing the way to an agreement on the 
second bailout before the expected point of bankruptcy in March 2012.  
With the second programme of 2012, ‘implementation of the growth-enhancing 
structural reform agenda [gained] prominence in the overall implementation of the programme’ 
(European Commission, 2012a, p. 1). These measures were triggered primarily by a much 
larger than expected contraction in domestic output. The 2010 bailout was based on a 
macroeconomic framework forecasting a cumulative GDP contraction of 8.6% in the 2009-
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2011 period, after which real GDP growth was expected to pick up (European Commission, 
2010f, p. 17). The Greek economy instead shrank by almost 19% in the same period and 
contracted by more than 25% before stabilizing in 2014 (see table 5.2). While the success of 
the first bailout hinged upon fiscal contraction having only a small impact on aggregate 
demand, in fact the negative effects of the austerity measures showed how the Greek economy 
in significant parts hinged upon government expenditure.  
The greater-than-expected contraction of the Greek economy did not cause a greater 
rethink on the role of wage and labour policies in the process of economic adjustment. As the 
pre-crisis boom and crisis bust revealed, government expenditure and private debt-led 
consumption generated aggregate demand and sustained Greek growth rates. Earlier in this 
thesis, I have described the relationship between Greece’s comparatively, but not excessively, 
high wage inflation and Greece’s demand-led growth regime. With Greek wages under 
increasing pressure, and with employment rates falling, the contraction in Greece’s economy 
rapidly accelerated (table 5.2). Rather than acknowledging the growth-stimulating role of 
Greece’s existing demand institutions, including public sector employment, the EU institutions 
continued the strategy of internal devaluation. In fact, the Troika hardened its insistence on the 
necessity of ‘ambitious internal devaluation … (with) an upfront reduction in nominal wage 
and non-wage costs’ (European Commission, 2012a, p. 2). 
The 2012 bailout package rested on the agreement that Greece would not only lower 
the minimum wage by 22%, but also a general labour cost reduction of 15% (European 
Commission, 2012a, p. 3). Despite persistent so-called “downward rigidities in wage-setting 
systems” – essentially collective bargaining agreements protecting workers – which had 
“prevented the necessary adjustment of private sector wages”, the new bailout programme 
expected unit labour costs to decrease by 7.8% in 2012 alone (European Commission, 2012a, 
p. 9). Achieving a reduction in labour costs of almost 8% in one year, and 15 % over three 
years would be a remarkable cost-cutting achievement, albeit one with potentially significant 
social costs. After years of hitherto unseen levels of internal devaluation, the 2012-2014 
produced a cumulative 11% contraction in unit labour costs.10 
 
 
 
 
10 OECD Stat. Productivity and ULC by main economic activity.  
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PDBI_I4 
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Table 5.2. Greece annual GDP growth percentage 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Troika forecast -2 -4.0 -2.6 1.1 2.1 2.1 
IMF data -4.3 -5.5 -9.1 -7.3 -3.2 0.7 
  
5.6.3. The rise of SYRIZA  
The 2011 Athens occupations, demonstrations, and mass strikes not only undermined 
Papandreou’s leadership, but also signalled the coming reorganisation of Greek politics. At the 
6 May and 17 June 2012 elections, SYRIZA would win 16.8% and 26.9% of the votes, 
effectively replacing PASOK as the left-of-centre option in Greece’s two-party political 
system. Compared to the 2009 election that had brought PASOK back into power, in the 2012 
elections SYRIZA first tripled its votes from 4.6% and immediately after grew by another 
10%points (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014).  
As Katsambekis (2016; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014) argues, it was during this 
period that SYRIZA transformed from a youth movement mainly associated with anti-
globalisation protests and particular events such as the 2008 Greek riots following a police 
killing. Instead, it increasingly turned into a left-populist party aiming to represent the popular 
resistance to bailout conditionality austerity. However, SYRIZA also continued its close 
association with civil protests, which intensified in reaction to the rollout of austerity measures 
(Vogiatzoglou, 2017). The successful transformation of SYRIZA would then come to rest on 
a general legitimation of the civil disobedience that SYRIZA both participated in and sought 
to represent (Katsambekis, 2016).  
Building strong rhetorical and personal links to the anti-austerity protest movement, 
SYRIZA committed to the project of reinvigorating the Greek society through the instalment 
of ‘the sovereign people’ and direct democracy (SYRIZA, 2015, cited/translated in 
Katsambekis, 2016). At the same time, SYRIZA’s leadership committed to Greece’s continued 
membership of the EMU and sought to build an alliance of progressive forces in peripheral 
member states (Spiegel, 2013). While the SYRIZA’s position mirrored the sentiments of many 
citizens, its pro-euro, anti-austerity stance pitted the SYRIZA leadership against other Greek 
left parties and the party’s left wing.  
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The SYRIZA strategy invoked two images of European political cooperation at once: 
the democratic power of the sovereign people and the creation of a progressive European 
alliance. For SYRIZA, like many other radical left parties, restoring the sovereign people to 
take back democratic control over economic policies was a project that ultimately runs through 
the powers and institutions of the nation state, including sovereign states’ right to reject the 
demands of international creditors.  
Therefore, SYRIZA were embracing “national and popular sovereignty”, while 
appealing to a European alliance of insurgent left-wing movements. Sovereignty was always 
understood in relation to the EU, particularly the Eurogroup. In this image, the relationship 
with the EU has been thought of as a question of wrestling for power in a zero-sum game, 
which has been reiterated by leading left-wing politicians and observers, such as Costas 
Lapavitsas (2019). Building European alliances, conversely, appealed to the image of 
international alliances’ constitutive power in transforming European integration. SYRIZA’s 
project always depended on the realisation of the second imaginary: that of building a 
progressive alliance to forge a counter-hegemonic project to the EU doctrine of fiscal discipline 
and internal devaluation. Yet, squaring the narrative of national sovereignty with the rhetoric 
of transformative-international alliances relied on the alleged distinction between the 
institutions and the potential of European integration.  
The domestic economic policy programme that had brought SYRIZA to power in the 
first place, announced in Thessaloniki in September 2014, prioritised a write-off of ‘the greater 
part’ of Greece’s public debt, with the remaining bulk to be repaid only once economic growth 
had been restored (SYRIZA, 2014). In budgetary terms, this would involve ending the EU 
institutional requirement of Greek primary surpluses. As for wage and labour policy, the 
Thessaloniki programme announced a gradual restoration of wages and pension. Specific 
policy proposals included the ‘restitution of the Christmas bonus’ for low-income pensioners; 
the ‘restoration of the minimum wage to €751’; ‘restitution of the institutional framework to 
protect employment rights’; abolition of relaxed layoff regulations; restitution of collective 
agreement frameworks; and an employment programme for 300.000 new jobs at a price of 3bn 
euros (SYRIZA, 2014). 
To fulfil any of these proposals, it would require SYRIZA to annul the 2nd MoU and 
renegotiating a new agreement with the Troika creditors. After coming first in the European 
Parliament elections in May 2014, SYRIZA started to poll consistently above 30%, and secured 
36.3% of the votes at the January 2015 general elections. Able to form a coalition government 
with the right-wing, Eurosceptic party Independent Greeks (ANEL), SYRIZA began 
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negotiations with Eurozone finance ministers and Eurogroup officials in late January 2015 
(Varoufakis, 2017). Within days of initiating negotiations, the Greek government announced 
its refusal to accept the conditions for the final instalment (or sub-tranche) of the second bailout 
package. Immediately, the ECB acted to put the Greek government under severe pressure by 
making ‘the provision of liquidity to Greek banks (…) harder and more expensive 
(Theodoropoulou, 2016, p. 16). Unable to convince European leaders of the virtue of 
renegotiating the policy conditionalities and debt obligations under the 2nd bailout programme, 
the Greek government eventually agreed to extending the programme. However, with serious 
disagreements persisting between Greece, on the one side, and the EU institutions and most 
European political leaders, on the other, Greece remained under severe liquidity pressures 
throughout spring 2015. This contributed to yet another economic downturn in an economy 
that had otherwise stabilized in 2014 after a five-year long recession. 
The public referendum in June 2015, in which Greek voters overwhelmingly supported 
the government’s rejection of the Troika’s condition for concluding the 2nd bailout 
programme, failed to change the relationship between Greece and its institutional creditors. For 
their part, European leaders seemed mostly uninterested in rethinking the strategy for dealing 
with Greece and the SYRIZA government. Instead, it emerged that EU leaders were drawing 
up contingency plans for the likely humanitarian crisis in case of a disorderly Grexit 
(Theodoropoulou, 2016). The public referendum, rather than giving the SYRIZA project an 
advantage in negotiations to change debtor-creditor relations within the Eurozone, became 
symbolic for the unravelling of SYRIZA’s alternative European project. As the SYRIZA-led 
government eventually capitulated to their European counterparts and accepted a 3rd bailout 
programme with more extensive and much tougher policy conditionalities than in the previous 
programmes.  
The 3rd programme underpinned in particular the need for an ‘ambitious reform of the 
pension system’ to compensate for the accumulated obstacles and delays in reforming the 
pension systems since the first bailout (Eurogroup, 2015). Further, the EU institutions, under 
the auspice of the Eurogroup, stressed the importance of ‘a significantly strengthened 
privatisation programme’ under the governance of an independent, depoliticised privatisation 
fund (Eurogroup, 2015). The third bailout programme further required the Greek government 
to generate savings of 0.5% of GDP annually by reforming a series of social security schemes. 
The government also committed to rolling out a guaranteed minimum income scheme targeting 
the poorest and most vulnerable (European Commission, 2015a, p. 17). Concerning labour 
reform, the MoU stipulated a comprehensive review process to bring “collective dismissal and 
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industrial action frameworks and collective bargaining” in line with the European best practices 
with the view to strengthen employment incentives and supporting inclusive growth.  
EU intervention into the governance of wages and labour in Greece changed 
dramatically because of the financial crisis, as Greece’s deficit- and debt-levels rapidly soared 
after 2008. The EMU, which had provided for massive inflow of cheap credit as well as 
historically low interest rates on government bonds, was unable to facilitate a solution to the 
Greek crisis within the existing institutional framework. Instead, a novel political innovation – 
a Troika of institutions both within and outside the EU – was required to unlock the situation. 
In return for a bailout of the Greek government, the Eurogroup of Eurozone Finance Ministers 
and the EU institutions in the Troika demanded a combination of strict fiscal discipline and 
severe wage cuts to restore cost competitiveness. During 2010, as it became clear that the initial 
bailout package was far from enough to restore Greece’s economy and debt sustainability, the 
EU institutions increasingly targeted Greece’s labour markets in an attempt to make the more 
fundamental reconfiguration of the Greek political economy the condition for another bailout.   
Coinciding with the broadening of the scope of the EU’s policy conditionalities, Greek 
popular discontent with the austerity programme was beginning to translate into decisive 
political change. Yet, quickly upon entering government, the contradictions of the SYRIZA 
project materialised. From the perspective of critical integration theory, SYRIZA’s strategy of 
defending the potentiality of European integration while fighting its institutional reality was 
ultimately untenable.  
To be sure, insurgent ideas and movements have transformed European institutions, 
even radically so. For instance, the once insurgent brand of Thatcherite neoliberalism 
transformed European integration via the European Single Act, although Europe’s eventual 
Single Market was not created in her image. Yet, the recent history of the EU, including the 
creation of the Single Market, suggests that “radical” ideas and movements transform European 
integration by working from within the institutions. Alternatively, they may seek to disrupt the 
institutional framework through (threats of) withdrawal (e.g. Brexit) or by wilfully breaching 
the Union’s fundamental values (e.g. Hungary and Poland). While the disruptive effects of 
such movements may be tangible, their institutional-transformative potential nonetheless 
remains unrealized. Critical integration theory stresses the path-dependencies of EU 
institutional change, including in the event of emerging political projects at the domestic and 
EU levels. This complicates processes of institutional transformation and makes EU 
institutions difficult channels for the formation of transnational alliances. Instead, the creation 
of powerful European hegemonic projects depends on the formation of increasingly 
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transnational social groups. The role of European industrial and financial capital in the 
formation of the European neoliberal project is the case in point (van Apeldoorn, 2002). 
In the absence of a new progressive European project, SYRIZA could not uphold the 
two narratives of popular sovereignty formulated against EU intervention and in favour of 
European transformation through transnational alliances. After the referendum to reject the 
EU’s demands for a third bailout package, the party’s leaders deemed the political and 
economic costs of a disruptive break with the European institutions unbearable. Rather than 
unilateral default followed by a Greek exit from the EMU and potentially from the EU, the 
SYRIZA-led government capitulated to the demands of the EU institutions. This way, 
SYRIZA’s popular rise and its eventual fall to the demands of the EU reflects the processes of 
institutional reproduction and occasional transformation. Contesting the principles of European 
monetary integration, including the dominance of creditor states in times of crisis, SYRIZA 
was bound to either succeed in transforming the EU institutions and the already established 
creditor-debtor relations - or contribute to their reproduction. SYRIZA arguably reproduced 
the EMU framework by eventually capitulating and thereby supporting Greece’s continued 
membership of the single currency.     
 
5.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the evolution of EU labour governance in the post-crisis EU 
landscape. In this chapter, I have argued that there is an absence of deeper political hegemony 
in EU labour governance, which allows for superficial compromises but restricts structural and 
institutional transformations. The evolution of labour governance within the EU economic 
governance framework has taken place through the new institutions of the European Semester 
and the MIP. As I have argued in this chapter, the absence of political hegemony has resulted 
in a large degree of continuity when comparing EU labour governance practices before and 
after the financial crisis. In particular, the practice of performance management techniques, 
including benchmarking and other elements of ‘governance-at-a-distance’, has allowed the 
European Commission as the central EU institution to develop and reproduce EU labour 
governance in the absence of hegemony. Attempts to install greater institutional 
transformation, via the Euro-Plus Pact or a Eurozone budget, has proven unable to materialise 
in the absence of hegemony. 
The Greek crisis and ensuing bailout programme provide a test case for my argument on the 
absence of deeper political hegemony. I have shown in this chapter that Greece has indeed 
undergone severe neoliberal adjustment, which has upended Greek labour markets and its 
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welfare state. However, the Greek case also adds to a picture of great geographical and 
institutional differentiation in EU labour governance. In Greece, EU labour governance took 
on the form of coercion, as the Troika institutions instructed the Greek government on the 
labour market reforms required to avoid default. Comparable processes have taken place in 
other programme countries. For most EMU member states, EU labour governance has hitherto 
not relied on sanctions. This political and institutional differentiation reflects the continued 
hegemonic competition over EU labour governance, and the very different power 
constellations that develops in the case of bailouts versus institutional reform. In the case of 
bailouts, the preferences of very few actors, particularly the German government, are decisive 
and thoroughly shape the institutional form and political-economic content of labour 
governance. In the case of institutional reform, a broader set of actors, with preferences and 
identities rooted at the domestic level in different member states may constrain efforts to 
transform EU labour governance. In the absence of structural transformation, EU labour 
governance in the context of EMU remains underdeveloped as an EU project. 
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Conclusion 
This conclusion summarises the key findings of the thesis and analyses the current state of EU 
labour governance in the context of the EMU.  
 
Summary of findings and contributions 
This thesis has studied the evolution of EU labour governance since the move to 
monetary union in the late 1980s. In particular, it has addressed the relationship between EU 
labour governance and the EMU. The key objective has been to address why and how EU 
labour governance has evolved over the last three decades and analysing what difference the 
financial crisis made. When Europe moved towards monetary union and a single currency, 
developments in EU labour governance did not match up. The EU did not develop a 
comprehensive framework for ensuring labour market liberalisation within the Eurozone, and 
neither did the EU build a framework for supporting employment and stimulating the economy 
in times of crises. Instead, a range of strategies and procedures for labour governance 
developed alongside but detached from monetary integration.  
EU labour governance, as it developed during the 1990s and 2000s suffered from 
structural and institutional weaknesses. The wave of social democratic leaders entering 
European politics in the late 1990s embraced the use of performance management techniques 
like benchmarking, which in turn helped overcome reluctance to EU labour governance from 
centre-right policy-makers. During this period, the project of EU labour governance remained 
institutionally weak and ineffective in assisting European integration and bringing economic 
convergence forward. The growing macroeconomic imbalances, the lack of real economic 
convergence, and the benign neglect with which European leaders treated these issues, are all 
illustrative of this. Nonetheless, domestic labour market strategies of inter alia wage 
moderation and deregulation nurtured EU-level labour governance. Shaped by the strengthened 
neoliberal hegemonic project of the 2000s, the EU increasingly targeted cost competitiveness 
as the guiding objective of domestic structural reform. Recent evolution in EU labour 
governance reflects the enduring competition of EU hegemonic projects. When the Eurozone 
crisis accelerated from early 2010, European leaders passed a series of reforms to EU labour 
governance via reforms to the EMU’s macroeconomic governance framework. The integration 
of labour governance within the EMU has led to radical change in the social organisation of 
selected member states but has not led to comprehensive labour market liberalisation across 
the monetary union. EU labour governance since the crisis takes place through differentiated 
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interventions, putting workers in crisis member states under severe pressure. Effectively, this 
strategy strengthens the tendencies in the EMU towards greater inequalities and political and 
economic instability. 
The thesis has stressed the importance of the EMU for Europe’s labour markets and 
vice versa. Analysing how EU labour governance has evolved since the first moves towards 
the Euro currency in the 1980s, this thesis has contributed to the European integration literature. 
One of the big gambles of the EMU was to establish separate layers of political responsibility 
for labour and monetary governance. At the domestic level, member state governments would 
remain responsible for macro-economically sound employment and wage policies. The launch 
of the EMU placed the responsibility for monetary policy at the supranational level, delegated 
to the (governing council of the) ECB. Entering a union with a single currency, EMU member 
states have also ceded the macroeconomic adjustment tool of currency readjustment. The 
separation of the political responsibility for monetary and labour governance has produced 
contentious results.   
The academic literature on EU labour governance often neglects the contentious 
relationship between labour governance and European monetary integration. Academic 
observers have noted the constraints on domestic social policy (spending) set by the EMU, and 
the interdependencies that arise from economic and monetary integration (Trubek & Trubek, 
2005). The literature then tends to explain the underdevelopment of EU-level labour 
governance by referring either to adverse policy coalitions or to national interests. Other times, 
focus is on the ideological content or the degree of intrusiveness of EU labour governance (de 
la Porte & Heins, 2015a; Zeitlin & Vanhercke, 2018). In either case, these studies rarely 
interrogate the deeper social causes of the enduring political disagreements over labour 
governance. In addition, the existing literature mostly neglect the dynamics that is unleashed 
from the policy disequilibrium between European monetary integration and EU labour 
governance. This thesis has contributed to the existing literature on EU governance by stressing 
the contentious politics of EU labour governance and the important role competing hegemonic 
projects play in reproducing the EU’s deficient efforts to bring convergence and stability to 
Europe’s labour markets. Further, this thesis has explicitly analysed EU labour governance in 
the dual context of monetary integration and economic globalization. 
Analysing the relationship between EU labour governance and the EMU, this thesis has 
also contributed to the literature on European political economy. Labour markets are complex 
social structures that constitute an essential part of Europe’s political economy. The ability to 
pursue macroeconomic policies conducive to employment creation is arguably important for 
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the political legitimacy of governments. Given the close relationship between employment, 
inflation, and money supply, labour governance and monetary policy are intimately connected.  
The enduring power relations and social struggles that constitute labour markets make labour 
governance a complicated social phenomenon. Social groups struggle over wages, regulations, 
institutions, etc., which complicates government interventions.  
A multi-level polity with supranational monetary policy and domestic labour market 
institutions only exaggerates the difficulties for macroeconomic coordination and political 
legitimacy. In the context of economic globalization, social struggles over labour governance 
have resulted in growing economic inequalities and instability. This thesis has demonstrated 
how the evolution of labour governance amplifies rather than lessens the problems of inequality 
and instability in the EMU. Focusing on the competition of hegemonic projects, the thesis has 
argued that enduring political conflict throughout the EU multilevel polity causes these 
problems. This way, the thesis has provided a novel interpretation of EU labour governance of 
relevance to EU studies as well as IPE.  
This thesis has advanced critical integration theory, and in particular the concept of 
competing hegemonic projects, to conceptualise the contested development of EU labour 
governance. To do this, the thesis has argued for the necessity of reconsidering European 
integration and discussing the social theories that underpin contrasting theoretical approaches 
to European integration. In contrast to the main theories of integration pursuing parsimonious 
explanations for European integration, this thesis has advanced a critical theory of integration 
that incorporates material and ideational structures, and institutional as well as macro-
structures (Chapter 1). Pushing a concept of the political and economic forces capable of 
reforming those structures, the thesis has argued for the utility of understanding agency in 
relation to structures through the concept of hegemonic projects. Due to the enduring nature of 
structures, and the comparatively shorter lifespan of political and economic agency, the task of 
transforming structures is difficult. However, structures also depend on the reproduction of 
supportive ideas, adequate institutions, etc., and therefore agency. Hegemonic projects 
designate comprehensive programmes of political and economic action that are capable of 
operating within existing political and economic orders and institutions.  
In EU labour governance and European monetary integration, pro-European social 
democratic and neoliberal hegemonic projects have dominated political contestation. However, 
the ongoing hegemonic competition in European integration, including labour governance and 
monetary integration, has not facilitated the creation of an integrated institutional framework 
for governing labour within the EMU (Chapter 2). Therefore, the EMU has facilitated a range 
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of political and economic crises tendencies with severe consequences for European labour: 
divergence in living standards as well as competitiveness levels within the Eurozone; the rise 
of wage moderation and anti-labour redistribution in response to economic globalization; and 
the rise of macroeconomic imbalances which triggered the Eurozone crisis.   
Empirically, the thesis has highlighted the political conflicts and hegemonic 
competition that has shaped the evolution of EU labour governance since leading European 
policymakers first moved towards monetary integration in the late 1970s. In the 1980s, 
domestic economic and political concerns were gradually drawing Europe’s leaders towards 
the idea of a monetary union with a single currency (Chapter 3). Using critical integration 
theory, the thesis has analysed domestic contestation over monetary policy in the context of 
global structural forces. The thesis has highlighted the slowdown in economic dynamism after 
the mid-1970s that pushed domestic demand for monetary integration, particularly in Germany. 
At the same time, economic instability pushed French leaders towards championing the idea 
of a single currency. All this took place in the post-Bretton Woods context of floating exchange 
rates.  
Under Delors’ reign as European Commission president, EU labour governance as well 
as European monetary integration accelerated in ambitions and effort. Yet, neither the criteria 
for EMU membership nor the framework for EMU governance addressed the performance and 
governance of Europe’s labour markets. The EMU institutional structure reflected the relative 
dominance of the preferences of German state actors, in particular the federal government and 
the Bundesbank. Therefore, EMU rules-based governance addressed fiscal discipline and price 
stability, which came with consequences for inter alia wage bargaining and labour market 
policy. However, there was little institutional integration of EU labour governance and 
monetary integration; instead, EU labour governance developed alongside, but separate from 
the EMU. Initiated by the Delors Commission, and since led by the wave of social democratic 
governments rising to power in the late 1990s, the EU developed a set of procedures for 
coordinating member state labour policy under the common objectives of competitiveness, 
employment, and social inclusion. While centre-right governments remained sceptical about 
EU labour governance, European leaders successfully launched new modes of labour 
governance based on benchmarking, peer review, and other ‘soft’ policy tools inspired by 
performance management.  
At the domestic level, trade unions, employers, and government actors had responded 
to global macro-structural transformations by promoting tripartite social pacts and other 
strategies of wage moderation. By the late 1990s, domestic wage moderation strategies had 
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caused a significant redistribution between labour and capital in the Eurozone. In 1998, wages 
amounted to 56.6% of total income; by comparison, in the 1960-1985 period, the wage share 
was constantly between 61% and 66%, reaching its periodic high in 1975 (Figure 4.1). The 
redistribution from labour to capital would eventually destabilise the Eurozone. Once 12 
member states had introduced the Euro between 1999 and 2001, this permanently removed 
some important domestic macroeconomic policy instruments, including interest rate and 
exchange rate adjustments. This meant that member states would be unable to respond to 
growing divergence in the Eurozone by currency devaluation or expansionary monetary policy. 
As the Eurozone crisis demonstrated, growing economic divergence among EMU member 
states threatened to undermine the project of monetary integration. In the absence of an 
integrated EU labour governance framework, the EU had little direct control over these 
developments. 
In this thesis, I have also followed post-Keynesian economics in arguing that growing 
inequality and redistribution from labour to capital caused the crisis (Chapter 4). This is 
because redistribution away from wage income lowers aggregate demand and increases 
economies’ dependence on exports and debt. Facilitating both exports and access to cheap 
credit, the EMU facilitated member states’ reliance on these sources of growth. Adding to the 
existing contributions of post-Keynesian economics, I have analysed the domestic political 
contestation and class conflict that facilitated the rise of debt- and export-led economies. In 
addition, analysing EU-level governance as reliant on competing hegemonic projects, I have 
analysed how EU institutions, and in particular the European Commission, approached the 
growing problem of macroeconomic imbalances. Importantly, by the time the Commission 
ended its practice of neglecting the issue of macroeconomic imbalances, the balance of power 
between social democratic and neoliberal policy-makers had tilted in favour of the latter. Under 
the dominance of neoliberal political leaders, EU labour governance remained an essentially 
contested project of European integration. Hegemonic competition at the domestic level 
resulted in great variation of labour market reforms. In Germany, the neoliberal trajectory of 
Schröder’s Neue Mitte project led to far-reaching labour market liberalization in the decade 
before the financial crisis. In other EMU member states, including the Netherlands, wage 
moderation had long constituted the basis for a compromise between labour market social 
partners. However, at the EU level, there was little appetite for fundamental EU reforms 
following the EU’s constitutional crisis. Therefore, the degree of EU intrusiveness was low, 
and there was little integration of labour governance into the EMU institutional framework. 
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After the financial crisis, and at the height of the Eurozone crisis, momentum for deeper 
EU labour governance in the Eurozone was growing. This is seen by the prominence of labour 
costs and structural reform in the MIP, in the adjustment programmes in Greece (and other 
crisis countries), and in the efforts to establish a contractual Competitiveness Pact (the Euro-
Plus Pact). I have argued that EU labour governance, even after the crisis, remained a highly 
contested emergent project in European integration (Chapter 5). Political contestation over the 
content and procedures of EU labour governance continued, but the Eurozone crisis had 
reinforced existing power relations. While the EMU institutional structure had reflected the 
preferences of German state actors and the dominance of the neoliberal project in Germany, 
developments in the first decade of the Euro currency had reinforced the export growth model 
at the Eurozone core.  
This way, the preferences of German, Dutch, and Austrian state actors had consolidated 
around the neoliberal project of European integration. During the financial and Eurozone 
crises, the preferences of this alliance of creditor member state actors aligned with the EMU 
institutional framework and the forces unleashed in global financial markets. Aligned with the 
EU institutions and global macrostructures, state actors in creditor member states were able to 
push through much more intrusive labour governance in member states requiring financial aid. 
Even if the neoliberal project of European integration had not overcome social democratic 
competition, the empowerment of creditor member states opened up the possibility of imposing 
structural reforms in some crisis countries. 
In the case of Greece, this allowed a project of EU labour governance that 
fundamentally transformed labour markets and society. Under the conditions of the EMU’s no 
bailout clause, Europe’s political leaders and central bankers were first reluctant to act when 
the sovereign debt crisis accelerated in Greece and started spreading from there. Following the 
delayed decision to bail out Greece, European leaders agreed on a MoU that started the process 
of transforming the living conditions and rights of labour in Greece, a process that has been 
reinforced by updated memoranda and new bailout programmes.    
 
The current state of EU governance and its relationship to the EMU 
Given the enduring tensions in EU labour governance that I have highlighted in this 
thesis, I find it relevant to reflect on the current state of this contested project of European 
integration and its relationship to the EMU. By the time of writing this conclusion, October 
2019, it has been a decade since the first escalation of Ireland and Greece’s combined financial 
and sovereign debt crises. During this decade, Europe’s single currency has moved from the 
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existential threat of the accelerating financial and sovereign debt crisis after 2009, to economic 
stabilisation following the ECB’s decisive intervention in 2012. Despite stability, the Euro is 
still under pressure. Institutional reform efforts have often been slow and characterised by 
indecision and inconclusive results. Latest, Eurozone economic performance slowed to 0.2% 
in the second quarter of 2019 (Reuters, 2019).  
In the post-crisis period, the emergent project of labour governance of European 
integration has still been characterised by political contestation. Despite the relative dominance 
of the neoliberal hegemonic project that allowed for major restructuring in e.g. Greece, EU 
labour governance is characterised hegemonic competition. Recently, hegemonic competition 
has materialised in political conflict over the relationship between EU funding, the EMU’s 
macroeconomic stabilisation needs, and domestic structural reforms. Like the MIP, the 
compromise on a Eurozone budget, the BICC, straddles the project of EU labour governance 
and the issue of Eurozone macroeconomic stabilisation. The BIIC compromise reached in June 
2019 left open the arguably crucial question of financing.  
Beyond the politics of EU labour governance, the European electorate has deserted the 
political centre in favour of the radical left and populist right (Lynch & Hopkin, 2018). This 
too signals the fragile dominance of the neoliberal hegemonic project in European integration 
as well as the evolving forms of hegemonic competition. The French, Dutch, and Greek social 
democratic parties are among the most prominent casualties of the infusion of electoral 
instability into European politics in the aftermath of the financial crisis. This feeds back into 
the dynamics of why and how EU labour governance evolves. In Italy, for instance, the 2018-
2019 coalition government of the (neoliberal) far-right Lega and the Five Star Movement 
reversed some key labour market and pension reforms, initiated constraints on non-standard 
employment, and proposed early retirement. This way, the (now former) Italian government 
broke the consensus established between the preceding Democratic government and the 
European Commission on what constituted sustainable labour market regulation and pension 
policy. The rise of right-wing challenges to the European policy consensus is an example of 
the new forms of contestation over EU labour governance in period since the crisis. In the 
Italian case, the rise of new political movements and the surge of a former peripheral, right-
wing party brought new elements of political contestation to domestic and EU labour 
governance, including conflict over the proposed citizen’s income.   
Despite political instability, the relative stabilisation of Europe’s economy means the 
single currency is no longer in danger of immanent collapse. The Eurozone has achieved 
relative economic stabilisation in the absence of political hegemony. Political leadership, 
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arguably, bears little responsibility for the delicate stabilisation. While European leaders were 
focusing on fiscal contraction and internal devaluation, it was ECB President Draghi’s forceful 
rhetoric and the ECB’s package of expansionary and unconventional monetary policy that 
calmed market pressure. Currently, no member states are in danger of sovereign default. 
Meanwhile, the German finance ministry has stopped drawing up plans for the expulsion of 
weaker members (Spiegel Online, 2011). The monetary context of EU labour governance is 
therefore no longer characterised by existential threat, but I argue, continued structural 
weakness. The primary structural weakness comes from the seeming inability to restore 
growth, and the unavailability of institutional capacity to stimulate the economy in case of 
another economic crisis.  
EU labour governance has been essential to the wider project of restoring Euro 
legitimacy after the crisis. This has happened through the promotion of investment for reform-
eager member states, the pursuit of consensual labour market reforms such as further education, 
and efforts to restore social dialogue at the EU-level. Yet, EU labour governance suffers from 
the EMU’s structural crisis tendencies and from political contestation over European 
integration. EU labour governance suffers from EMU structural weaknesses to the extent that 
the EMU continues to produce divergent outcomes for its member states with enduring 
potential for political and economic crisis. The longstanding issue of Eurozone economic 
divergence - as well as the structural forces unleashed by the EU policy response to the crisis 
- suggests that the governance of labour within the Eurozone remains in highly uncharted 
territory. There are several indicators of persistent divergence in the Eurozone. 
First, macroeconomic imbalances persist in the Eurozone. In Germany, high saving 
rates and strong export performance produce large current account surpluses. Since 2011, 
Germany’s current account surplus has remained consistently above the MIP threshold of 6%. 
In 2018, the Eurozone ran a current account surplus with the rest of the world of 3%. 
Nonetheless, eight EMU member states were running current account deficits in 2018. This 
highlights the disparity in macroeconomic positions of different EMU members.   
Second, the unemployment rate is another indicator of the continued divergence in the 
Eurozone. In Germany, unemployment was at 3.4% in 2018. Conversely, the unemployment 
rate in Greece was 19.3 % while in Spain it was 15.3%. Economic estimates suggest that while 
Germany has a natural rate of unemployment at 3.4%, Greece’s is 13.4%. According to 
standard economic reasoning, Greece’s economy remains cyclically depressed (with 
unemployment significantly above its natural rate) and structurally impeded (with natural 
unemployment about four times as high as in Germany). If it were true that Greece’s problem 
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was primarily structural unemployment, the solution would be continued structural reforms. 
Yet, seeing how the EU project of structural labour market reforms has combined with austerity 
to depress economic output in the Eurozone periphery, it is highly uncertain if more structural 
reforms would succeed in bringing down unemployment and raising living standards in the 
Eurozone periphery. 
Third, standards of living also continue to diverge in the Eurozone. Figure C.2 shows 
the unweighted average GDP per capita in five core member states (Austria, Germany, 
Belgium, Netherlands, and Finland), in four peripheral member states (Italy, Spain, Greece, 
and Portugal), as well as GDP per capita in France. The unweighted average GDP per capita 
in the Eurozone core is 37.475 EUR, while the similar figure for the Eurozone periphery is 
21.864 EUR (in 2018). By this measure, there is a 71% gap in core-periphery income. Further, 
the gap has been growing. Over the course of the last two decades, the GDP per capita has 
improved much more in the core than in the periphery. In the Eurozone core, the unweighted 
average GDP per capita has grown by 24% in 20 years. In the Eurozone periphery, the same 
average grew at a much slower rate: 10% in 20 years.  
 
  Figure C.2 
 
Periphery average is the non-weighted average of GDP per capita in Greece, Italy, Spain, 
and Portugal. Core average is the non-weighted average of GDP per capita in Austria, 
Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, and Finland. Source: AMECO, own calculations. 
 
Real economic divergence in the Eurozone - as illustrated by the divergence in current 
account balances, unemployment rates, and GDP - preceded the financial crisis. Divergence, 
therefore, is not the product of the crisis and its policy response. The EU policy response of 
austerity and the contested project of labour governance, however, has likely reproduced 
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Eurozone divergence. Requiring fiscal discipline combined with structural labour market 
reforms, EU rules and recommendations have helped rebalance government budgets and 
external balances by depressing domestic demand in the periphery (Interviewee #14; 
Interviewee #19). It has also brought economic stagnation and social decline to affected 
countries. In addition to cross-country divergence, functional inequality remains historically 
high. Overall, in the Eurozone 12, the share of income enjoyed by labour (the wage share) was 
at 55.5% in 2017.11 The EU’s core-periphery and capital-labour inequalities point to the 
potentially destabilizing effects of an EMU institutional structure unable to bring about real 
convergence in living standards across the EMU. The EU, meanwhile, promotes a policy 
package of state-backed financial market expansion and permanent austerity.  
Notwithstanding the requirements for balanced government budgets and pursuit of 
internal devaluation in crisis countries, there is persistent political contestation over labour 
reforms at the domestic and EU levels. As a result, many European countries have maintained 
extensive, if reconfigured welfare states as well as regulated, if reorganised labour markets. 
For instance, research by the European Trade Union Institute on collective bargaining shows 
how ‘the level of bargaining has remained constant in 13’ Western European countries in recent 
decades (Waddington, et al., 2019, p. 10).  
Yet, some crisis-struck member states in the Eurozone periphery, including Greece, 
have quite fundamentally transformed their existing social model (Waddington, et al., 2019, p. 
9). In Greece, EU labour governance in combination with fiscal austerity has caused significant 
domestic structural transformation. The primary structural effect of the Greek crisis, austerity 
measures, and internal devaluation, was the immediate decline in investment and consumption 
that led to the rapid rebalancing of Greece’s current account after 2009.12 Supporting this 
process of rebalancing the current account was also the pickup in exports between 2009 and 
2014, facilitated by the reduction of unit labour costs after 2010.13 The costs for the rebalancing 
of the current account has come in the form of social deterioration. The poverty rate rose from 
13% to 15%,14 and the disposable income dropped by between 7% and 11% per household four 
 
11 The Eurozone 12 refers the 12 countries that adopted the Euro currency between 1999 and 2001.  
12 Eurostat – Current account balance (percentage of GDP). 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tipsbp20&plugin=
1 
13 Eurostat – Exports of goods and services. 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00110. 
AMECO – Nominal unit labour costs: total economy. https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco 
14 OECD Data – Poverty rate. https://data.oecd.org/inequality/poverty-rate.htm 
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years in a row.15 The latter resulted in a drop in disposable income by 1/3 between 2009 and 
2013.   
This reorganisation of Greece’s socio-economic model has taken place within the 
institutional context of the Troika institutions and the bailout (financial assistance) programme.  
Critical integration theory stresses the importance of institutions, larger macrostructures, and 
hegemonic projects. Institutionally, the power relations inside the bailout programme made the 
demands of creditors much more prominent than in the general EU institutional framework. In 
terms of macrostructures, Greece’s EMU membership has reshaped the country’s relationship 
with global financial markets. In terms of hegemonic competition, the emergence of the new, 
left-social-democratic force of SYRIZA was unable to find a new route for Greece in the 
context of the Troika’s institutional structure and the structure of global finance. 
Critical integration theory points to the enduring nature of hegemonic competition in 
European integration to explain the fundamental transformation in the Greek political 
economy, as well as the resilience of capitalist diversity in other member states. Rather than 
the embedding deeper neoliberal hegemony, or alternative the end of the neoliberal project, 
recent evolution and the current state of EU labour governance suggests a case of contested 
neoliberal dominance. The current state of EU labour governance is a case of contested 
neoliberal dominance as social democratic ideas provide an external competition: that is, 
competition over the appropriate role and design of government intervention in the market 
economy. The dominance of the neoliberal hegemonic project also faces internal competition, 
as the nationalist-neoliberal project has grown stronger in recent years.   
Outlining the key findings of the thesis and taking stock of the current state of EU 
labour governance, this conclusion has reiterated how the thesis has answered the research 
question on the evolution of EU labour governance. In particular, the thesis has stressed the 
importance of competing hegemonic projects that make EU labour governance a contentious 
project of European integration. In effect, it is a politically contested and mostly ineffective 
project for promoting economic convergence and stability. Under the condition of continuous 
hegemonic competition over labour governance, the EMU and Europe’s single currency has 
been unable to address enduring tendencies towards economic inequalities and political and 
economic instability. In the post-crisis period of contested neoliberal dominance, the EU has 
been able to inflict much greater social cost on crisis countries than previously. However, rather 
 
15 OECD Data – Household disposable income. https://data.oecd.org/hha/household-disposable-
income.htm 
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than assisting the EMU in delivering on the promise of real economic convergence, the current 
state of EU labour governance has worsened the destabilising effects of European integration.   
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Appendix 
Table 4.2 European Commission Communications on pay and wage issues 2008-2009 
 
Communication Title Theme 
(economic or 
social & 
employment) 
Labour costs  
 
 
Income, inequality 
COM(2008) 238  EMU@10: 
successes 
and 
challenges 
after 10 years 
of Economic 
and 
Monetary 
Union 
Economic Yes - highlights wage 
moderation 
'improvements', but 
'lasting differences' 
between member 
states (p. 5).  'Greater 
wage differentiation… 
instrumental in 
boosting 
competitiveness and 
allowing the smooth 
reallocation of 
resources in the event 
of shocks' (p. 9). 
Yes, linked to 
disappointing 
(productivity) 
growth, report 
acknowledges 
'concerns about the 
fairness of income 
and wealth 
distribution have 
grown' (p.2). 
COM(2008) 639 Commission 
Recommend
ation on the 
active 
inclusion of 
people 
excluded 
from the 
labour 
market 
Social & 
Employment 
No, only work/welfare 
incentives. 
Yes, income - but 
policy implications 
concern welfare 
restructuring: 'work 
needs to be more 
attractive than 
welfare' (p. 4). 
COM(2008) 706 From 
financial 
crisis to 
recovery: A 
European 
framework 
for action 
Economic No Yes - proposes 
efforts to support 
incomes, especially 
'at the lower end of 
the labour market' (p. 
7) 
COM(2008) 800  A European 
Economic 
Recovery 
Plan 
Economic Yes - urgent need to 
'reinforce the link 
between the wage 
setting mechanism and 
productivity 
developments' in 
countries with 
competitiveness 
problems (p. 10). 
Yes - 
recommendation to 
temporarily increase 
'transfers to the 
unemployed or low 
income households' 
(p. 8). 
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COM(2008) 868 New Skills 
for New 
Jobs: 
Anticipating 
and matching 
labour 
market and 
skills needs 
Social & 
Employment 
No. Yes, job polarization 
raises 'concerns 
about wage 
differentiations 
between jobs' which 
may cause higher 
inequality in income 
shares between high, 
middle, and low 
skilled workers (p. 
8).  
COM(2009) 79 Five years of 
an enlarged 
EU 
– Economic 
achievements 
and 
challenges 
Economic Yes - "wages have 
grown in excess of 
productivity in several 
countries, thereby 
leading to 
competitiveness 
losses" (p. 6). National 
reforms related to the 
completion of the 
single market 'pay a 
double dividend: they 
boost growth and job 
creation and promote 
macroeconomic 
stability by facilitating 
the better adjustment 
of wages and prices to 
shocks' (p 8). 
Yes, in terms of EU 
income convergence: 
'Sound fiscal policy 
is essential to 
maintaining macro-
financial stability and 
promoting 
integration and 
income convergence' 
(p.  
COM(2009) 257 A Shared 
Commitment 
for 
Employment 
Social & 
Employment 
Yes, but only non-
wage labour costs 
Yes - tax/benefit 
system must reform 
'to make work pay' 
and 'reducing 
disincentives to 
work' (p. 8). 
COM(2009) 527 Annual 
statement on 
the Euro 
area. 
Economic Yes -  reversal of 
'accumulated wage and 
cost divergences' 
protracted by 'lower 
potential growth, 
which limits the room 
available' (p. 7). 
Yes, income - 
'relative resilience of 
consumption has 
proved to be a 
stabilising factor 
during the recession, 
as disinflation and 
relief measures 
included in fiscal 
stimulus packages 
have supported 
household incomes' 
(2). 
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COM(2009) 649 The 
Employment 
Crisis. 
Trends, 
policy 
responses 
and key 
actions 
(background 
paper to the 
EPSCO 
Council) 
Social & 
Employment 
Yes: 'An enhanced and 
constructive dialogue 
with social partners is 
crucial also to ensure 
that 
wage developments 
are in line with 
productivity and 
sectoral and local 
labour market 
conditions' (p. 11). 
Yes - "many Member 
States have taken 
action to support the 
income of their most 
vulnerable citizens 
e.g. by increasing the 
level of minimum 
income or minimum 
wage, extending the 
coverage or duration 
of unemployment 
benefits…" (p.7). 
"Benefits are in some 
cases too low, or 
their duration very 
limited in time. On 
the other hand, the 
design and 
generosity of benefits 
need to be properly 
defined in order to 
limit disincentive 
effects to take up 
work for 
beneficiaries" (p. 9). 
 
 
Table 4.3 European Commission Communications on pay and wage issues 2010-2011 
 
Communication Title Theme 
(economic or 
social & 
employment) 
Labour costs  
 
 
Income, 
inequality 
COM(2010) 250 
final 
Reinforcing 
economic policy 
coordination 
ECO Yes - 'The 
economic and 
financial crisis has 
triggered a partial 
rebalancing of 
current accounts. 
But this rebalancing 
is only partly 
structural. Major 
policy reorientation 
is needed to bring 
about the necessary 
adjustment in terms 
of costs and wages, 
structural reform 
and reallocation 
employment and 
capital (p. 4)'. + 
proposes 
surveillance of , 
No 
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among other  
indicators, unit 
labour costs, to 
address 
'macroeconomic 
imbalances, 
including 
competitiveness 
developments and 
underlying 
structural 
challenges' (p. 6). 
COM(2010) 2020 Europe 2020 A 
strategy for 
smart, 
sustainable and 
inclusive growth 
ECO + 
Social&Empl 
No. Yes, member 
states need to 
'fully deploy their 
social security and 
pension systems 
to ensure adequate 
income support' 
(p. 19). Also: 'The 
number of 
Europeans living 
below the national 
poverty lines 
should be reduced 
by 25%' (p. 11).  
COM(2010) 367 
final 
Enhancing 
economic policy 
coordination for 
stability, growth 
and jobs – Tools 
for stronger EU 
economic 
governance 
ECO Yes - Depending on 
the nature of the 
imbalances 
identified in the 
Member State(s), 
the 
recommendations 
could address a 
broad range of 
policy issues 
covering 
macroeconomic 
policies, wages and 
labour markets (p. 
4) 
(Only in relation 
to fishermen and 
farmers' income, 
p. 10). 
 247 
COM(2010) 488 Broad economic 
policy guidelines 
ECO Yes - all 'Member 
States should 
encourage the right 
framework 
conditions for wage 
bargaining systems 
and labour cost 
developments 
consistent with 
price stability, 
productivity trends 
and the need to 
reduce external 
imbalances. Wage 
developments 
should take into 
account differences 
in skills and local 
labour market 
conditions' (p. 8). 
Euro area Member 
States with large 
and persistent 
current account 
deficits that are 
rooted in a 
persistent lack of 
competitiveness 
should achieve a 
significant yearly 
reduction in 
structural terms (8-
9). Those Euro area 
Member States 
should also aim to 
reduce real unit 
labour costs (p 9). 
Surplus countries 
should act on 
excessive inflation 
differentials.  
No, but stresses 
the need to tackle 
'structural 
unemployment 
and inactivity 
while ensuring 
adequate and 
sustainable social 
protection and 
active inclusion to 
reduce poverty' (p. 
6).  
COM(2010) 525 
final 
Proposal for a 
REGULATION 
OF THE 
EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE 
COUNCIL on 
enforcement 
measures to 
correct excessive 
macroeconomic 
imbalances in the 
euro area  
ECO Yes 'Depending on 
the nature of the 
imbalance, the 
policy prescriptions 
could potentially 
address fiscal, 
wage, 
macrostructural and 
macroprudential 
policy aspects 
under the control 
of government 
authorities' (p. 5). 
'Correction of 
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competitiveness 
and external 
imbalances requires 
significant changes 
in relative prices 
and 
costs and 
reallocation of 
demand and supply 
between the non-
tradable sector and 
the exports sector 
(p. 5-6).  
COM(2010) 526 
final 
Proposal for a 
REGULATION 
OF THE 
EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE 
COUNCIL 
amending 
Regulation (EC) 
No 1466/97 on 
the strengthening 
of the 
surveillance of 
budgetary 
positions and the 
surveillance and 
coordination of 
economic 
policies 
ECO No. No. 
COM(2010) 527 
final 
Proposal for a 
REGULATION 
OF THE 
EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE 
COUNCIL on 
the prevention 
and correction of 
macroeconomic 
imbalances 
ECO Yes, wages 
potentially part of 
macroeconomic 
imbalance 
governance 
No. 
COM(2010) 682 
final 
An Agenda for 
new skills and 
jobs: A European 
contribution 
towards full 
employment 
Social&Empl Yes - highlighting 
problem of low 
wage growth: 
"Wages have 
tended to grow 
below productivity 
in most Member 
States, and in-work 
poverty is 
persistent" (p. 14).  
Yes, in-work 
poverty a 
consequenceof 
low wage growth 
 249 
COM(2010) 758 The European 
Platform against 
Poverty and 
Social Exclusion: 
A European 
framework for 
social and 
territorial 
cohesion 
Social&Empl Yes - "Since 2000, 
the number of 
individuals affected 
by in-work poverty 
has increased as a 
consequence of the 
rise in temporary 
and part-time work 
(including 
involuntary part-
time work), coupled 
at times with 
stagnating wages" 
(p. 4) 
 
 
(2010/707/EU) 
COUNCIL 
DECISION of 21 
October 2010 on 
guidelines for the 
employment 
policies of the 
Member States 
Social&Empl Yes - "In order to 
increase 
competitiveness 
and raise 
participation levels, 
particularly for the 
low-skilled... 
Member States 
should encourage 
the right framework 
conditions for wage 
bargaining and 
labour cost 
development 
consistent with 
price stability and 
productivity trends" 
(p. 4). 
Yes, Member 
States’ reforms 
should therefore 
ensure access and 
opportunities for 
all throughout 
their lifecycle, 
thus reducing 
poverty and social 
exclusion through 
removing barriers 
to labour market 
participation... 
(F)ighting 
segmentation, 
structural 
unemployment, 
youth 
unemployment, 
and inactivity 
while ensuring 
adequate, 
sustainable social 
protection and 
active inclusion to 
prevent and 
reduce poverty, 
with particular 
attention to 
combating in-
work poverty (p. 
2). "Empowering 
people and 
promoting labour 
market 
participation for 
those furthest 
away from the 
labour market 
while preventing 
in-work poverty 
 250 
will help fight 
social 
exclusion..." (p. 
5).  
COM(2011) 11 
final/2 
Annual Growth 
Survey: 
advancing the 
EU's 
comprehensive 
response to the 
crisis 
 "Member States 
with large current 
account deficits and 
high levels of 
indebtedness should 
present concrete 
corrective measures 
(these could include 
strict and sustained 
wage moderation, 
including the 
revision of 
indexation clauses 
in bargaining 
systems)" (p. 5).  
 
COM(2011) 400 Concluding the 
first European 
semester of 
economic policy 
coordination: 
Guidance for 
national policies 
in 2011-2012 
 Yes - "In some 
instances, this may 
involve reviewing 
wage-setting 
systems, in 
consultation with 
social partners, to 
ensure that wages 
support 
competitiveness 
and develop in line 
with productivity 
growth." (p.6) 
 
 
 
